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Learning was an important trope in the literature of the Victorian period, particularly to 
the extent that it shaped subjectivity.  Alongside such textual elements as voice, 
character, and setting, the theme of learning responded to the historical and institutional 
forces exerted upon human existence in this phase of British history.  In this period, a 
new consciousness of political and cultural possibility permeated the social field.  This 
new consciousness was largely democratic and often made gestures towards the 
universal.  Learning was a significant means through which many Victorian writers 
sought to negotiate the gap between individual experience and this larger social horizon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There is a thirty-year debate about the formation of literature as an “instrument of 
learning” (Robert A. Colby, 14).  According to Colby’s book Fiction With a Purpose:  
Major and Minor Nineteenth-century Novels, the educative role of literature was a 
development of nineteenth-century English literature accompanied by an “extension of 
the role of the author.”  This assertion is consistent with both the popularization of the 
novel and the consolidation of realism as a genre.  Colby quotes Dinah Mulock’s remarks 
regarding “the appearance of a really popular novel, the innumerable discussions it 
creates, and the general influence which it exercises in the public mind” (17).  At the 
same time, if literature could be viewed as a tool for learning, it was because it accurately 
depicted a way of life modeled on the school:  “the nineteenth-century novelist believed 
that art was didactic precisely because life, which it imitated, was didactic” (24).  Thus 
many leading writers of the period “assumed . . . that life amply and correctly represented 
yields its own ‘message.’”  In this formulation, author and reader, text and life, 
collaborated in an undertaking the main goal of which was to learn something about the 
changing shape of social life.   
At least one critic has challenged the thrust of Colby’s book.  In an essay titled 
“Learning from Literature,” Peter Lamarque moves the discussion to consider literature 
in general, though he examines Our Mutual Friend in particular.  He contends that 
literature is first of all an aesthetic phenomenon.  Thus its value is not determined 
primarily in relation to some conception of truth.  In other words, “what we learn from 
works of literature is not a measure of their greatness, as it might be a measure of 
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philosophical value” (21-22).   Displaying a deep concern for the final cause of literature, 
Lamarque observes that we “cannot infer that learning is a goal of fiction.”  Lamarque 
asserts that, while one may of course learn from literature as a result of reading, such a 
result is secondary and, indeed, not necessarily even intentional.  This possibility is 
consistent with the general structure of learning, which “does not [per se] need to be 
directed, purposeful, self-reflective, or rational.”  Learning is not the same as volition or 
consciousness.  To this, one might add that learning has an unquestionably positive 
valuation only in a society which, like Victorian society, places a high premium on 
institutions and on conformity (someone like Mr. Krook in Bleak House, who is afraid to 
learn writing from anyone lest they teach him wrong, provides an exception).   
Yet this line of reasoning leaves unanswered a question about the model of 
reading which Lamarque proposes.  To reiterate, for Lamarque, the project of literature is 
not first of all a knowledge project.  Thus he dismisses the ‘defenses of poetry’ because 
they “have repeatedly attempted to assimilate the literary enterprise into something like 
the philosophical one.”  Such theoretical gestures imply that “the only value is the value 
that knowledge gives.”    What then is the function of literature and what is the proper 
way to interact with it?  In Lamarque’s view, the medium of literature is “verbal artifice, 
which invites a distinctive mode of appreciation unlike that associated with philosophy or 
science.”  The deployment of the term “artifice” is important in this context, as it 
suggests the sense that literary works don’t necessarily reveal their content in 
straightforward or informational ways and that literature might, in fact, be entirely 
resistant to cooptation by the category of truth.  One can either, with Plato, use this 
dimension of art as grounds for banishing the poets from the republic, or, with Adorno, 
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highlight the great importance which subjective phenomena hold for any consideration of 
its complement, objectivity.  Nonetheless, what we are to do with or in literature is 
different from what we do in philosophy:  we don’t, as with the latter, learn its truth, we 
appreciate its “greatness,” according to Lamarque. 
This debate about the proper uses of literature, though somewhat relevant to the 
topic of the present study, is really one step removed from its basic assumptions.  Once 
the writers of the nineteenth century take up learning as a theme deserving of serious 
consideration, learning becomes, as it were, fair game for critical commentary.  Though 
one may object that learning had been considered for some time before the nineteenth 
century a legitimate topic of literary discourse, that argument must be qualified by 
reference to several examples.   
In general, before the Renaissance, and, indeed, even during the Renaissance, 
learning was a pursuit secondary in importance to training in arms for the youth.1
                                                 
1 Thus Alan Young writes in Tudor and Jacobean Tournaments that the money allotted by courts to 
tournaments “far surpassed that spent on disguising, pageants, masques, and plays” (7). 
  
Though one might refer to The Tempest, as Peter Greenaway has done in the movie 
Prospero’s Books, as an example of the importance of learning for stately life and culture 
in the Renaissance period, it should be apparent that the emphasis placed upon Prospero’s 
library is primary only in the modern reading of Shakespeare.  In the Jacobean period, 
Jonson’s Epicoene or The Silent Woman provides an example in the character of Jack 
Daw of how learning and the ignorance which learning sometimes implies could easily 
become a target of ridicule.  In the Romantic period, as I discuss in the chapter on Lewis 
Carroll, genius could be foreshadowed more easily than created by a process that 
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involved real difficulty.  Thus learning resulted from sudden insight and encounter more 
than from practice and dull repetition.  There was, perhaps, a change in the valorization 
given to learning during the Restoration, but in general learning had not been particularly 
exalted in the English-speaking world.      
The purpose of my dissertation is to map the discourse of learning in the literature 
of the Victorian period and to examine how this discourse inflected subjectivity.  By 
subjectivity, I mean that notion of self which serves to negotiate the relation between the 
individual and some larger social horizon.  Such a study therefore necessitates some 
knowledge of and reference to the larger context of Victorian culture.  Of what 
significance is it that Edward Rochester’s first bride is from the West Indies, for 
example?  How does Jane Eyre’s learning inflect her presence within an estate with 
colonial connections?  How do Silas Wegg’s attempts at reading shape our understanding 
of the novel’s own claim to literariness? 
These are the kinds of questions I have braved to ask, and they are questions 
which extend formalist notions of plot and theme, character and setting, to the point 
where it becomes necessary to ask about the world of sociological knowledge before 
turning back to the aesthetic qualities of a given work of literature.  At the same time, as 
the chapter titled “The Moment of Alice:  Rules and Gentlemanly Learning in the 
Victorian Period” suggests, the preoccupation with the aesthetics of literature itself 
represents a shift from other paradigms, in which criticism of social conditions is a more 
or less normative feature of artistic and interpretive projects.   
Whether we discuss literature which tends towards the critical or towards the 
fictional, the problem remains of defining subjectivity in a satisfactory manner.  Aside 
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from all the demarcations according to which we say that subjectivity is determined—
demarcations of class, gender, or some other stratification—the concept of subjectivity is 
relatively straightforward.  In what she describes as a pragmatist approach, Regenia 
Gagnier has surveyed literally hundreds of Victorian-era autobiographies to arrive at 
some solid conception of “an economy of self” (249).  The results of her research are 
presented in the book Subjectivities:  A History of Self-Represenation in Britain, 1832-
1920.  By focusing on first-hand accounts—autobiographies, in other words—Gagnier 
has sought, in solid empirical fashion, to discover something like the truth of lived 
experience in the Victorian period, “of what it was like to be a Victorian gentleman, lady, 
midwife, carpenter, mudlark, barrister, or nurse” (3).   
 Though it would be easy enough to take from this quote the notion that 
subjectivity is simply a matter of self-representation and therefore susceptible (subject) to 
the contingencies of narcissism or other varieties of exaggeration, Gagnier is also careful 
to identify the other side of subjectivity.  She writes, “simultaneously, the subject is a 
subject to, and of others; in fact, it is often an “Other” to others, which also affects its 
sense of its own subjectivity” (8).  At this point, her definition of subject as a self or an 
agent which is nonetheless communal begins to take on resonances with Jonathan Arac’s 
notion of the “commissioned spirit,” a subjectivity no doubt privileged in many respects, 
but also responsible to the society of which he or she forms a part.  In Commissioned 
Spirits:  The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickens, Carlyle, Melville, and Hawthorne, 
Arac explains that the commissioned spirit is the writer who possesses a new capacity of 
vision:  “surveying from above, the narrator turns to his audience and reflects at once on 
the world he has created within the novel and the world he claims to be representing” (5).  
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In order to further support this idea, Arac provides a quote from Henry James—next in 
line after Eliot in F. R. Leavis’s “great tradition”—which describes “that vivid show of a 
society trying to build itself, with every elaboration, into some coherent sense of itself.”  
In this passage too, the importance for subjectivity of the context of observed experience 
is presaged.          
In sum, subjectivity is a codeword for the negotiation between self, artistic vision, 
and society, a negotiation particularly important for understanding English literary 
culture.  Readers of Althusser or Lacan will be familiar with the way in which modern 
theorists of subjectivity have sought to show that, in the context of subjectivity, the self is 
a fiction, determined in part by the vagaries of the imagination.  Perhaps it is needless to 
say that such a description does not imply that the self is either false or unreal.   
True and false, real or unreal:  these are not, however, the binaries which best 
define the fiction of the self (subjectivity) and its operations or existence.  It is more 
appropriate to understand the self and its fictions as a process in the making on the one 
hand and as an inadequation to the totality of which it is a part on the other.  To 
paraphrase a modern theorist, the parts do not add up to the whole.  It is on this point, 
finally, that I place the stakes of my manuscript:  namely, while I am indebted to ways 
other critics such as Arac and Gagnier have envisioned the self and subjectivity, I also 
want to suggest that it is precisely the lack inherent to subjectivity which makes a more or 
less political reading of literature possible.  What I mean by a “political reading” is not 
only the more narrow sense of an investigation into for example, the fact that Benjamin 
Disraeli, the novelist, was also Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime Minister.  Rather, I mean an 
enquiry into the totality of “real conditions” under which individuals live, along with the 
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alliances and antagonisms which they form in struggling with those conditions.  Thus 
subjectivity raises the question of how to imagine the world and how to respond to that 
representation, even in the knowledge that it must, by definition, be particular and, hence, 
incomplete.        
In our readings, then, we must keep in mind at the same time both the fictional 
work before our eyes, with all of its formal properties, and our best approximation of the 
work’s entire historical underpinning.  This is not to say, to repeat a longstanding worry, 
that literature is simply derivative of history or that it is simply of its time.  Rather, it is to 
say that one way we can understand the value of literature is by examining how it 
formulates a poetic vision of history, how it uses the devices available to fiction—irony, 
character, plot—to create a unique articulation of history’s meaning.  Thus we must treat 
the particularity of any such articulation as valuable and revealing of a cosmography 
which is ultimately irreducible to some other telling of historical narrative or to the 
critical statements which can be made about it.  
Yet what is the whole, the “totality,” to use Arac’s phrase, which literary vision 
fails to capture?  In the Victorian era, we might say that the whole was that specific 
agglomeration of rising industrialism, maritime mercantilism, scientific discovery, and 
the disciplinary urban society which heavily inflected the British experience between the 
Napoleonic Wars and the recrudescent imperial aggressions of the 1870s.  Throughout 
the dissertation, I discuss ways in which writers approximated some aspect of this cluster 
by deploying the trope of learning.  That is to say, learning repeatedly appears as a sort of 
compensation for the distance between the fictional character and that unattainable fully 
omniscient view which would defy the very conditions for the possibility of discourse.  
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For example, though Dorothea Brooke “yearned . . . after some lofty conception of the 
world which might frankly include the parish of Tipton and her own rule of conduct 
there,” that conception’s elusiveness is, one might say, precisely what allows for her 
struggle to be narrated.    
To provide a different example of a compensating distance, one of the effects of 
the period of reaction against Napoleonism was a deepening acknowledgement of the 
necessity for an expansive and inclusive English culture.  This need was registered not 
least of all in Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, which sought the consolidation of 
national cultural institutions and the formation of criticism in particular.  I argue below 
that Carlyle developed his approach to criticism by incorporating both antagonism and 
distancing in his writing.  I argue further that the class issues which underpin Carlyle’s 
text are consistent with the development of a democratic consciousness in the same era.  
Given what I have already observed concerning the notion of subjectivity, it should 
perhaps come as no surprise that Sartor Resartus, in my reading, gives only a partial and 
ambiguous revelation of the new doctrine of democracy, and only partially addresses the 
demands of the latter.  Nonetheless Carlyle affords us with a narrative perspective that 
sweeps across many segments of Victorian society, finally imagining a battle between 
two sides determining “which ought to look down and which up.”    
 
 I have focused primarily on five texts from the Victorian period that take up the 
question of learning in some sense:  in addition to Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, 
Charlotte Brönte’s Jane Eyre, Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories, Charles Dickens’s Our 
Mutual Friend, and George Eliot’s Middlemarch constitute the centerpieces of my study.  
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To these works I have posed a series of questions about the relationship between 
learning, literature, and subjectivity.  What was the role of literature and learning in 
shaping notions of self?  How were ideas about character or aesthetics inflected by class 
and other identity markers in nineteenth-century literature?  And what new forms of 
pedagogical concerns and techniques emerged during this period, and with what 
historical precursors and effects?            
 I have then proceeded to ask periodizing questions about the way learning helped 
to shape subjectivity.  The works around which I have formed my study were written in 
the period from 1833 to 1869.  Nonetheless, all of these texts address the theme of 
learning in more or less explicit ways, which suggests its growing importance to a society 
that was becoming increasingly professionalized and urbanized.     
 Written in the historical context of debates about the possibilities and difficulties 
of employment for the accomplished woman, Jane Eyre, the focus of my second chapter, 
asks about the mutual inflections of class and gender in nineteenth-century England.  
Pursuing Laura Morgan Green’s assertion that “Jane Eyre poses for its protagonist a 
series of alternative pedagogies by which to achieve . . . ambition,” I examine Jane’s 
pedagogical options in the light of the larger narrative structure.  That larger structure is 
informed by the colonial relationship between England and both the West Indies and 
India.  Mr. Rochester’s past is intertwined with the former, St. John Rivers’s with the 
latter.  One could say that Jane’s preference for Mr. Rochester represents a solid break 
with both Jane’s evangelical education and the English colonial mission. 
 The third chapter, “The ‘True Golden Gold’:  Exchange, Counterfeit, and 
Learning in Our Mutual Friend,” examines Charles Dickens’s last completed novel.  I try 
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to make the claim that the novel refuses the counterfeit in order to champion authenticity 
in learning.  Authenticity is not, generally, the possession of any particular character, 
though several characters display authenticity at different points in the plot.  What I take 
to be the surprising discovery made by my research is that authenticity takes on an 
important role precisely in the context of a society which engages in the process of 
speculation and monetary exchange.  Thus learning is bound up in complex ways with 
the way the novel imagines the social life of London as a financial center.    
 In the fourth chapter, learning becomes disinterested and the female child 
becomes emblematic of selfless learning.  Yet Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories problematize 
this figuration.  In order to examine the position of the child in relation to learning, I 
claim that Carroll produces a contradictory child figure.  On the one hand, this figure 
belongs to a tradition in which the child is earnest and agreeable.  Furthermore, the 
repeated invocation of games in the stories suggests an arena of competition free from 
any social determinant other than skill.  But the games always go wrong, the rules are 
constantly compromised, and the child is subject to outbursts.  As a result, I conclude that 
Carroll is an author who resisted the notion that the child could stand both for innocence 
and for a universal, harmonious culture.   
 The development of what we might today call structural biology is one of the 
driving forces of the narrative of Middlemarch.  In my fifth chapter, “The Fateful 
Strength of Metaphors:  Middlemarch and Intellectual Passion,” I investigate the 
metaphor which likens such scientific knowledge to romance.  By way of close reading, I 
suggest that this metaphor is consistent with the era’s “(relative) democratization of 
learning across the genders and the anxieties which attended that process.”  I furthermore 
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show that the narrator figures herself as feminine in an attempt to distinguish herself from 
the frivolous character Rosamond and to show that, as a woman, she (the narrator) is both 
competent to aspire to and wary of the pitfalls of a learning which is simultaneously 
scientific and masculine.         
 Throughout my study, I have attempted to understand learning as a phenomena 
that is material, historical, and also discursive.  In doing so, I have followed in the 
footsteps of those who have viewed literature as an institution.  Yet the project of 
understanding literature as an institution, and, in the case of Victorian literature, as an 
institution of industrial society, means coming to terms with a certain contradiction.  One 
might simply describe it as the tension between freedom and constraint.  As I mention 
several times in the body of the manuscript, authorship in the nineteenth century was 
frequently described in terms of genius, originality, and innovation.  Artistic creation 
seemed far removed from any systemic determination of utterances or institutional limits 
of discourse.  Yet the existence of a relation between these is what I propose and what I 
have sought to elicit, with whatever degree of success, in what follows.    In doing so, I 
hope I have preserved some sense of the importance of both historical structures and 
individual imagination.    
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
Didactic Destiny:  Sartor Resartus and the Institution of Criticism 
 
 Sartor Resartus is an allegory of the formation of modern criticism.  In one of 
Thomas Carlyle’s first book-length works, the cenobite, as a representative member of 
modern culture and its institutions, learns to incorporate the eremite or the prophet into a 
new national life.  The eremite is integrated into the national culture, but at a remove 
from it.  In the process, the eremite—that is, Teufelsdröckh—imparts his sense of 
distance to the institutions, and specifically the institution of criticism.  Or, to say the 
same thing in other words, the institution of criticism absorbs and responds to something 
of the character of the prophet: namely, the distancing  which the latter figure implies. 
Sartor therefore envisions a modern cultural formation from which not even the 
sage escapes.  Thus the spatial metaphor which dominates the book is one of totality.  
Yet, while  Sartor teaches the value of theoretical holism, it also strains under the burden 
of that “Philosophy of Things in General” which Herr Teufelsdröckh professes.   With its 
bending and circuitous reasoning, Teufelsdröckh’s writing elaborates a social philosophy 
which shows that the old society must undergo a “Phoenix Death-Birth” which will give 
rise to a new one.  If Carlyle’s readership was still relatively small when he published 
Sartor Resartus, it is nonetheless undeniable that his insights into “British Criticism” 
were prescient.  The central problem which the book raises—that of criticism itself—has 
retained currency down to our own era, and has become perhaps only more perplexing 
since the first half of the nineteenth century.  
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In some senses, criticism has become a catch-all phrase that addresses any 
number of contradictions or opposites and attempts to place them in conjunction with one 
another.  I have chosen to write about Sartor, as well as several other Carlyle texts, 
because it is one of the first publications originating in the post-Napoleonic era to 
specifically address the problem of criticism and to do so in a way that represented 
criticism as an accessory to a number of mutually inflecting developments.  My 
preliminary thesis about the character of criticism holds that it is the site of antagonism 
and of distancing.  This antagonistic character of criticism, in turn, is largely consistent 
with the democratic turn taken in European and Atlantic politics in the first part of the 
nineteenth century.  It thus becomes part of my larger argument that the world Carlyle 
was attempting to represent in the book—one hesitates to call it a novel—was the world 
of agitation for voter reform in the post-Napoleonic era.    
One of the grievances for such reform urged the lowering or elimination of the 
property qualification.  Thus, an early antagonism which informs the history of criticism 
is the antagonism between rich and poor, or to use Carlyle’s phraseology, between 
dandies and drudges.  One of the contradictions which subsequently informs the text is 
that both Teufelsdröckh and the Editor, as intellectuals, can claim membership to either 
faction only on a precarious basis.  Yet for the Editor it seems as important to join the 
battle as it is to report on it.  In Raymond Williams’s rereading of Carlyle, and in later 
appropriations of Williams, this antagonism has been rewritten as that between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie.  As a result, the specific details of Carlyle’s texts have 
sometimes become less important for contemporary readers of Carlyle who position him 
in a relation that makes him antagonistic to a specific position within the relations of 
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production.  Perhaps a more careful tracing of the stakes of Carlyle’s works has been 
performed by James Eli Adams, who has pointed out that there are really two types of 
hero in Carlyle’s literary imagination:  the eremite, the prophetic outsider, and the 
cenobite, who has developed the tact, flexibility, and sociability to work within the 
institutional setting.  It is perhaps in this context that we can best observe and apply the 
terms frequently derived from Williams, which posit a hegemonic society and an 
oppositional culture.  These latter perspectives, by extension, tend to emphasize the 
marginal status of the “cultural critique” offered by Carlyle.  But, if we are to read Sartor 
Resartus as an allegory of criticism—that is, of criticism as an institution—in the line of 
succession which Williams reconstructs from the history of English letters, it is perhaps 
necessary to bracket the motifs of domination, centrality, and marginality, if only for a 
brief moment.  Though these terms, in more or less contemporary discussions, are 
intertwined with important connotations around the notion of class, the more important 
insight for me is that, in my reading of Carlyle, criticism implies something else:  it 
implies antagonism, totality, and distance.   
 I have suggested that criticism as a problem continues to have currency in 
contemporary debates.  In his essay “From Non-Fiction Prose’ to ‘Cultural Criticism’: 
Genre and Disciplinarity in Victorian Studies,” Stefan Collini has focused on the 
ambivalent position of criticism within the field of English Studies.  According to Collini, 
the problem with a writer like Thomas Carlyle is that, as a non-fiction prose writer, he 
doesn’t fit into the literary paradigm later developed by T. S. Eliot and the New Critics, a 
paradigm which celebrated the elements of literature typically associated with fiction.  
Collini explains that “a defining property of the New Critical conception of ‘literature’ 
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was precisely that it was non-propositional, that literature achieved its effects (and its 
status) by its enactment of tension, ambiguity, irony, and so on,” rather than by means of 
its directly indicative statements (17).  And since the former were characteristics 
primarily of fiction, it is only with difficulty that Carlyle’s works could be considered 
literature.  Sartor may be something of an exception because it is at least partly fictional.   
The attention which Collini brings to the critical paradigm established by the New 
Critics provides the ground for only one of his arguments, however:  the New Critics 
aside, Collini has also set as his goal a settling of accounts with those who, following the 
writings of Raymond Williams, invoke the phrase “cultural critique” to describe the 
intellectual work of a number of Victorian thinkers, Carlyle included.  Regarding this 
cohort, Collini’s argument is rather devastating because it seems to imply that if we so 
much as mobilize the term “cultural criticism” in our pedagogical vocabulary, we run the 
risk of creating confusion between Victorian Moralists and “campus radicals,” whom 
Collini describes as “manqué.”  Thus Collini writes that “the category of ‘cultural 
criticism’ risks turning them [the Victorian Sages] into campus radicals manqué, whose 
intentions adumbrate a rather primitive critique of bourgeois society while failing to 
appreciate the more insidiously coercive power of hegemony” (27).  This risk, according 
to Collini, follows from the discursive structure of Culture and Society itself, in which the 
two terms of the title, society and culture, are anchored into a relationship that posits 
them as either hegemonic or resistant to hegemony.  Other authors, such as Gerald Graff 
and Bruce Robbins, have joined the discussion by replying that contention is precisely 
one of the defining aspects of cultural studies today and that there is no reason to 
privilege the call for a more reserved model of scholarship voiced by Collini and others. 
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I have written elsewhere about the debates in the past several decades concerning 
the evolution of literary and cultural studies, as well as Carlyle’s position within the 
debate about that evolution.  What I wish to do on the present occasion is something 
slightly different.  In effect, there are three purposes to the present chapter.  First, I want 
to narrate a process of learning—specifically, the process whereby the cenobite learns to 
integrate the eremite into modern cultural institutions and the institution of criticism 
specifically.  Second, I want to show how this integration nonetheless implies the 
sublation or the suspension of elements of antagonism and of distance within the 
institution of criticism.  In other words, I suggest that there is a larger setting and 
resonance around the narrative of the Editor and Teufelsdröckh, cenobite and eremite 
respectively, which inflects not just individual but institutional subjectivity.  Finally, I 
want to say something about the context for the development of criticism in the early 
nineteenth century, though in some respects I can make only educated guesses about that 
context. 
 
Learning and the Crisis of Communal Religion 
 For Carlyle, the most pressing need for a reconstitution of national culture 
stemmed from the crisis he detected in religious life.  He believed that organized religion 
had universally failed in the eighteenth century but he also felt that all of human life, 
even in the nineteenth century, could be properly understood as religious.  This 
contradiction should key the reader in to the fact that whatever cultural innovation 
Carlyle made would likely be shaped by the universalizing and totalizing motifs typical 
of much Christian religion.  In a manner at odds with the trend toward free inquiry in the 
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nineteenth century, Carlyle opposed the autonomy of the intellect and intellectual 
freedom to the “moral feelings” of more religious periods (Lippincott 6).   
 Whatever he saw, in most of his writings, was furthermore colored by a lens that 
interpreted in religious terms.  His religious philosophy, according to Richard Bishirjian, 
is the twin of Carlyle’s social vision:  “Carlyle himself understood his social vision . . . to 
be in essence a religious vision” (95).  Bishirjian furthermore concludes his essay on 
“Carlyle’s Political Religion” by asserting that “at the transition in English culture 
between religious and secular Messianism stands the figure of Thomas Carlyle” (113).    
 In understanding the writings of Carlyle, then, it is of the greatest importance to 
keep in mind their double nature, which is simultaneously secular and religious, as well 
as Messianic and totalitarian.  One way to read Sartor Resartus might explore the 
possibility that it substitutes the secular for the religious and the Spirit for the Letter.  
Tellingly, this is nowhere better articulated than in the chapter “Pedagogy”:  “first must 
the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead and drop piecemeal into dust, if the living 
Spirit of Religion, freed from its charnel house, is to arise on us, newborn of Heaven” 
(147).   
This substitution of Letter by Spirit is registered as a radical change in the 
condition and experience of language as much as of religion: the “Letter,” which can be 
read metonymically as the linguistic field itself, is dead, and must confess as much, 
before departing and being replaced by “Spirit.”  Teufelsdröckh’s doctrine about the 
primacy of the “Spirit” of religion over the “Letter” extends so far as to suggest that the 
entire vocabulary which has described religious experience must be abandoned; it must, 
in Carlyle’s words, “drop piecemeal into dust” (147).  The scope of the problem is 
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important.  It is not this or that particular practice of any specific church which must be 
reformed, but religion in its totality.  This demonstrates the width of the crisis as Carlyle 
understood it and gives an early intimation about the limits of religion traditionally 
understood.  Carlyle is writing on the cusp of the crisis, and so he can only transcend 
those limits with difficulty.  At the same time, because the crisis will involve a real 
rupture, its resolution may render the earlier letter—that is, earlier language—nearly 
incomprehensible.  In other words, Carlyle’s project entails a complete transformation, a 
jump from one semantic paradigm to another, from which viewpoint the earlier paradigm 
may be only barely recognizable.  How to make the transition between the two paradigms 
is what the Editor learns from Teufelsdröckh. 
 Carlyle’s sensitivity to the connections between religion and language bears upon 
his contribution to criticism as an institution.  In the quotation from the chapter on 
“Pedagogy” above—and criticism can be thought of as a pedagogical institution—Carlyle 
frames the religious question of his time, his era’s “Purgatory” of “Unbelief,” as 
essentially linguistic:  the sharp criticism which Carlyle makes of traditional religion 
stems from the ragged condition of its semiotic dress, the “Letter of Religion.”  A new 
language and a new letter must be invented, and criticism will be part of that invention. 
 Sartor Resartus, then, represents an attempt to navigate the “crisis of religion” 
which Collini has identified as one of the formative factors in the public sphere of 
nineteenth-century England.  The text suggests that, while a return to earlier forms of 
dogmatic belief is impossible and undesirable, some elements of religion need to be 
retained.  In the chapter which describes Teufelsdröckh’s conversion experience, “The 
Everlasting No,” the Editor first recounts the period of deep questioning which 
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Teufelsdröckh underwent before his conversion.  In commenting on this narrative, the 
Editor emphasizes Teufelsdröckh’s skeptical mode of thinking during this period:  
“perhaps at no era of his life was he more decisively the Servant of Goodness, the 
Servant of God, than even now when doubting God’s existence” (207).  In this chapter, 
which is usually considered to be the most important of the autobiographical chapters of 
the work, questioning and doubt are discussed as if they are actions mandated by God, 
though they are also modes of inquiry which have the capacity to significantly alter long-
standing beliefs about the nature and the status of the Deity.  But by making the Deity out 
to be the mouthpiece of a “doubting skepticism,” Carlyle emphasizes the continuity that 
will persist between religion and criticism as a secular institution. 
  To give one example, the Editor poses questions about Teufelsdröckh’s religious 
conversion.  The Editor asks how important the conversion experience was, hinting 
therefore that there may be a danger in fully accepting the terms in which it has been 
described.  “Was ‘that high moment in the Rue de l’Enfer,” wonders the Editor, “properly 
the turning point of the battle”? (234).  Thus the Editor displays the potential for distance 
upon which the institution of criticism relies.  And the Editor’s frustration that 
Teufelsdröckh offers “no clear logical picture” intimates that there may be other ways of 
interpreting Teufelsdröckh’s experience.  These moments emphasize the distancing and 
sometimes skeptical attitudes which criticism must embrace.  Thus, while the Editor 
integrates Teufelsdröckh’s experience into his own work of criticism, he also sets himself 
apart from those experiences and asks incisive questions about them. 
 To emphasize the importance of the continuity between religion and the 
institution of criticism, or rather, the way that criticism tries to compensate for the 
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fragmenting of communal religion, what I want to suggest is that the vision of personal 
religious experience outlined in Sartor Resartus nonetheless dovetails with the liberal 
ideology of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, which also placed great emphasis on the 
philosophical category of the individual.  Such an individual would expedite the 
functioning of an industrial society dependent upon the quantitative calculations of an 
early mass-production economy.  Recognizing the centrality of the concept of the 
individual to the ascendant bourgeoisie helps to further delimit Carlyle’s critical vision, 
for it sought to bridge the distance between the individual and the community. 
 If Victorian cultural criticism was, as Andy Green has suggested, in fact largely a 
conservative reaction to the industrial capitalists’ hegemony, then the religion Carlyle 
denounced—that which must pronounce itself “dead”—was largely a result of that 
ascendance:  though still present in society, the other, communal religion no longer 
exerted the kind of influence it once had.  Perhaps one of the most obvious points of 
contention in debates between the two was on the issue of free inquiry, especially 
empiricism, and the role of experience in relation to authority and knowledge.  These 
were issues that had been raised time and again since the Middle Ages, but the rapid 
advance in science, pure and applied, in the nineteenth century no doubt made them 
unavoidable.  Asa Briggs has written that “belief in free discussion and inquiry” was one 
of the formative factors of mid-nineteenth century social life in England (4).  And 
Carlyle’s mouthpiece in Sartor Resartus, Teufelsdröckh, satirizes the empiricist assault on 
religion when he observes that “men ask now: ‘Where is the Godhead; our eyes never 
saw him?’” (207).  The question is somewhat of an exaggeration of empiricism as a 
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philosophy of science, though it does show the logic of a position which holds that we 
can only know things which we perceive with our senses. 
There are obviously difficulties and a great deal of simplification in the empiricist 
position as represented by Teufelsdröckh.  But it’s not too much to infer that the 
individual experience which Teufelsdröckh views as so important in understanding the 
very substance of religion is likewise promoted both by a social paradigm in which 
humans are viewed as atomistic units within an economic calculus and by empirical 
science.  Though empirical science and political economy may have done much to 
undermine the conceits of orthodox religion, they did not, Carlyle saw, do enough to 
compensate for the loss of social vision which the church provided in earlier times.  Even 
the development of individualistic conceptions of religion could sometimes obstruct the 
development of a social institution which would offer instruction in “moral feelings.”  
Carlyle’s solution was to imagine a criticism that would temper the individualizing 
tendencies of his era. 
  
From our perspective, it’s perhaps difficult to grasp the extent to which religion 
was intertwined with other cultural institutions in nineteenth-century Britain.  And it’s 
difficult to measure the extent of the crisis in religion.  But clearly, the question of 
religion was a widespread one in Carlyle’s era; it was raised in several intellectual and 
institutional debates.  An examination of one of these will help further contextualize the 
emergence of Carlyle’s notions of criticism and learning.   
The first few decades of the nineteenth century were, in Scotland at least, a 
moment of debate about the character of education.  The dynamics of the interplaying 
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forces in this period can be introduced by way of reference to the discussions around and 
findings of the Royal Commission which in 1826 was tasked with reporting on and 
reforming the Scottish University System, of which Carlyle himself was a product.  By 
recounting some of the tendencies within Scottish education and culture to which the 
reports of the commission point, I hope to suggest that Carlyle’s shaping of a criticism 
that depended largely on a vision of totality was not entirely surprising. 
The controversy over the Scottish Universities began as a concern over financial 
and administrative duties, but the Commissioners were quick “to pry into the curriculum 
and to criticize severely an academic inheritance . . . of which the Scots themselves for 
the most part were very proud indeed” (Davie 26).  The controversy about the curriculum 
tended to divide the Commissioners as well as the parliament and the Scottish 
professoriate into two large tents:  one camp privileged education that is popular, holistic, 
and religious; the other preferred education that is elitist, professional, and secular.  In 
defending the customary way of educating the college students within the Scottish 
University system, Carlyle’s friend, Francis Jeffrey, stated that the benefit of the general 
education afforded by the Universities was that it allowed “large numbers of people to 
get—not indeed profound [or specialized] learning, for that is not to be spoken of—but 
that knowledge which tends to liberalize and make intelligent the mass of our population” 
(quoted in Davie, 27, emphasis added).  The view about the appropriate aim of education 
here expressed by Jeffrey has direct correlations to those which Carlyle conveyed to 
Ralph Waldo Emerson in the same period.  Regarding Emerson’s Second Series, Carlyle 
had written the author “Why won’t you come and help us then?  We have terrible need of 
one man like you down among us!” (in Harris, 50).  Thus Carlyle provided Emerson with 
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an early intimation of the evolution in his thinking whereby the exiled prophet would 
become the integrated and integral heroic statesman.  Like the witness to the Royal 
Commission, Carlyle believed that the appropriate location and concern for the priest or 
teacher was among the masses, here represented as a needful “us.” 
Also opposing the bill to reform the Scottish Universities, two members of the 
Commission, both of whom were important figures in the Church of Scotland, argued 
that “the proper order in education was that broad views should form the preliminary 
descent to the minutiae” (31).  Voicing the opposing opinion were men like Archdeacon 
Williams, Rector of Edinburgh academy, who believed that the curriculum of the Scottish 
Universities should be reformed on the model of the ancient English Universities.  Under 
this proposal, philosophy would no longer play the central role in the Scottish College 
Curriculum.  The bill for reform was presented in 1834, but the outcry threatened a 
political crisis between England and Scotland and the matter was dropped for the time.    
Although this narrative underemphasizes the degree to which the primary aim of 
the reformers was to substitute Greek language study for philosophy at the center of the 
curriculum, it does help to illuminate some of the debates which were shaping intellectual 
life during this period of British history.  The university was being shaped by the tension 
between the general and the particular, the whole and the fragment.  Carlyle clearly 
favored the notion of holism over specialization.  Like his friend Francis Jeffrey, he was 
anxious that the knowledge afforded the masses of the new democratic society should be 
as general as possible.   For example, his contention that “some oversight of the whole” 
of history is necessary demonstrates his support for general education in the humanities 
(“On History” 95). 
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It was therefore consistent with his view of pedagogy that Carlyle criticized the 
Utilitarians, whose unflinching dissection of human motives implied a kind of analysis 
which Carlyle thought dangerous and irresponsible.  Of course, Carlyle’s response to the 
Utilitarians, including Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and even Jeffrey himself, is not 
based merely on his aversion to their penchant for analysis.  In the book On Heroes, 
Hero-worship and the Heroic in History, Carlyle at first laments the tendency of the 
Utilitarians—here designated as “these poor Sceptics,”—not towards analysis, but 
towards mechanization:  “the living Tree Igdrasil . . . has died-out into the clanking of a 
World-Machine” (171).  After he has asked us to “contrast these two things,” “‘Tree’ and 
‘Machine,’” Carlyle declares “the world to be no machine!”   
Nonetheless, as early as his 1830 essay “On History,” he had examined the 
methodological problem which analysis raises for historiography.  Because of the 
proliferation of specialization in history and the creation of a number of subfields, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a sense of “the purport” of history’s smaller 
or more obscure branches in relation to the whole (86).  In the case of the machine 
imagery which he uses to describe the Utilitarians, it’s hard to shake the association it has 
with the anatomizing “Steam-engine” of a “Universe” in Sartor Resartus, “rolling on, in 
its dead indifference to grind [him] limb from limb” (210).  As in the discussion of the 
Utilitarians in On Heroes, the analytical mode is taken to be a basic philosophical gesture, 
to which Carlyle opposes his own organic and holistic romanticism.  For Carlyle, division 
disparaged its object; thus his own distinction between “intellectual” and “moral” 
Scepticism informed a needed criticism of the Sceptics, while the sceptics’ analysis of 
human motives threw the “mystery” of the human subject into question. 
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In any event, the Universities, perhaps attentive to the kinds of reasoning offered 
by the Utilitarians and the empiricists, were becoming less religious.  The book From 
Don to Clergyman:  The Rise of the Academic Profession in Nineteenth-Century Oxford, 
written by A. J. Engel, shows that the development of the educator as a professional, in 
the context of the ancient University of Oxford, is simultaneously a story about 
contradictory anxieties around religion.  In the Oxford context, Reverend Coplestone 
could still provide support for the view that “the only purpose of university study was to 
provide mental discipline and inculcate religious values,” while the Tractarians could 
argue “‘that Oxford has, and ever has had, what men of the world will call a popish 
character,’” both applying “the monastic ideal” to university education (27-28, 24).  Of 
course, the monastic ideal was one which Carlyle himself supported.   
Monastic ideals were in decline, however, as “the new Oxford which came into 
being in the nineteenth century and which so offended the ‘Don of the Old School’ was 
an increasingly secular institution” (1).  Thus the nineteenth century was an era in which 
religious ideals and the communalism of traditional religion were put into question.  
Carlyle’s response was to imagine a kind of criticism that tried to reinvigorate both 
communal life and religious ideals.      
 
 We have already seen that Carlyle steadfastly opposed the doctrine of 
individualism.  In fact, the opposition to individualism formed the basis for the criticism 
he practiced.  Simultaneously, he constantly reminds his reader of the continuity between 
the religion of yesterday and his own critical practice.  The religious tenor of everyday 
life was inseparable in any significant from what Raymond Williams would call “a whole 
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way of life.”  In Past and Present, the simile of the construction of Paul’s Cathedral as 
religious activity works not just because the building serves a religious function, but 
because the labor that goes into it, “the Masonries and Worships and Quasi-Worships that 
are there,” is a miraculous activity: “Men had not a hammer to begin with, not a syllabled 
articulation: they had it all to make;--and they have made it” (132).  Unlike the “seven-
feet-high” “lath-and-plaster Hat” with which the haberdasher advertises his wares, true 
work makes no claim upon “noisy” proclamation and promotion, but is content to be a 
“silent” prayer (144, 135).  The very contrast between the religious nature of church 
building and the self-promotion of advertising serves to highlight Carlyle’s critical 
method.  
 Carlyle represents labor as prayer in order to achieve particular rhetorical, that is 
to say political, effects.  By denouncing the Strand Street retailer, Carlyle is indicating a 
preference for certain cultural values—or, more accurately, a certain style—emphasizing 
such qualities as plainness, directness, and honesty over against ostentation, ornament 
and self-promotion.  Carlyle then deploys this preference the more strongly to appeal to 
“Mr. Bull,” a caricature of the English nation equivalent to the American Uncle Sam 
(163).  This appeal to English nationalism in Past and Present once again invokes the 
Dandy, one of the two flag-bearers of the apocalypse in Sartor Resartus.  In Past and 
Present, the Dandy is once again held up as a negative example singled out for 
destruction:  “have thy eye-glasses, opera-glasses, thy Long-Acre cabs with white-
breeched tiger, thy yawning impassivities, pococurantisms, fix thyself in Dandyhood, 
undeliverable; it is thy doom” (130).  The dandy is an important figure because he 
provides an occasion for Carlyle to imagine a cultural politics which is socially 
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conservative—drawing, for example, on religious imagery—and to claim this politics in 
the name of an earnest, hardworking English people.  
The Dandy thus offers one version of culture against which Carlyle had to 
compete.  The Dandy’s dictum to “‘Go gracefully idle in Mayfair,’” his penchant for 
“Insincere Speech,” and his predilection for ostentatious dressing all place him in 
opposition to Carlyle’s program of earnest endeavor.  If even Mammonism could be half 
excused because it would bring at least some of the nation to work, “Dilettantism” could 
not be countenanced because of its idleness.  Moreover, it was against the notion of 
culture as the province of the eminently refined, aristocratic, and elite—not to mention 
effeminate—Dandy that Carlyle was able to prepare the way for Raymond Williams’s 
“idea of a common culture” (337).  Though Williams’s reading of Carlyle is meant to 
produce a genealogy of the term “culture” in the English context, one could also point out 
that the creation of a (single) common culture is also consistent with Carlyle’s critical 
agenda and his pervasive holism. 
  Furthermore, in reading Carlyle, Williams points out that Carlyle has lasting 
relevance to English and Anglo culture because he anticipated “the characteristic 
movements of the English working class,” which “have been in the direction of more 
government, more order,” and “more social control” (80).  The chaos in Sartor Resartus, 
which must be overcome if order is to be once again established, is caused by the 
discrepancies between social classes.  The political crisis of the 1830’s had already 
developed to the point where the Chartists were making articulate demands upon the 
parliament.  Clearly most of the petitioners were from the working classes, a group 
seemingly opposed in every way to the privileged Dandy.  Thus there’s a connection 
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between the historically specific “working class” movement and the “common culture”—
the division between honest labor and ostentation frames the semiotic possibilities 
contained by the common culture.  Indeed, this distinction is what makes palpable 
Carlyle’s claims to both an English nationalism and to conservatism (“Bull is a born 
Conservative”) (Past and Present 164).  
The attempt to satisfy the demands of both English nationalism and cultural 
conservatism is evident in Carlyle’s use of the apocalyptic trope.  Conservatives aren’t 
usually thought of as parties to revolutionary discourse.  However, the apocalyptic trope 
is one which imagines severe changes.  Carlyle points out that revolution was not 
unheard of in English history.  “Before this,” writes Carlyle, presumably referring to the 
Civil War, “the English People have taken very preternatural-looking Specters by the 
beard; saying virtually: ‘And if thou wert ‘preternatural?’  Thou with thy ‘divine-rights’ 
grown diabolic wrongs?  Thou—not even ‘natural’; decapitable; totally extinguishable!” 
(165).  The diabolic wrongs of the Stuart monarch are the kind of injustices which might 
motivate the “most Conservative English People” to “be wholly a Reforming People,” the 
English being reticent to change the national institutions absent a severe crisis. 
Carlyle’s writing is innovative in that it addresses history in a way that speaks to 
the cultural legitimacy of a distinctly modern class, the working mass that Carlyle 
characterizes as “slow to believe in novelties” and “deeply and forever certain of the 
greatness that is in Law, in Custom once solemnly established, and now long recognized 
as just and final” (164). The emphasis in Carlyle’s conservative historiography on the 
worker’s commitment to “custom” sutures the representative “modern worker” into a 
narrative that allows for historical consciousness.  This task is only completed when 
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Carlyle claims that the modern is continuous with the ancient by virtue of a process of 
selective conservation:  “Truth and Justice alone are capable of being ‘conserved’ and 
preserved!  The thing which is unjust, which is not according to God’s Law, will you, in a 
God’s Universe, try to conserve that?”  Such an argument allows for the English workers, 
for example, to claim the conservative label against the aristocracy in the battle over the 
Corn Laws, or, in the period of Sartor’s composition, to claim a position within the 
patrimony of English politics, even without the money and privileges of the aristocratic 
and commercial orders.   
 
The Romantic Theory of History 
 In the battle between the dandies and the drudges, the two are engaged in a 
combat the outcome of which will be transformative, or, more strongly, apocalyptic:  the 
result of the battle “when it will be practically seen which ought to look down and which 
up, is not so distant.”  In other words, the battle will bring about the kind of rebirth of 
society on which the Editor and Teufelsdröckh spend so many words in the novel.  This 
“transformation” is, as Arthur Quinn has pointed out, part of the “rhetoric of ascent” 
typical of the “romantic rhetorician” (231, 232).1
                                                 
1  In examining romantic rhetoric in an essay titled “Teaching Burke:  Kenneth Burke and the Rhetoric of 
Ascent,” Quinn has elaborated some of the continuities between latter-day romantic rhetoricians and earlier 
ones, such as Carlyle, finding that, among other similarities, one can observe in both a “transformation” of 
“negation into an affirmation” which occurs “through our encounter with genius,” in this case the genius of 
Professor Teufelsdröckh. 
  The philosophy of clothes, as a trope of 
universal history, allowed Carlyle to posit revolution as the primary goal of his 
romanticism.  The figure of reform, in turn, had the rhetorical effect of positioning the 
aristocracy as decadent and perhaps little more than habitual encroachers upon the 
historical legitimacy which rightly belonged to the English working masses.   
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 In the last paragraph of the first book in Sartor, just before turning to the paper 
bags of materials through which the Editor must sift in order to compose a biography of 
Teufelsdröckh, the Editor recommends the professor’s works in the following terms:  
“Wild as it looks, this Philosophy of Clothes, can we ever reach its meaning, promises to 
reveal new-coming Eras, the first dim rudiments and already-budding germs of a nobler 
Era, in Universal History” (99).  This hope for “new-coming Eras” illustrates a longing 
on the part of the Editor for some alternative to the present, a longing which seems 
natural, given Carlyle’s difficult, paradoxical predicament:  namely, that it makes a claim, 
in living labor’s name, to a cultural history which is nonetheless “universal.”  For, in 
making this claim of legitimacy on the same grounds that the aristocracy had made its 
own claims to authority—i. e, historical lineage—Carlyle risked, at the very least, 
reduplicating the problematic hierarchies associated with the traditional land-owning and 
warring aristocracy. 
 In other words, Carlyle’s desire to be the prophet of future transformation was 
informed by his attachment to and understanding of history.  In one of the many parallels 
between Teufelsdröckh and Carlyle, the Editor has Teufelsdröckh write that “for great 
Men I have ever had the warmest predilection; and can perhaps boast that few such in this 
era have wholly escaped me” (224).  Indeed, such a turn in the professor’s biography was 
presaged as early as his days at the university.  There, he avers that he managed to “read 
fluently” and that “it was my favourite employment to read character in speculation and 
from the Writing to Construe the Writer” (146).  Reading in history allows the professor 
to observe that it was “wondrous” that “a certain groundplan of Human Nature and Life 
began to fashion itself in me,” because his “whole Universe, physical and spiritual, was 
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as yet a machine.”  History provided an organic perspective, one that allowed for the 
intertwining of elements in unpredictable ways.        
        To summarize the import of this passage, as well as the import of the generic shift in 
Carlyle’s writings then:  in Sartor, we can observe the priority of the romantic doctrine of 
transformation and transvaluation coming to grips with historically informed reading, 
which, while frequently concerned with individuals, also spoke to a vision of 
universality.  This reversion to more traditional subjects, history and great men, became 
more pronounced over the course of Carlyle’s opus.  Nonetheless, his understanding of 
history remained particularly romantic throughout his career.  Specifically, his 
understanding of “Universal History” remained romantic—that is, holistic—in its attempt 
to think the aristocracy and the working class together, as part of a panoramic criticism. 
 
Carlyle’s Popularity:  The Dandaical Body 
 If Carlyle’s writing was simultaneously romantic and reforming, his appeal is 
unsurprising, given that romanticism and reformist tendencies were highly popular in the 
1839’s.  But the relationship between his romantic theory and his popular appeal are 
worth thinking about because the early nineteenth century required a social 
transformation.  Too many people had been invigorated by the Napoleonic wars and too 
many people had suffered economically during the period for the status quo to be 
acceptable.  There is therefore a parallel between Carlyle’s popularity and the extent of 
the crisis he addresses in his criticism.   
One effect of Carlyle’s popularity and the totalizing gestures in his work has been 
to gain him infamy as a precursor to fascism.  Thus Lippincott writes that      
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“fascism is to a great extent Carlyle’s creed brought up to date” (18).  Carlyle’s 
absolutism, his hostility, and his sometimes limited political imagination have all earned 
him this reputation.  It could also be said that though he is a writer of great strength, he 
nonetheless lacks subtlety.   
 What remains important, however, is the fact that, as Lippincott informs us, “no 
political writer in nineteenth-century England was as widely read” as Carlyle (6), and 
thus he was particularly well-positioned to make claims about the importance of 
universalizing or far-reaching forms of knowledge.  And I will demonstrate below that 
Carlyle, even in the early period in which Sartor was written, could indeed be considered 
a political writer.  Here, I take Lippincott to use the phrase with the best sense of both 
words in mind:  there was a politics to Sartor, but it is represented through and by a 
particular poetic vision that deploys specific figures and tropes.  
Beyond being simply numerous, his readership transected the various strata of 
society.  His writings were read by “circles in the aristocracy and in the lower classes.”  
Charles Franklin Thwing, in Education According to Some Modern Masters, seems to 
suggest that Carlyle’s appeal might arise from his status as “a bundle of inconsistencies 
and contradictions” (38).  As a figure who was “in his tastes a democrat, in his theories 
an aristocrat,” Carlyle could expect to garner favor with both halves of the 
“popular/particular” binary into which English literary audiences were traditionally 
divided.   Another possible way of articulating this explanation for Carlyle’s popularity is 
to say that Carlyle, with his pious working-class background, provided a banner around 
which a front could be formed against the advances of bourgeois liberal democracy.  
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And, in fact, a passage towards the end of Sartor Resartus imagines such a cultural 
alignment.   
 In the chapter on “The Dandiacal Body,” the Editor extrapolates on 
Teufelsdröckh’s examination of two social groups in the contemporary British nation, 
which groups are designated by the quasi-religious term “Sect” (354).  The first group is 
represented by the Foppish “Dandy,” the second by the impoverished “Poor-Slave” or 
“Drudge.”  In this passage, Carlyle returns to the idea that Clothes are the manner in 
which “Ideas” are expressed “outwardly” (344). Carlyle furthermore attributes to the 
dandies “perennial Martyrdom, and Poesy, and even Prophecy.”  However, by ascribing 
martyrdom to the dandy, Carlyle is employing him as a foil against which he can 
ironically contrast his own ideas.      
The ironic treatment which the Editor metes out to the dandy foreshadows an 
even sharper satire on the part of Teufelsdröckh. The professor identifies a method of 
worship, a temple, and a literary canon peculiar to the dandy, equating religious and 
secular forms of cultural authority.  But the satire works by remarking on the distance 
between the practices of this sect and the benefits of true education.  For instance, 
Teufelsdröckh surmises that dandies exhibit a “resemblance to that Superstition of Athos 
Monks, who by fasting from all nourishment, and looking intensely for a length of time 
into their own navels, came to discern therein the true Apocalypse of Nature, and Heaven 
Unveiled.” Parodying the religious tenor which has been adopted throughout the text, 
Teufelsdröckh nonetheless manages to criticize the dandy rather than religion itself.  The 
temple of the dandies is Almack’s, a club famous for the drinking and gaming that 
occurred there.  Finally, the canon is the genre of writing denominated Fashionable 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
DIDACTIC DESTINY 
34 
  
 
 
Novels, and Teufelsdröckh concludes “Of such Sacred Books” that they are “Books that 
the unassisted human faculties are inadequate to read” (353).  Thus Carlyle turns the 
charge which might most readily be made against his own work—the charge of 
obscurantism—into a suspicion about the intellectual powers of the leisure class.   
The social figure whom Sartor most celebrates, the poor-slave who is the 
antithesis of the dandy, appears in the same chapter.  Like the dandy, the poor-slave, or 
drudge, whom Carlyle identifies as typically Irish, wears a quite noticeable array of 
clothes: 
Their raiment consists of innumerable skirts, lappets, and irregular wings, 
of all cloths and colours. . . . It is fastened together by a multiplex combination of 
buttons, thrums and skewers; to which frequently is added a girdle of leather, of 
hempen or even of straw rope, round the loins.  To straw rope, indeed, they seem 
partial, and often wear it by way of sandals. 354 
By the end of the chapter, the representatives of the two social classes, the dandy with his 
“snuff-brown suit,” and the drudge, as described above, become, along with the classes 
they represent, figures emblematic of a wider social apocalypse.  Prefiguring the Marxian 
notion of a social conflict which devolves into a two-sided struggle, the battle between 
the classes in Sartor Resartus imagines the dandy and the drudge as providing the rallying 
centers for a struggle between the two sides.  The origins and extensions of the two 
groups work “to separate and isolate” the English commonwealth “into two 
contradictory, uncommunicating masses” (360).  Carlyle’s critical project maintains these 
“contradictory . . . masses” within a single field of poetic vision.   
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 Carlyle’s criticism is not merely descriptive however; it actively takes sides.  The 
only elements of the nation which are attracted to Dandyism are the “Positive Electricity 
of the nation (namely, the Money thereof),” the money being best understood as the 
ruling bourgeois and aristocracy.  On the other hand, the “Negative Pole,” which attracts 
“the Hunger” of the nation, gathers around itself, in the preamble to the final conflict, 
adherents to a diversity of religious and philosophical positions.  “Christian or Infidel 
Pagan, . . . Utilitarians, Radicals, refractory Potwallopers” all could be absorbed into the 
“general mass” of the negative pole, so long as they were “Drudgical.”   
 This formulation of an imaginary social apocalypse, in which “the entire structure 
of Society” is divided into two opposing forces is consistent with the image of the 
Victorian Sage which recent scholarship has interrogated.  Collini has suggested that the 
writings of “the major Victorian moralists,” including Carlyle, aim “to get beyond all 
partial, sectarian or merely specialized perspectives, to find somewhere to stand, 
intellectually speaking, from which the most ‘general’ assessment can be made” (25).  
Carlyle’s widespread appeal, coupled with a social vision that sought to be totalizing, 
positioned him to be the Victorian Moralist par excellence.   
 In fact, Carlyle’s eventual popularity was probably a result, at least in part, of his 
ability to give voice to the disappointment with laissez-faire economics felt by large 
numbers of English subjects in the period after the Napoleonic Wars.  In a reading of 
Carlyle which is somewhat more even-handed than Lippincott’s, professor of economics 
Joseph Persky has shown just how wide Carlyle’s influence has been.  Persky indicates 
that Carlyle is primarily responsible for an understanding of economics as a “dismal 
science” (167).  Persky also views Carlyle in a light which is consistent with the image of 
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Carlyle and the “Drudges” of Sartor Resartus as providing “a rallying cry of a mid-
nineteenth century attack on liberal political economy.”  Persky further asserts that 
Carlyle’s “attack on political economy was incidental to the larger enterprise” of 
rebuking “both democratic government and the market system” (166).  The strongest and 
most essential criticism that Carlyle levels against these institutions, in Persky’s view, is 
that they are “eager to leave the world ungoverned” (167).   
In sum, Carlyle’s wide appeal stemmed largely from his ability to give voice to a 
number of discontents to the aristocratic and mercantile settlement of late eighteenth-
century Britain, the economy being a sore point for a wide swath of the English.  Cultural 
criticism provided the space needed to voice that discontent.  Thus culture itself came to 
have class connotations.  If the aristocratic Tories still occupied the dominant political 
sphere—the parliament, the aristocracy was no longer dominant in the cultural sphere.  
The schism between the political and the cultural spheres threatened civil war, until the 
Whigs, led by Charles, the second Earl of Grey, and the even more aggressively reformist 
Henry Brougham, formed a new government in 1830 and introduced the bills to expand 
the franchise.  This series of events coincided with Carlyle’s own insights about the rising 
importance of the drudges and workers in English society. 
 Carlyle’s critical project during this period, then, registered contemporary social 
developments.  In this context, Carlyle’s writings in the first half of the nineteenth 
century sought to wrest cultural authority away from the historically dominant aristocracy 
in the name of the modern worker.  This process entailed the construction of a romantic 
theory of English history that displaced the aristocracy and the aristocratic dandy from 
the center of that history.  The success of this project can be examined by way of 
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recounting Carlyle’s ascendance to fame as a kind of Victorian sage. It is widely known 
that Carlyle achieved fame only with the publication of The French Revolution and its 
recommendation to the reading public by John Stuart Mill.  By contrast, Sartor had only 
been published after several attempts, and then serially.  It received some scant words of 
praise from Ralph Waldo Emerson in America, but the general response of the readership 
of Fraser’s, the magazine in which it first appeared, was unfavorable.  Nonetheless, his 
later works were largely continuous with Sartor.  They did not abandon the desire for 
transformation, or Baphometic Fire Baptism, expressed in the earlier work. 
 The success of Carlyle’s romanticism is furthermore inflected by two 
contradictory facts: on the one hand, by the time he was writing On Heroes, he adapted 
the symbolism espoused in Sartor Resartus to a kind of writing that was one part criticism 
and one part history.  At the same time, however, the success of his works on history 
depended inherently on that earlier romantic theory of transformation, a theory which 
was most successfully outlined in Sartor Resartus.  This theory of history—that clothes 
and appearances imparted significant truths about reality—was often a theory about 
symbols generally and language specifically.  It is instructive to examine the issue of 
language in Carlyle’s writings, because over the course of his career he began to assert 
that language in and of itself was misleading.  This perspective tends to undermine the 
assumption of Sartor, which holds that every society relies upon language for its 
existence.  For Carlyle, the other moiety of linguistic circulation was silence itself.  And 
in the decades after Sartor Resartus was published, he began to imagine, not the rebirth of 
symbol and reality, but the evacuation of signs in the name of reality.   
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 Underlying all of Carlyle’s later work was a deep skepticism of language.  This 
skepticism allowed for Carlyle to once again occupy the position of the eremite and to 
construct the pathological limit of criticism.  The primary danger, in Carlyle’s view, is 
that language has the capacity for manipulation, in the sense that, in a more or less 
democratic era, there is no final guarantee of the truth-value of linguistic productions.  
Thus, ironically, the revolution led by Carlyle’s idol Cromwell resulted in the restriction 
of the institution of monarchy to such a degree that linguistic truth became almost 
infinitely complex.  This is the point of much of Lewis Carroll’s writing, which I will 
examine later.  But the epistemological shifts represented by the democratic 
developments had the consequence, for Carlyle, of throwing into doubt the veracity of 
every statement.   
 Such a distrust of linguistic value leads him further to distrust the kind of 
democratic government which, as a result of its attempt to respond to the will of a public, 
must always capitalize on public opinion and the form of value represented in such 
opinion.  In Past and Present, Carlyle gives an early description of the convergence of 
democratic representation and suspect volubility by contrasting Oliver Cromwell with an 
imaginary parliamentary candidate, Sir Jabesh Windbag.  In indicating that Cromwell 
was “no volunteer in Public Life, but plainly a ballotted soldier strictly ordered thither,” 
Carlyle casts self-promotion as an illness of modern democracy in general (221).  Carlyle 
furthermore introduces the public candidate with a plethora of names which cast language 
in a negative light:  he asks that we “do but contrast this Oliver with my right honorable 
friend Sir Jabesh Windbag, Mr. Facing-both-ways, Viscount Mealymouth, Earl of 
Windlestraw, or what other Cagliostro . . . the course of Fortune and Parliamentary 
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Majorities has constitutionally guided to that dignity.”  Thus language becomes empty, 
deceptive, weak, shrill or obsequious.  In order to complete the comparison, Carlyle 
imagines an afterlife for Cromwell when “the utmost flow of Paragraphs, the utmost ebb 
of them, is now, in strictest arithmetic, verily no matter at all; its exact value zero; an 
account altogether erased!” (222).  In this passage, language is reduced to nothing; it is 
precisely anulled.  Whereas the project in Sartor was one of giving birth to a new society 
and to a new symbolism, the project here takes language and symbols to be 
inconsequential.  What has value now is reality pure and simple.  This is a reality without 
adornment, and hence it is a silent reality.  By promoting the value of silence, the literary 
critic paradoxically establishes an economy of language in opposition to language itself.                    
 At one level, then, this passage registers a fear that language is inconstant or 
deceptive.  At the same time, however, it expresses an anxiety about how language, the 
medium, not just of social communication, but of the critical task which Carlyle had set 
for himself from early on, could be entirely ineffective.  The Editor concludes the passage 
above by asserting that “these Paragraphs,” by which he means parliamentary reports, 
“and low or loud votings of thy poor fellow-blockheads of mankind, will never guide 
thee in any enterprise at all” (243).  This despair about language is expressed repeatedly 
in Carlyle’s later works.   
In the text On Heroes, language and the spread of ideas was still viewed with a 
benevolent eye.  There, he optimistically observes “how the Press is to such a degree 
superseding the Pulpit, the Senate, the Senate Academicus and much else,” further 
venturing that “if Men of Letters are . . . actually performing such work for us from age 
to age . . . then I think we may conclude that Men of Letters will not always wander like 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
DIDACTIC DESTINY 
40 
  
 
 
unrecognised unregulated Ishmaelites among us!” (165).  In this pronouncement, he 
suggests that the propagation of ideas in the popular press is salutary both for our age and 
for our “Men of Letters.”  The only threat posed by language is an artificial investment in 
“Appearance,” which is the sign of the harmless “Bungler” (157).  The relative ease with 
which Carlyle overcomes his reservations about language is evident in the topic of the 
final chapter, “The Hero as King,” which once again returns to a discussion of Cromwell.  
In this chapter, Carlyle reasserts a faith in teaching and governing.  This confidence is 
undisturbed by the complexities of modern language.  
 In Latter-Day Pamphlets, however, the contradictions between speech and silence 
emerge.  “Stump-orator,” the fifth pamphlet, begins by recounting the value placed upon 
speech in traditional education:  “it lies deep in our habits, confirmed by all manner of 
education and other arrangements for several centuries back, to consider human talent as 
best of all evincing itself by the faculty of eloquent speech” (209).  A training in such 
talent might translate into ascension to “Parliament and the election beerbarrel, and a 
course that leads men very high indeed” (210). Again, though Carlyle recalls the anxiety 
about “sham” speech, the greater anxiety is about the consequences such speech has for 
work, which Carlyle still believes to be a religious duty.  And the fact that speech is such 
an inextricable component of parliamentary activity means that the assembly is therefore 
the most suspect of modern institutions.  “Parliament will train you to talk,” he grants, “to 
tell a good story for yourself, and make it appear that you have done your work” (240).  
But he doubts whether Parliament will train “your men” to “the intrinsic functions” of “a 
statesman,” which, for Carlyle, is to work at the exclusion of speech if necessary.  At this 
point in his writing—the 1850’s, the writing against language and the suspicion of 
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democratic institutions signals the breakdown of the precarious balance of institutions 
and politics which had been possible in the 1830’s.   
In this regard, “Stump-orator” represents another shift in his thinking about 
language and criticism.  Thus Carlyle finishes the pamphlet by urging the youth to “love 
silence rather than speech in these tragic days” and to “be not a Public Orator, thou brave 
young British man” (256).  The correct course is to “appeal by silent work, by silent 
suffering if there be no work, to the gods” (255).  But such a strong refutation of 
language, the medium of Carlyle’s criticism, nonetheless illustrates a continuity within 
that critical practice.  The cure is different here:  we are no longer to expect or tailor new 
symbols for a changed society.  Instead, he recommends restraint from linguistic or 
symbolic endeavor altogether.  But tradition and religion are still invoked—and perhaps 
it is the failure of those institutions which Carlyle registers in the later writings.  In any 
event, the notion of totality is still relevant, but here it is the totality of possibilities 
delimited by silence as well as speech.  Silence is an eremitic figure, one which finally 
elides the conditions for the possibility of criticism. 
 
In contrast to his writings of the 1850’s and after, Sartor Resartus assumed not 
only that human institutions tended to decay and deviate from their original splendor, but 
that they could be regenerated, whether peacefully, through painful reform, or violently, 
through cataclysmic upheaval.  This Sisyphean narrative of human history led Carlyle to 
deploy a semiotic contradiction whenever he attempted to articulate his own position as 
an intellectual and critic.  James Eli Adams, in Dandies and Desert Saints, points out that 
the contradictions Carlyle embodied were consistent with early Victorian notions about 
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gender, whereby “the same gender system that underwrote male dominance also called 
into question the ‘manliness’ of intellectual labor” (1).  Adams suggests that, on the 
surface, at least, the “dandy is antithetical to the Carlylean hero, whose essential selfhood 
is typically bodied forth in a ‘savage’ disregard for social decorum and the public gaze” 
(22).  However, Adams eventually concludes that the dandy and the Carlylean hero do 
share a certain spectacle-based relationship with an audience.  Thus, while the prophetic 
hero seems to oppose, or even disdain, the dandy in every respect, the two share a 
structural similarity: both are figures who compete for “cultural authority” (23).  As the 
narrative of Sartor Resartus—and of Past and Present—makes clear, the Carlylean hero 
can never fully escape the contingencies of appealing to an audience—in Adams’s 
phrasing, “hero-worship is a fundamentally relational structure.”  Because of this, the 
hero must, like the dandy, rely on signs in order to persuade his audience.  
Adams’s analysis of gender thus extends to the unwieldy problem of language in 
the context of Carlyle’s criticism.  In discussing the dialectic of language and audience 
within which Carlyle’s critical personae operated, Adams points out that “language 
actively enmeshes the hero in a web of compromising social relations” (31).  Within the 
text of Sartor Resartus, Teufelsdröckh faces a double challenge: on the one hand, he must 
submit his ideas to an audience yet he must do so while pointing out the defects of his 
audience’s society.  His task was therefore aided by the invention of an indecorous idiom.  
Such an idiom would also be useful because his task entailed creating a cultural space for 
the lower and working classes who were simultaneously obtaining political power.  
The task of reforming culture toward a more working-class bent, in an era with 
relatively few intellectuals from laboring backgrounds, led Teufelsdröckh generally to 
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denounce intellectuals and university intellectuals in general.  For instance, two-hundred 
pages before the apocalypse that pits dandy against drudge in Sartor Resartus, Carlyle 
anticipates the ridicule of the dandy with similar reprobation of higher education.  As the 
Editor opens the bag “Sagittarius,” he begins a description of education which at first 
promises to fault its haphazard organization.  The reader expects that the statements about 
education will follow the gist of the “confusion and capricious indistinctness” of the 
variety of Teufelsdröckh’s documents themselves:  the “fragments of all sorts; scraps of 
regular Memoir, College-Exercises, Programs,” and other detritus of Teufelsdröckh’s 
education promise proleptically to frame the analysis of education (138).  But, with 
Teufelsdröckh, disarray is almost commendable, auguring as it does a confident disregard 
for propriety and tradition.  Neatness and order are, for Teufelsdröckh, signs of 
conformity to a decaying society.     
Thus, the discourse quickly turns to the professors who work at the university and 
the public which is served by it.  Teufelsdröckh describes the professors as similar to 
sentries, “being stationed at the gates, to declare aloud that it was a University, and exact 
considerable admission-fees.”  The implication that the education Teufelsdröckh received 
might have simply been a monetary scam is heightened by the description of the 
professor’s declaration of the university’s institutional status.  This description has the 
dual rhetorical purpose of suggesting that the institution hardly attained to the status of a 
university and that the professoriate were employing the “arts of Puffery” and “of 
Quackery.”  Thus, the professors’ “Declaration aloud” is one “fit apparatus” by which the 
public is “gulled, with the most surprising profit.”  The shortcomings of an institution are 
described in terms of artificial language.  It is only a short step to considering language 
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itself as artificial, which in Carlyle’s eyes would be an entirely bad thing.  Furthermore, 
by adding the university to his list of critical targets, Carlyle is magnifying the sense of 
impending revolution which saturates Sartor.  This in turn emphasizes the difficulty faced 
by those who would undertake the task of learning: how is it possible to learn in a world 
which is so topsy-turvy?     
Several moments of hesitation mitigate this passage’s indictment of the university 
system, however.  The Editor reminds us that, before the “Sagittarius” papers, 
Teufelsdröckh had “already expectorated his antipedagogic spleen,” and he hints that 
Teufelsdröckh may not have been “called upon to shoot [the] arrows” which he directs at 
the institution.  Such qualifications lessen the force of the criticisms about the university.  
Additionally, reinforcing Adams’s thesis that the hero and the dandy in fact share a 
common set of commitments and expertise, Teufelsdröckh asserts, concerning the 
professors, that “their attempts at working, at what they called Educating, now when I 
look back on it, fill me with a certain mute admiration” (144).  If the professors are like 
dandies in their deployment of showy language, Teufelsdröckh is not entirely 
unsympathetic to their efforts.  Indeed, Teufelsdröckh compensates for the lack of 
educational organization by pursuing a zealous reading program.  Deciding to impose 
upon himself some of the asceticism which Adams regards as central to the intellectual 
labor of the Victorian male, Teufelsdröckh exclaims, “Here are Books, and we have 
brains to read them; here is a whole Earth and a whole Heaven, and we have eyes to look 
on them: Frisch zu!” (150).  However, the fact that Teufelsdröckh pursues this reading 
program on his own suggests that he is very much the eremite, carrying on his education 
outside the established channels.        
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Teufelsdröckh’s description of the university professors is thus highly 
contradictory.  In imagining the professors to be mostly superfluous, Teufelsdröckh 
equates them to “Millers” in the “mechanism” of gulling.  Yet he also declares that the 
professors “themselves needed not to work.”  Doubtlessly, this was a way of excluding 
intellectual labor from the domain of work, which was itself becoming more 
masculinized in the popular imagination.  Thus, Teufelsdröckh does not acknowledge the 
“Educating” performed by the professors as work, even though it might lead to the kind 
of self-reliance which Teufelsdröckh displayed and which was itself the sign of a highly 
developed intellect.  Equally perplexing is that Teufelsdröckh finds himself capable of “a 
certain mute admiration” for the professors whom he has just associated, by way of their 
alleged failure to work, with the dandy. 
 
The Victorian Hero 
Adams’s observations regarding the parallels between hero and dandy thus 
deserve pause.  The conclusion seems ineluctable that both hero and dandy rely on a 
public display for their cultural authority and that they in fact represent competing 
models of cultural authority.  This seems to be very much the point of Teufelsdröckh’s 
“mute admiration” of the professors: he is, like them, constrained to purvey his teachings 
to a public audience, though he has, in addition, the Editor to support his theories.  
Despite what Carlyle occasionally urges about the veracity of the hero, in other words, 
the latter figure’s existence depends upon a public display of signs and is thus as subject 
to their recognition and acceptance as the dandy is. Still, something is lacking from 
Adams’s inquiry into Carlyle’s use of the dandy figure, astonishing as the revelation is 
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that the hero and the dandy share such a strong structural affinity.  I would suggest that, 
in Carlyle’s writings, the difference between the dandy and the hero is in the latter’s 
pedagogical usefulness for a society as subject to increasing democratization as Carlyle’s 
was. 
As an era of democratization, the early nineteenth century in England produced 
writings that responded strongly to the contemporary transformations.  In brief, the 
change from the Georgian to the Victorian period was a change from patronage and 
clique membership to individuality and idiosyncrasy.  In this respect, the forms of 
cultural authority championed by Sartor Resartus were entirely consistent with this trend.  
Carlyle imagines a hero, Teufelsdröckh, who is no longer beholden to the norms of 
deference and who, instead, plunges ahead into the uncertainty of a democratic England 
in his own name.  Such independence represented an ethos more appropriate to the new 
England and constituted an advantage for Teufelsdröckh over the dandy in the struggle 
for cultural legitimacy and leadership.   
In the book Public Moralists:  Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 
1850-1930, Stefan Collini has offered to explain that the mid-Victorian obsession with 
character “presupposed an agreed moral code” (100).  This fairly stable set of 
conventions held that “‘the abiding sense of duty is the very crown of character,’” to 
quote that mouthpiece of Victorian morality, Samuel Smiles.  But this assessment is 
qualified by Collini’s later observation that “one part of the framework of assumptions 
that gave vitality and persuasiveness to these repeated invocations of character . . . was 
that it was an ideal peculiarly suited to a future of unknown circumstances” (113).  Thus, 
the writings of nineteenth-century Britain frequently imagined an earlier England held 
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solidly together by a code of behavior which encompassed all of society.  By contrast, the 
present society was in relative disorder and faced an uncertain future, a future in some 
ways incomparable to the present.  Thus the Victorian Moralists frequently figured the 
masses as a flock which had gone astray and which needed some authority figure to 
return them to the right course.  This, naturally, is exactly the pedagogical function which 
the hero was intended to fill: namely, to provide the subjects of the democratizing nation 
with meaningful access to its historical legacy.  The hero thus forms part of the 
“Teaching Class” who, by “Judging, Law-making” and “Church-extension,” will allow 
Europe to “continue to exist” (Past and Present, 241, 244, 240).     
In fulfilling a historical need, the hero was paradigmatic, but the paradigm which 
the hero represents is simultaneously catachrestic, for the hero represents the paradigm of 
anti-conventional convention.  The Victorian Hero exercised a cultural authority that was 
very much at odds with Romantic and Georgian notions of deference and decorum.  In 
the shift from the dandy to the eremitic hero, then, we can witness the shift from the 
“Georgian . . . attention to the arts of winning esteem and cultivating connections” to “the 
Victorian . . . overcoming of adverse circumstances” (Public Moralists, 111).  Though the 
hero espouses a discourse of individuality and eccentricity, this discourse was, in fact, 
quite normative in Victorian society, corresponding to the “anxiety about the way in 
which the pressures of opinion in a commercial society made for conformity and lack of 
enterprise.”        
The Victorian era thus produced a kind of cultural authority that favored 
originality and even idiosyncrasy.  And we have seen that the figure of the eremite 
accords with this new direction in cultural tendencies.  Yet this preference was also 
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tempered, in Carlyle, by a suspicion that the mainstream contemporary society, with its 
preference for originality, placed too great an emphasis on the individual.  This is, in my 
reading, one of the main reasons that Carlyle represents Teufelsdröckh and his doctrine 
by way of the Editor, a figure who can temper the more iconoclastic notes in 
Teufelsdröckh’s philosophy.  The deployment of the trope of anti-conventionality on 
Carlyle’s part is therefore telling in ways that bear upon Carlyle’s construction of 
subjectivity.  I want to further argue that the structure of Carlyle’s discourse on the hero 
entails a specific conception of criticism as well.  In doing so, I will draw upon Adams’s 
identification of the twin figures of the eremite and the cenobite in order show to what 
degree they helped Carlyle articulate a model of criticism that relies upon the eremite as a 
figure of distancing. 
 
Adams Revisited:  The Eremite and the Cenobite 
Regarding the eremite, Adams writes that he “renounces worldly order and 
uniformity.”  He deploys what I am calling the trope of anti-conventionality in order to 
compete for the attention of an audience.  As Teufelsdröckh’s objections to his 
experiences at the University suggest, the prophetic Teufelsdröckh performs his heroism 
in a manner consistent with Adams’s description.  Thus Adams does well in analyzing 
the project of Carlylean heroism.  My task, however, requires pushing this analysis a step 
or two further and demonstrating the role which this heroism plays in forming a 
conception of “criticism.”  For, while Adams shows that the eremite roundly rejects the 
pre-existing social order, Carlyle deploys Teufelsdröckh in a manner that displays a 
slightly ambiguous attitude toward that order.  I want to suggest in effect two things 
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regarding the analysis of the hero.  First, I want to suggest that, at least in Sartor, the 
eremite and the cenobite are not two entirely independent figures:  they overlap 
structurally, and, more importantly, they are constituted by one another.  Secondly, I want 
to hypothesize that criticism, in Carlyle’s hands, relies upon these two figures to create an 
effect of distancing. 
In order to see how Teufelsdröckh conforms to Adams’s conception of the 
eremite—if we need further convincing—we might return to Teufelsdröckh’s criticism of 
the university as an institution.  We recall that the University in Sartor Resartus is a 
disordered space.  Thus the order which Teufelsdröckh protests is already a disordered 
order.  The only sign of efficiency at the University lies in the ability to create and 
maintain “Reputation,” which once again clues us in to the degraded nature of the 
linguistic or symbolic order.  As a reputation-making machine, the University is a kind of 
“mechanism” which efficiently “makes mechanism for itself!” (Sartor Resartus, 143).  
Otherwise, the University is characteristically disorganized: “a desert this was, waste, and 
howling with strange monsters.”  Adding to this estimation of the university, 
Teufelsdröckh’s closest friend, Herr Towgood observes that “at a small cost men are 
educated to make leather into shoes” and then asks, “but at a great cost, what am I 
educated to make?”  This passage emphasizes the difficulty of adapting more traditional 
valuations of labor and activity to the life of the university.  Thus Teufelsdröckh is able to 
articulate the position of the consummate outsider—that is, he appears to be able to stand 
outside of the modern institution and to represent a power independent of establishment 
power.  This imaginary position is consistent with the eremite’s ability to represent 
distance. 
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Teufelsdröckh is therefore a figure around whom develops a dialectic of distance, 
because the distance he represents is always relative and dependent upon that audience 
for whom the eremite performs.  Teufelsdröckh’s performance at the school is such that, 
though he was “shy” and “retiring,” “certain established men are aware of his existence; 
and, if stretching-out no helpful hand, have at least their eyes on him” (148).  Both the 
attitude herein represented and the manner of its representation are at odds with the 
notion that Teufelsdröckh is entirely removed from established institutions and their 
representatives.  Similarly, the account of how Teufelsdröckh “appears, though in dreary-
enough humor, to be addressing himself to the Profession of Law” reveals an 
involvement with the existing order which complicates Adams’s description of the 
eremite.   
Both of these statements, in fact—the begrudging admission of some recognition, 
albeit modest, by establishment figures, as well as an ambiguous declaration of an 
establishment profession—are consistent with Carlyle’s construction of criticism within 
the context of a representation of a democratizing England.  For these two statements 
demonstrate a tension within Carlyle’s heroic rhetoric, the tension which developed from 
the need to simultaneously recognize and reject the existing cultural hierarchy and the 
figures who form its apex.  Thus, by acknowledging that he is noticed by the 
establishment elite, Teufelsdröckh is also acknowledging the power of authority and 
connection which they possess.  Yet the narrator also seems to suggest that Teufelsdröckh 
might possess a power independent of the establishment, though the theorization of that 
power frequently remains implicit rather than explicit.  The text of Sartor Resartus 
therefore creates a space—in the figure of Teufelsdröckh—which is potentially outside of 
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the institutions of modernity at the same time that it totalizes knowledge in the form of 
the “Philosophy of Things in General” (21).  The conjunction of totality and distance 
shape the criticism with which Carlyle faces the future of a democratizing England.  
In the process of forming his particular mode of criticism, the Editor, and Carlyle 
by extension, learns both to incorporate the views of the eremitic hero into his own 
teaching and to negotiate the relationship between the eremite and his audience.  The 
professor, after all, is the Editor’s foil.  The clever details, such as the citation of an 
imaginary book, Die Kleider, ihr Werden und Wirken, published by a fantasy publishing 
house merely heighten Teufelsdröckh’s role as counterpart to the more docile Editor.  
The interplay of biography and fiction, their artful combination in this work, makes 
Teufelsdröckh’s position more interesting.  For not only is Teufelsdröckh thereby 
prevented from being a “genuine fiction,” the hybrid form in this case further excludes 
him from speaking for himself.  Instead, the Editor almost assumes Teufelsdröckh’s 
identity as the former adroitly arranges the latter’s “disappearance” (373).  This act of 
displacement is central to Carlylean criticism.   
Towards the end of the book, Carlyle performs this act even as he asks whether 
there is “any reader that can part with him [Teufelsdröckh] in declared enmity” (370).  
Indeed, the end of the book is riddled with passages that take leave of Teufelsdröckh in 
an almost condescending manner.  Of course, this condescension is, in turn, a device 
whereby the Editor further distances himself from the prophetic eremite in order to make 
the latter’s teaching more palatable to the English readership.  By regretting that “talents, 
which might have profited in the higher walks of Philosophy, or in Art itself, have been 
so much devoted to a rummaging among lumber-rooms; nay, too often a scraping in 
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kennels, where lost rings and diamond-necklaces are nowise the sole conquests,” the 
Editor mocks the idiosyncratic culture which Teufelsdröckh represents while remaining 
somewhat sympathetic to the latter’s project.  Similarly, the Editor occasionally derides 
Teufelsdröckh’s intellectual paradigm:  “how could a man occasionally of keen insight,” 
the authorial voice asks, “resolve to emit them in a shape bordering so closely on the 
absurd?” (371). 
This passages marks the transition in Carlyle’s writing in which the eremitic 
prophet is relinquished in favor of the coenobitic hero.  This transition entails that the 
Editor, as the voice of a newly inaugurated criticism, patrol the border which prevents the 
eremite from directly addressing his audience.  In the same stroke that Carlyle renounces 
the figure of Teufelsdröckh with a mixture of “astonishment, gratitude and disapproval,” 
he registers his own status as an author who is writing, not in isolation, but in the context 
of an increasingly numerous community of “British Readers” (338).  The communal 
nature of the act of reading is underscored in the text by the extensive use of metaphors 
whereby it is the Editor’s “Hope” that the “unheard-of Bridge” of “Palingenesia” has 
been “travelled” by his readers “without accident” (339).  Despite opposition from “the 
darkness” and “the element of nature,” the gifted reader has “cleared the passage, in spite 
of all.”  And, though the number of initial readers is only a “happy few,” the community 
will grow and “new laborers will arrive; new bridges will be built” (340).  Thus the “little 
band of Friends” will form a working community that will combine their assets in an 
effort to bring about the “Phoenix Death-Birth of Society.” Meanwhile, Professor 
Teufelsdröckh, while being admitted as “the greater” of the two minds, will be quietly 
displaced by the Editor, symbolized by “British Criticism.”  The Editor, then, while 
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taking possession of the professor’s audience, performs a kind of quarantined triage on 
Teufelsdröckh himself, whose “mad humors,” since they cannot be cured, must be 
prevented from “spreading.” 
Teufelsdröckh, in other words, is ultimately a ventriloquized character in the text, 
one who can speak only on condition of being moderated or qualified by the Editor’s 
intrusions.  Teufelsdröckh’s status within Sartor thus suggests that Carlyle himself was 
rather more cautious about deploying the eremitic hero than might at first be guessed.  
Lest there be any protestation that the relationship between censor and artist obtains 
between any author and his or her characters, we should read carefully the “Farewell” 
chapter of the book.  That chapter reasserts the importance of Teufelsdröckh’s doctrine, 
after the character himself has been so impugned.  The many qualifications about 
Teufelsdröckh’s “piebald, entangled, hyper-metaphorical style of writing” helps the 
Editor to gain the trust of an English audience when the Editor gets around to the task of 
summarizing the teaching of Teufelsdröckh.  And, as the Editor reformulates it for 
posterity, Teufelsdröckh’s pedagogy has grown several degrees cooler.  Barely mustering 
his own conviction, the Editor waffles:  “His attitude, we will hope and believe, is that of 
a man who has said to Cant, Begone; and to Dilettantism, Here thou canst not be; and to 
Truth, Be thou in place of all to me” (370).  The reader should notice that truth and 
language have begun to assume, in this iteration, descriptions which are highly spatial.  
“Here” is an inappropriate habitation for dilettantism, truth must be “in place of all.”  
This logic is consistent with the competition for integration within the power structures of 
modern society, a contest which the Editor wins, but with the help of the eremite, who 
cannot win acceptance for himself. 
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This moment in the text thus signifies the further transition from the eremite 
Teufelsdröckh, the figure of the prophet exiled to the wilderness, to the coenobitic Editor, 
the man of letters who works within the context of the collective institutions of 
modernity.  It is consistent with the distinction Carlyle would later make in “The Hero as 
Man of Letters” between the ancient and the modern hero.  “Hero-gods, Prophets” begins 
that chapter, “are forms of Heroism that belong to the old ages, make their appearance in 
the remotest times; some of them have ceased to be possible long since, and cannot any 
more show themselves in this world” (Heroes 154).  By contrast, continues Carlyle, “the 
Hero as Man of Letters . . . is altogether a product of these new ages.” This shift from the 
eremite to the cenobite therefore corresponds to a series of other transitions:  first, in 
Carlylean and Victorian attitudes towards establishment power; second, between 
Carlyle’s representations of the ancient world and of the industrial era; and, finally, in 
Carlyle’s attempt to negotiate the new differential between manual and intellectual labor.  
As Adams has shown, the contrast between the two kinds of hero has deep resonances 
into Carlyle’s later works, such as Past and Present, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the 
Heroic in History, and Latter-Day Pamphlets.  What I have hoped to demonstrate, on the 
other hand, is something about the way Sartor Resartus negotiates this contrast.  
Responding to the democratizing tendencies of the 1830’s, the text constructs the 
possibilities of a new subjectivity based on distancing and antagonism, not least of all 
that between the cenobite and the eremite.  The eremite in this context becomes a figure 
who occasions learning on the part of both the reader and the Editor.  Yet, because of his 
rhetorical positioning, the eremite cannot be placed entirely within or outside of modern 
culture or modern subjectivity.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
Birds of a Feather?:  Gender, Class, and Learning in Jane Eyre 
 
In What Sense is Jane Eyre a Pedagogical Novel? 
 Towards the end of the novel Jane Eyre, Jane relocates Edward Rochester at his 
Ferndean manor, the house at Thornfield having been burned to destruction by his first 
wife, Bertha Mason.  Having been blinded in the fire and devastated by the disappearance 
of Jane earlier in the novel, Mr. Rochester is anxious and unsure when Jane announces 
her entrance into his room: 
 Oh, you are indeed there, my sky-lark!  Come to me.  You are not gone:  not 
 vanished?  I heard one of your kind an hour ago, singing high over the wood:  but 
its song had no music for me, any more than the rising sun had rays.  All the 
melody on earth is concentrated in my Jane’s tongue to my ear (I am glad it is not 
naturally a silent one):  all the sunshine I can feel is in her presence.  488 
Jane’s response seems to confirm Rochester’s sentiment at the same time that she 
becomes somewhat emotional about what Rochester is proposing.  Jane doesn’t reject the 
idea that she, previously a governess with no familial connections, is now the source of 
music and light for the aristocratic, if somewhat humbled, Rochester.  But the notion does 
inspire a welling up of feeling in Jane: 
 The water stood in my eyes to hear this avowal of dependence just as if a royal 
 eagle, chained to a perch, should be forced to entreat a sparrow to become its 
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 purveyor.  But I would not be lachrymose:  I dashed off the salt drops, and busied 
 myself with preparing breakfast. 
 Indeed, Jane has little reason to be sad, for she has fared better, and in some cases 
far better, than most of the other female characters when it comes to marriage.  Though 
Jane is told at the beginning of the novel that she is “less than a servant,” Jane’s marriage 
partner, Mr. Rochester, is a member of that class of people who can employ on a 
permanent basis, not only Jane’s nurse Bessie, but her eventual husband, Robert Leaven, 
“the coachman” (19, 105).  Georgianna Reed, problematic as is her standing in the 
aristocratic order, is frowned upon by her suitor’s parents, and they are prevented from 
eloping when the other Reed sister uncovers their plan.  And it goes without saying that 
Jane’s situation is better than Bertha Mason’s, racked as the latter is by insanity, 
alienation, and addiction.  Even the male character St. John Rivers has no marriage 
partner at the end of the novel:  “St. John is unmarried:  he never will marry now,” as he 
faces imminent death, apparently from the conditions of India which Jane herself 
managed to avoid.    
 The explanation for Jane’s emotional response must, in fact, be related to the 
particular charge which what we can call the Jane-Rochester narrative carries within the 
novel as a whole.  And, although the denouement is in some senses entirely predictable, 
we can assert that the charge which the Jane-Rochester narrative carries is attributable to 
the positing of a new social arrangement characterized by an approximation of gender 
equality that similarly cuts across class boundaries.  Thus the disadvantaged Jane is able, 
at the end of the novel, to provide hospitality and care to the commanding Rochester.  If 
we follow the wording of the narrative, we indeed find this to be the case:  the tears 
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which she cries are in response to a new relationship in which “a royal eagle,” that is, Mr. 
Rochester, is “forced to entreat a sparrow to become its purveyor.”   
 This use of the word “purveyor” is somewhat surprising in the breadth of its 
ambiguity.  The first meaning of the word has to do with providing or furnishing, and the 
applicability of this sense to Jane’s situation is immediately apparent:  now that Mr. 
Rochester has been temporarily disabled, he needs someone to administer to his needs in 
a new way.  Jane hopes that she can assume this function as a caregiver and a wife.  The 
second meaning of purvey has to do not with supplying and furnishing, but with 
propagating or promulgating.  And it is this second meaning that is more resistant to 
immediate reception or agreement within the context of Jane Eyre.  The novel instead, it 
could be argued, depicts the end, if not of a man, than at least of a man’s kind of 
experience and mode of being in the world.  Mr. Rochester has gone from being a daring, 
horse-riding, virile man to being a helpless, blinded, domesticated one.  Rather than a 
promulgation, the moment of Rochester’s reunion with Jane, as well as their domestic 
future, seems to be a crystallized partnership.  The debauched, aristocratic past is 
replaced with a tranquil domestic future.   
 Critical interpretation of the novel has accorded with this sense of the ending of 
Jane Eyre, taking the conclusion of the book to be a dead end which effectively contains 
and paralyzes the social energies unleashed by the narrative to that point.  In the essay 
“Living on the Moon:  Jane Eyre and the Limits of Self-Education,” Laura Morgan Green 
argues that the ending of the narrative identifies the novel as one which ultimately 
endorses the private domestic sphere over and above a public sphere of education:  
“Jane’s intellectual achievements at Lowood and her adoption of the role of educator lead 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
BIRDS OF A FEATHER? 
58 
  
 
 
her not into the public and institutional world but triumphantly back to the private and 
domestic one” (44).  Thus the “limits” of self-education are demonstrated by Jane’s 
eventual determination to forego the career of schoolteacher in favor of a seemingly less 
economically independent position.  In fact, Green asserts that Jane’s decision evinces a 
“willed escapism” which “‘resolves the claims of self and others in a way that is scarcely 
reproducible; certainly, it cannot be institutionalized, made publicly available” (40, 42).  
In this chapter, I want to interrogate the assumptions behind the idea that Jane’s narrative 
is impervious to institutionalization, keeping in mind that Jane Eyre remains a widely-
taught text in the literature curriculum.3
 Indeed, Green contends that Jane Eyre must be read as a “confession of failure” 
because Jane’s own psychological “interior becomes the predominant location of a moral 
activity that cannot be externalized and is not amenable to political amelioration” (44).  
In this reading, the social character of early modern education is subverted onto a terrain 
that is, according to the classical liberal distinction, beyond the political realm entirely.  
In essence, then, the resolution of the novel deploys the category of the individual, which 
I discussed in the previous chapter as a category of the liberal bourgeoisie, but here it 
appears in an anarchistic guise which confounds “political amelioration.”  Furthermore, 
the “perfect concord” which results from Jane and Rochester’s complete devotion to one 
another can be read as a proto-fascist demand for “absolute assimilation” (Jane Eyre 500, 
Green 43).       
  What I hope to have suggested is that this 
conclusion is illustrated by the novel’s resolution, but I will in the meanwhile examine 
some of the larger pedagogical contexts within the narrative.  If I follow Green in 
outlining such contexts, I nonetheless ultimately revise her argument significantly. 
                                                 
3 Indeed, I have participated, as a teaching assistant, in that very form of cultural institutionalization. 
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 This apolitical refusal of society in no way answers the diversity of educational 
settings and paradigms which Brontë explores elsewhere in the novel.  Green elaborates 
three such educational moments, the first of which is “the radical self-sufficiency of the 
autodidact.”  Autodidactic education is that upon which Jane relies in order to cope with 
the antagonisms of the Reed household at the beginning of the book, where she is bullied 
by John Reed, ignored by the Reed Sisters, punished by Mrs. Reed, and variously 
supported or contained by the servants.  This education of the autodidact is revealing, not 
only of the social complexity of English national life in the nineteenth century, but also of 
Jane’s own position within that complexity.   
 On the one hand, Jane belongs, if only nominally, to the aristocratic world of self-
conceit and patronage which the Reed siblings enjoy, yet the beginning of the novel finds 
her excluded from their company.  Somewhat contradictorily, Mrs. Reed informs Jane 
that she must “exclude” Jane from “privileges intended only for contented, happy, little 
children” (13).  By asserting that this exclusion must be maintained until Jane learns to be 
“more sociable,” Mrs. Reed is promoting the fiction of an individual independent of 
society.  Accordingly, Jane finds her consolation by reading a book about the natural 
world rather than human society, the History of British Birds.  This reading supplies her 
with a pair of images between which she must choose in forming her identity:  the image, 
on the one had of “a rock standing up alone in a sea of billow and spray,” and, on the 
other, “the broken boat stranded on a desolate coast” (14, 15).   
 The coast upon which Jane is stranded, as it happens, is not entirely desolate:  
when the nurse, Bessie, “chanced to be in good humor,” and allowed the children to “sit 
about” her ironing table, then she occasionally “fed our eager attention with passages of 
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love and adventure taken from old fairy tales and older ballads; or (as at a later period I 
discovered) from the pages of Pamela, and Henry, Earl of Moreland” (15).  This scene 
gives an early indication of the number of issues which the novel will develop, especially 
ones which examine the relationship between reading, class, and gender.  Ironically, this 
vignette describing Bessie’s “reading” also informs Jane’s final revolt at Gateshead, 
which leads to her relocation to Lowood school and a new context for reading and 
learning.   
Meanwhile, the type of reading and the type of relationships depicted in the scene 
around Bessie’s ironing table are quite different from those invoked behind the “scarlet 
drapery” of the breakfast-room.  While reading the book on British birds, Jane is secluded 
from the aristocratic circle, allegedly because Mrs. Reed has not heard from Bessie, a 
member of the servant class.  Whether intentional or not, this parallel license, which 
would allow Jane to speak only when Bessie speaks, reinforces a social equality between 
Jane and Bessie.  Indeed, it would be less than surprising if Mrs. Reed intends to initiate 
Jane into a conscious solidarity with the servant class, as it is an ancient custom among 
the aristocrats to take in less fortunate members of the family as servants.  For example, 
the novel presents such an instance in the figure of Mrs. Fairfax.   
 At the same time, the scene with Bessie imagines a reading list that is about 
human society and desire rather than desolate scenes of nature.  Fairy tales, ballads, 
romantic and historical fiction all provide something that the book on arctic and 
Scandinavian birds does not, namely, an imaginative social world whose complexities 
have the potential, if only latently, to at least “ameliorate,” to use Green’s words, the 
stark realities of nature.  Thus when John Reed, upon discovering Jane behind the 
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curtains, imposes an impromptu punishment by throwing a book which cuts her, Jane 
responds by drawing upon the kind of reading more typical of Bessie’s recitations:  
having read Goldsmith’s History of Rome, Jane is able to make a comparison, however 
exaggerated, between John Reed and the most powerful rulers of that civilization which 
was to so heavily influence English language and culture.  “You are like a slave-driver—
you are like the Roman emperors!” she cries.  Immediately they scuffle; Jane is 
victorious but punished, unsurprisingly.  Within a short time she is banished to Lowood 
Institution, where she faces a different set of struggles.         
 In Green’s scheme, the second pedagogical moment, or category, in the text is one 
of “intellectual and familial companionship of homosocial community” (24), a moment 
which encapsulates two narrative passages: first the years that Jane spends at Lowood, 
and, secondly, the time she spends with the Rivers Sisters at Marsh End.  This 
pedagogical moment is telling in that it entails a social orientation quite different from 
that of Gateshead.  At Gateshead, reading is not an encouraged activity: when Bessie tells 
tales, it is an entirely oral performance, the fact of their literary origins being 
unmentioned.  And, in the encounter with John Reed, reading takes on an aspect that is 
entirely foreboding.  John uses a book as a weapon, hurling it at Jane, and he describes 
the Reed library as a possession which he guards jealously.  This covetous possession of 
reading materials reinforces Jane’s inferior position within the Reed household.  “You 
have no business to take our books,” he informs Jane, “you are a dependent. . . . Now, I’ll 
teach you to rummage my book-shelves: for they are mine” (17).  At Lowood, on the 
other hand, reading is actively taught in the classroom and permitted during leisure time.  
On her first morning at the school, Jane is exposed to the orderly training in a basic 
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curriculum:  “repetitions in history, grammar, etc., went on for an hour; writing and 
arithmetic succeeded, and music lessons were given by Miss Temple to some of the elder 
girls” (58).  At Lowood, Jane benefits from instruction by teachers who, unlike the nurse 
at Gateshead, are trained specifically for education as a disciplinary pedagogy.  Their 
reading is performed in a setting designed especially for such instruction, as opposed to 
Gateshead hall, where Bessie tells stories as entertainment as she irons or performs other 
domestic duties. 
 Lowood, in other words, is a modern institutional space explicitly founded for an 
educational purpose.  On her first recess, Jane explores the grounds and finds upon “a 
stone tablet over the door . . . this inscription”:  “‘Let your light so shine before men that 
they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven’” (59).  
Instead of having to hide behind a curtain to furtively snatch a few moments of reading, 
Jane is able to stand alone in the “convent-like garden” and “read these words over and 
over again.”  When she finally is interrupted, it is not by a bullying, importunate boy, but 
by the inadvertent cough of a girl: “the sound of a cough close behind me, made me turn 
my head,” Jane recounts.  But this interruption leads immediately to another moment of 
reading, one which emphatically supports the interpretation of Lowood as a space which 
permits reading, even if it sometimes regulates it strictly.  For the figure who interrupts 
Jane’s reading of the inscription is Helen Burns, who is reading Rasselas.  Helen 
entertains many of Jane’s questions about the book, about “the writing on that stone over 
the door,” and about the school they are both attending. The two students eventually 
become close friends.  Certainly, there is still ostracism at Lowood, such as that 
experienced by the girl with curls in her hair, but the ostracism is limited and regulated 
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such that statements of absolute exclusion are avoided.  There are no arguments at 
Lowood in which Jane says “they are not fit to associate with me,” as she says of the 
Reed children at Gateshead (36). 
 Lowood, then, is a space, not of isolation, but of homosocial community, learning, 
and reading in particular.  And, after Jane leaves Lowood for her first sojourn at 
Thornfield Hall, she finds a similar community at Moor House with the family, and 
especially the sisters, of St. John Rivers.  Unable to match the depths of their learning, 
Jane becomes a fatigued partner in their polite conversations:  “I could talk a while when 
the evening commenced:  but the first gush of vivacity and fluency gone, I was fain to sit 
on a stool at Diana’s feet, to rest my head on her knee, and listen alternately to her and 
Mary; while they sounded thoroughly the topic on which I had but touched” (392).  
Diana, as the leader of the trio, “offered to teach me [Jane] German.  I liked to learn of 
her:  I saw the part of instructress pleased and suited her; that of scholar pleased and 
suited me no less.”  In time, Jane herself becomes an instructress and headmistress of a 
school at nearby Marsh End.  Like Miss Temple at Lowood, part of Jane’s remuneration 
consists of living quarters attached to the school.  Nearly all of the students are illiterate:  
“but three of the number can read:  none can write or cypher” (401).  It seems that all of 
the students are girls, which helps to locate the school within the context of the 
“homosocial community” paradigm, though the fact that the girls are “coarsely clad little 
peasants” perhaps hampers their intimacy with the aristocratic Jane.   
 As I have already indicated, the end of the novel moves Jane outside of the 
pedagogy both of the autodidact and of the homosocial community, ultimately placing 
her within a paradigm characterized by “the intellectual and erotic fulfillment of the 
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heterosexual dyad” (Green 24).  This is strongly evident in the relationship with Mr. 
Rochester, although it might best describe the relationship which St. John offers her—for 
it is St. John, rather than Rochester, who is more interested in the development of Jane’s 
intellectual powers per se.  But the earlier moments, and especially the moments of the 
pedagogy of homosocial community, seem perhaps more powerfully to articulate the 
stakes which the novel explores by way of Jane’s emphatically personal narrative.   
 Green reads this pedagogy by referring to the “libidinal energy” which the 
narrative time and again unleashes, only to recapture it in domestic situations structured 
around gender binaries.  This is the case in the removal of Jane, first from Lowood to 
Thornfield and later from Marsh End to Ferndean, both of which take Jane from a 
feminine, more or less egalitarian, to a hetero-social context of greater intensities of 
hierarchy.  But we also see the dispersal of female homosocial community under the 
impetus of the patriarchal marriage institution in the case of Miss Temple, who removes 
from Lowood to become a wife, and in the case of the Rivers sisters.  In the latter case, 
the sisters pursue new lives, but only at the expense of abandoning their present ones and 
only after Jane has inherited her fortune.  “Choosing to share it with the Riverses,” 
explains Green, “she releases Diana and Mary from the need to work, but ironically that 
release only hastens the final dispersal of this second female community, for the girls are 
now enabled to marry” (35). 
 Thus, from the viewpoint of “protolesbian erotics,” the narrative continuously 
short-circuits female homosocial desire:  “between the cruel economics and the 
compelling erotics (in Brontë’s view) of patriarchal organization, female homosocial 
communities have little chance of survival.”  Green therefore rightly disavows Jane Eyre 
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as a representation of a “fully realized erotic connection”—the limiting of lovers to 
family members at Manor House, the destitution in which Jane arrives there, the morbid 
disease which robs Jane of Helen at Lowood all constructing a ground which only with 
great difficulty could foster an “erotics,” properly denominated.  And, of course, 
patriarchal marriage in every case does indeed seem to capture any available female 
libidinal energy.  Thus, one could conclude, with Green, that when the question of female 
desire in the Victorian period is taken up, Jane Eyre should be quickly shut.  But, I think, 
if we are to allow the question of desire at all, then we cannot, prima facie, exclude Jane 
Eyre.  For though Jane Eyre, as a novel of classic realism, can’t help but to foreclose 
certain desires with a resolution at the end of the narrative, this resolution must not only 
license particular desires, but also recall earlier moments of conflict, in all of which 
certain desires, tensions, and social pressures are enacted in a way that made enough 
sense for contemporary consumers to purchase with scarce money. 
 The earlier moment at Manor House, a moment of a pedagogy developed within 
and relevant to homosocial community, is typical of what makes salient Green’s claim 
that the resolution of the novel does not provide an adequate response to those social 
energies which it has dramatized.  Furthermore, the conclusion, Green argues 
convincingly, offers a denouement in which both pedagogy and homosocial desire are 
foreclosed.  But at this point in Green’s argument, the fact of Jane Eyre’s status as a 
narrative which is eminently “made publicly available” seems to reassert itself—not only 
did the novel go to numerous printings, it has remained, into the twenty-first century, a 
text more or less central to the institution of literary studies (43).  In explaining the 
durability of this text, then, I will argue that it remains current because it animates the 
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very question which the analysis thus far has raised, which indeed was the question 
which it seems Carlyle himself posed when he asked about the appropriate forms of 
authority in the post-aristocratic era.  This question concerns the way to negotiate and 
promulgate a cultural sensibility for modernity in light of the differences which stand 
between itself and its antecedent history.  And, I will argue, the novel Jane Eyre is 
compelling in its performance of this negotiation today because of the way in which it 
invokes gender and pedagogy, namely, in a manner that is explicitly concerned with what 
was once thought to be the “final” or “fundamental” instance of social existence, the 
economic.4
 To resume my original line of argument, then, I must reassert that the final 
passages of Jane Eyre, those in which Jane marries Rochester and performs a number of 
reconciliations with the other characters in the novel, especially St. John Rivers, stands as 
a kind of commentary upon pedagogy, despite the reading by Green.  Her reading, to 
review, concludes that this moment, crucial as it is to understanding the final verdict 
which the text passes upon the theme of pedagogy, represents a failure in the text 
regarding its pedagogical impulse.  The public sphere has been refused in favor of the 
private by the end of the novel, and Jane has similarly refuted the profession of teacher to 
embrace the feminine roles of mother and wife.  Along the way, the homosocial erotics of 
the feminized spaces of learning which Jane has inhabited have been dispersed and 
recaptured in a number of heterosexual domestic spheres, including that of the smaller 
 This is the reason both that I take up the question of desire and that I attend 
so frequently to the conclusion of the novel:  the ending seems to be the location where 
the most acceptable configuration of new cultural and personal desires is presented. 
                                                 
4 Here I draw upon The Political Unconscious, where Fredric Jameson suggests that the economic and the 
cultural can be viewed simultaneously as two parts of the social totality. 
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manor at Ferndean, occupied by both Jane and Rochester at the end of the novel.  Thus 
learning in the text becomes eroticized, not least by the heterosocial domestic 
arrangement with which the novel concludes.  
 To contest this reading, or at least parts of it, would mean to employ two 
arguments, one about the character of public and private spaces in nineteenth-century 
England, the other about the definition of “culture,” per se, about which it may be 
necessary to provide a few words of caution before launching into a more nuanced 
reading of the pedagogical passages which occur over the course of the novel’s narrative.  
The first argument, constructed by Esther Schor and rehearsed by Stephen Behrendt, 
originates in the context of the English cultural responses to Princess Charlotte Augusta’s 
death in the early part of the century.  In Royal Mourning and Regency Culture, Behrendt 
observes that  
 the responses to Charlotte’s death demonstrate that the ostensibly separate realms 
 of private and public experience do not merely complement one another or 
 cooperate in furthering some larger, national goal.  Rather, “they are identified 
 with one another expressly to argue for the necessity of domesticating the nation’s 
 rulers.” [quoting Esther Schor’s Bearing the Dead] 24 
This approach in understanding the relationship between “the realms of private and 
public experience” is highly suggestive when it comes to reading the narrative of Jane 
Eyre, which itself posits the eradication of an expansive aristocratic domesticity in favor 
of a more typically nuclear family, while simultaneously offering this new domestic 
arrangement up as suitable fare for a large readership. 
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 The political subtext of the Jane Eyre novel has powerful resonances with the 
earlier representations of public and private spheres which informed the responses to 
Princess Charlotte’s death, as well.  His lordly manor at Thornfield destroyed, Rochester 
himself has been domesticated and, one might even say, feminized.  This indeed seems to 
be the price of his redemption, and it is in this context that it is necessary to refer to the 
definition of culture offered by Katie King in Theory in its Feminist Travels in order to 
contest Green’s reading of Jane Eyre as refuting the private in favor of the public sphere.  
In defining the meanings of “culture,” King offers one which is highly relevant to my 
reading of Jane Eyre:  “culture also means the art forms of ‘civilization’” (110).   
 This process of “civilization” plays a central role in the novel, both excluding 
Bertha Mason as an acceptable spouse for Rochester and shaping the development of 
both Jane and Rochester himself.  Jane undergoes a transformation whereby she learns to 
no longer giver her “furious feelings uncontrolled play” (47).  Rochester, on the other 
hand, while he is careful to distinguish his actions from his first wife’s “debauchery” 
nonetheless becomes “reckless,” indulging in “dissipation” as his attempts to find a 
suitable mate are thwarted.  Even at the moment when he narrates those events, Rochester 
informs Jane that he is “not cool and dispassionate” (350, 342).  He further invites her to 
“put your finger on my pulse, feel how it throbs, and—beware!” (342).  In a discourse 
which opposes raw dynamism, Rochester cannot fail to be the object of Jane’s own 
civilizing mission. 
 Rather than being merely coincident with King’s notion of culture as an art of 
civilization, Jane Eyre instead indicates the great extent to which culture has been 
imagined according to the paradigm of civilization.  Furthermore, this sense of a 
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civilizing mission of culture suggests the importance of “culture,” especially because it 
shares certain connotations with “pedagogy.”  Thus, for example, when Jane describes 
the students whom she teaches at Marsh End, she, like Carlyle, calls attention not only to 
the “information” which is relayed in the process of education, but also the 
“improvement” of character which is said to accompany such transmission.  In addition, 
because it connotes a wider set of social habits and customs, the category of culture 
allows analyses of pedagogy to move, if uneasily, from classroom-specific settings and 
representations of such settings, to lager social contexts.   
 To move the analysis into the larger social field would be to acknowledge that 
Rochester, in the narrative of Jane Eyre, is positioned as a viable subject of pedagogy, 
and that he, too, has something to learn within the development of the narrative.  It would 
also open the possibility of reading Jane Eyre within the context of changing ideas about 
social spaces in England and the contests around the appropriate affective constructions 
of those spaces.  In this regard, I have already mentioned the several pedagogical 
moments which Green has identified within the novel.  These moments have resonances 
with real, historical, developments in England, although such pedagogical moments 
necessarily inflect, rather than reproduce wholesale, the social body of the English polity. 
 What all of this means for an analysis of the role of pedagogy within Jane Eyre is 
that a two-pronged approach to the reading of the novel is required in order to adequately 
understand how the novel is employing the trope of pedagogy.  On the one hand, it will 
be necessary to understand the resonance which the Jane narrative has with contemporary 
discourses about the role of education, taking into consideration in turn the degree to 
which such discourses conform to, refute, or are indifferent to class- or economic-based 
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ideologies.  For instance, we would want to inquire into what makes possible Jane’s 
statement that her own learning constitutes “a good English education” (101).  On the 
other hand, such an examination hopefully will then allow us to see how education fits 
into ideas about and contests over national spaces in England, considered more generally, 
which should, finally, allow us to see to what extent Jane Eyre is consistent with notions 
about the role of women in “redeeming” an errant aristocracy.  This, I contend is the real 
import of the novel’s problematic conclusion, which should frame any evaluation of its 
claims and successes as a pedagogical tool. 
 
Three Models of Education:  Religious, Charity, and Aristocratic 
 In terms of the educational paradigms with which Jane Eyre is conversant, a 
comparison between Jane’s experiences at Lowood and her expectations for Thornfield is 
sufficient.  While there are other, more or less oblique invocations of education within the 
novel, these two, I would argue, represent the two strongest contenders for some kind of 
educational “representativeness.”  This approach obviously excludes the autodidactic 
familial group at Moor House, which does indeed represent an important kind of 
education in England in the nineteenth century.  As W. B. Stephens writes in Education 
in Britain 1750-1914, “an unknowable, but probably not inconsiderable, number of adults 
also educated themselves at home or through the many adult and Sunday schools, mutual 
improvement and other societies and adult institutions” (26).  Thus the example of the 
autodidact in England was not uncommon in this period.  But, in the novel Jane Eyre, the 
phase of autodidactic learning at Moor House with the Riverses is relatively short-lived 
and is in any case eclipsed by the school at Marsh End, where Jane takes on the 
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responsibilities of a more typically modern village school.  Similarly, the episode at 
Gateshead is brief. 
 Bracketing the settings of Moor House, Gateshead, and the even more important 
Ferndean, then, I will focus on Lowood and Thornfield, though the two, individually, do 
not consistently represent discrete educational paradigms in modern Britain.  For 
example, Mr. Brocklehurst, the evangelical director of Lowood who was modeled on the 
Reverend Carus-Wilson, directs a school which conflates discourses about pedagogy and 
different kinds of historical aims and instruction in nineteenth-century England.  On the 
one hand, the puritanical and evangelical cast of Brocklehurst, along with the fact that his 
model is a reverend, might alert us to the possibility that Lowood is a religious school, of 
the type favored by “many of the English and Welsh middle classes” (Stephens 12).  
Such a school, in Stephens analysis, was calculated not to “make the poor dissatisfied and 
unfit for their natural occupations.”   
 This kind of school, in other words, adhered to an ideology of resignation, 
hierarchy, and historical transcendence: it envisioned a relatively stable, a-historical 
world of hierarchical positions, which it was the duty of students to learn about and fit 
into.  In her interview with Mr. Brocklehurst pertaining to Jane’s admittance to Lowood 
Institution, Mrs. Reed pronounces a set of statements very much parallel to this series of 
expectations which the middle classes, more or less contradictorily, placed upon the 
students of clerically controlled schools.  When she states that “I should wish her [Jane] 
to be brought up in a manner suiting to her prospects,” Mrs. Reed is espousing precisely 
the doctrine of resignation, which stipulates that education is to prepare the student for a 
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position in society, which is already predetermined, rather than changing essentially the 
range of positions or prospects for which the student might be qualified.            
 The continuity between this version of Lowood and the clerical school is evident 
in the “moral and religious” instruction which Stephens explains is central to the latter.  
Brocklehurst assures Mrs. Reed that “humility is a Christian grace, and one peculiarly 
appropriate to the pupils of Lowood.”  Invoking the ideology of “stability,” he further 
adds that “consistency, madam, is the first of Christian duties, and it has been observed in 
every arrangement connected with the establishment of Lowood” (43).  Though such an 
intellectual regimen must have a stodgy aspect from some viewpoints, it also has various 
kinds of compensations, including, most obviously, the equation of position with 
responsibility, as well as the protection of dependents based on their lack of ultimate 
responsibility.  When Miss Temple, the superintendent of the school, breaks the rules in 
order to secure a reasonable meal for the students, she informs the entire school that “‘it 
is to be done on my responsibility,’” thus protecting her dependents from imputation 
should there be consequences.   
 Another concern of nineteenth-century educators was that advancement be based 
upon accomplishment.  This concern is perhaps more problematic, as it doesn’t fit exactly 
with the notion that students at Lowood should learn their places, so to speak.  If one may 
potentially advance based upon accomplishment, then the proper “place” for any given 
student seems to be more or less open to competition.  The rift between position based on 
predetermination and morality or position based on academic qualification is perhaps 
nowhere more strongly dramatized than in the relationship between Helen Burns and 
Miss Scatcherd.  Helen is clearly one of the brightest students in her group, yet Miss 
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Scatcherd seems to single her out for her poor hygiene.  Jane narrates a scene from her 
third day at Lowood which seems fairly representative of the educational procedures at 
Lowood:  “a chapter having been read through twice, the books were closed and the girls 
examined” (64).  Jane herself seems awed by the story of “the reign of Charles I” and the 
“sundry questions about tonnage and poundage, and ship-money which most of them [the 
students] were unable to answer.”   Helen, however, proves to be the unflagging 
exception: “still, every little difficulty was solved instantly when it reached Burns, her 
memory seemed to have retained the substance of the whole lesson, and she was ready 
with answers on every point.”   
 From Helen’s performance, Jane expects that Helen will receive the accolades of 
her instructor, Miss Scatcherd, but she is disappointed, of course.  Instead, Miss 
Scatcherd evaluates Helen based on the qualifications of “plain fare” and “simple attire” 
which Brocklehurst elaborates in his interview with Mrs. Reed.  “You dirty, disagreeable 
girl!” exclaims Miss Scatcherd, “you have never cleaned your nails this morning!”  Of 
course, Burns does not explain that the oversight is entirely beyond her own individual 
control.  Helen herself endorses the kind of morality which Miss Scatcherd purveys, 
explaining, “I am, as Miss Scatcherd said, slatternly; I seldom put, and never keep, things 
in order; I am careless; I forget rules; I read when I should learn my lessons” (67).  In the 
Lowood narrative, Helen ultimately does become the “martyr” to the ideology of self-
resignation which Jane thinks her, while Jane remains more cautious and sometimes 
defiant of such notions:  when she claims that she “must resist those who punish [her] 
unjustly,” Jane includes those who might happen to be above her in the social hierarchy, 
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thus continuing her rebellion against hierarchy which begins with her dispute with Mrs. 
Reed. 
 In fact, the novel seems to combine Jane’s sense of self-importance with a 
discourse of merit.  In the passage immediately after Helen’s death and the school’s 
reformation, Jane, the central character of the novel, quickly narrates her rise in the 
academy:  “I remained an inmate of its walls, after its regeneration, for eight years: six as 
pupil, and two as teacher; and in both capacities I bear my testimony to its value and 
importance” (98).  Though the narrative is quite brief, it is a moment in which Jane 
expresses solidarity with a modern form of mass instruction, which she accordingly calls 
“an excellent education.”  Her proficiency in understanding is highlighted by the fact that 
she “rose to be the first girl of the first class” and was subsequently “invested with the 
office of teacher; which [she] discharged with zeal for two years.”  And, though I have 
suggested that such an ordering of experience describes a commitment to merit rather 
than morality, one could also argue that, in this passage Jane exhibits an ethical 
sensibility which allows her to reflect positively on her “fondness for some of [her] 
studies, and . . . desire to excel in all, together with a great delight in pleasing [her] 
teachers.” 
 The merit-based ethic of Lowood school is, unsurprisingly, more consistent with 
the “charity schools, maintained by subscription” which, Stephens notes “became 
common” by or around 1750 (2).  On their first encounter in the schoolyard, Helen 
explains to Jane that Lowood is “partly a charity-school,” maintained by a combination of 
subscription and tuition fees:  “fifteen pounds is not enough for board and teaching, and 
the deficiency is supplied by subscription” (60).  Though the school caters for students 
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who are “poor,” this poverty should be understood primarily in the familial rather than 
the monetary sense; Helen explains that “charity-children” are those who have a dead 
parent.  Schools which were operated by and for the working classes and the poor on a 
monetary basis were called “dame schools.”  The charity school, on the other hand, 
represents attempts on the part of “benevolent-minded ladies and gentlemen” to alleviate 
the threat to the middle- and upper-class cohesion represented by their orphaned children, 
for the cost of maintaining and educating such children could drag the individual parent 
or relative down the social scale.   
  The status of the charity school as an instrument for social cohesion among the 
middle and upper classes no doubt accounts for the excellent, if culturally over-
determined, curriculum which prevails at Lowood Institution, although the preference for 
secular instruction was not unusual in the nineteenth century.  Stephens explains that 
“textbooks used by all kinds of voluntary schools demonstrate a shift of focus from 
religious topics to a range of secular subjects, including grammar, art, science, history, 
geography and political economy” (17).  The curriculum at Lowood remains something 
of a puzzle, but there are some brief clues.  The first is the description which Jane 
provides of her first day at the school:  “repetitions in history, grammar, &c., went on for 
an hour; writing and arithmetic succeeded, and music lessons were given by Miss Temple 
to some of the elder girls” (58).  This description, together with the “lessons in 
geography” administered to the first class, depicts an interesting conglomeration of new 
and traditional subjects.  History and geography likely would not have been taught as 
distinct subjects perhaps a hundred years earlier, and instruction in written English was 
similarly a fairly recent contender for instruction.  Grammar was one of the trivium of 
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Medieval university instruction, while both arithmetic and music were part of the more 
advanced quadrivium.5
 The second textual clue we have to the curriculum at Brocklehurst’s school 
appears when Jane is advertising for a station somewhere else; her notice informs 
prospective employers that “‘she is qualified to teach the usual branches of a good 
English education, together with French, Drawing, and Music’” (101).  The recurrence of 
music in both of these descriptions provides a revealing occasion for the assessment of 
the Lowood curriculum:  it resonates with the sense of a liberal education as depending 
upon arts which aren’t crafts:  aesthetically pleasing, technically demanding, and yet 
immediately perishable, affective, and, frequently, consumed in their demonstration.  
Music is clearly important both to the novel as a whole and to the education depicted 
therein; when Jane meets Adela, the young pupil sings a song which foreshadows the 
themes of abandonment and love which will inform the whole relationship between 
Rochester and Jane.  As an art, music conforms to the double focus required of many of 
the liberal, rather than applied, arts: commanding proficiency in music implies a level of 
achievement which is inextricable from the leisure available to those who can afford it.  
At the same time, it means being able to commit time and energy to developing skills 
which allegedly refute the necessity of having to work with one’s hands for money.  The 
inclusion of this discipline as both apex of achievement and rarity (it’s taught “to some of 
the elder girls”) as well as a somewhat superfluous, extraneous subject (it’s offered in 
addition to the “usual branches of a good English education”) captures the contradictory 
attitudes about education in Victorian England, where aristocratic circles might use 
education to indicate material abundance, while workers and mechanics might pursue an 
 
                                                 
5 For a brief history of the liberal arts curriculum, see Re-reading English, edited by Peter Widdowson.   
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education more immediately oriented towards practical, that is to say, vocational, ends.  
This difference is illustrated in Jane Eyre by way of the contrast between Jane, who, as a 
potential member of the gentry, is trained in drawing and music, and the nurse Bessie, 
who, though she is able to admire talent in that direction, is not trained in belles-lettres or 
liberal arts. 
 Jane’s (structural) position at Thornfield is as complicated as the curriculum 
which she is to teach.  Though both she and Adela, Rochester, and the larger circle of the 
lower aristocracy in the novel share a common commitment to what more or less amounts 
to a modern version of the liberal arts, their interests in this kind of education are 
somewhat different.  For the aristocratic gentry, the heavily feminized liberal arts 
represent a sign as much of accomplishment as of luxury, which no doubt accounts for 
the less-than-lackluster achievement which the Reed sisters have attained in drawing and 
music.  In the intriguing scene where Bessie administers Jane’s “qualifying 
examinations” immediately before she leaves Lowood, Bessie remarks that Jane has 
painted “as fine a picture as any Miss Reed’s drawing-master could paint, let alone the 
young ladies themselves; who could not come near it” (106).  In this passage, Bessie 
invokes the long-standing discourse of gentility as measured by accomplishment as 
opposed to birth.6
The confluence between achievement and manners in this discourse of “merited 
gentility” is once again demonstrated in Jane’s observations at the social gathering at 
Thornfield which brings the Ingrams to the hall.  There, while watching Blanche Ingram 
converse on botany with Mrs. Dent, Jane is careful to distinguish between good manners 
   
                                                 
6 For an early example of gentility as stemming from personal qualities rather than birth, see “The Wife of 
Bath’s Tale” ll. 1109-1124 in Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales.   
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and intelligence:  “I presently perceived that she was (what is vernacularly termed) 
trailing Mrs. Dent; that is, playing on her ignorance: her trail might be clever, but it was 
decidedly not good-natured” (196).  In reverting to the language of nature (with its 
cognates denoting “birth”), Jane is insisting that the biological and material 
determinations of gentility (“good-nature”) be replaced with considerations of proper 
manners, such as forthrightness and honest dealing. 
 Jane’s interest in so closely observing and evaluating Blanche’s speech and 
manners is in part due to the fact that the two are in a competition for Mr. Rochester’s 
affection.  Immediately before the extended soiree at Thornfield, Jane and Mr. Rochester 
had begun to grow intimate.  He had revealed to her the history by which Adèle had come 
to be his ward, and since the narrative is an explanation of Adèle’s circumstances, it also 
inevitably covers the more seedy ground of his affair with Céline Varens (more about this 
later).  Hence, this narrative has the effect of augmenting Jane’s familiarity with both 
Adèle and Rochester.  Indeed, the closeness between Jane and Rochester had been 
growing already by this point in the narrative.  As Jane explains, “I never seemed in his 
way; he did not take fits of chilling hauteur:  when he met me unexpectedly, the 
encounter seemed welcome; he had always a word and sometimes a smile for me” (166).  
She continues the passage in even stronger language:  “so gratified did I become with this 
new interest added to life, that I ceased to pine after kindred:  my thin crescent-destiny 
seemed to enlarge; the blanks of existence were filled up; my bodily health improved; I 
gathered flesh and strength.”  At the social gathering a month after these reflections, 
however, Rochester seems to indulge the company of only one female, and that female is 
not the intelligent but disinherited Jane, but the elder of the Ingram sisters, Blanche.  
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Thus it is not difficult to detect at least a tinge of disappointment and envy when Jane 
remarks to Mrs. Fairfax that “you see Mr. Rochester evidently prefers her to any of the 
other ladies” (192).   
 The feeling of contention on Jane’s part is shared by Blanche and demonstrated in 
the remarks which the latter makes about governesses.  On one evening of the visit, the 
group indulges in conversation, and Jane explains that Blanche, finding herself and Mr. 
Rochester without a partner, “selects a mate” (199).  Immediately Blanche turns the 
conversation to the topic which had earlier drawn Rochester and Jane closer together, 
namely the subject of “children” and the “little doll” Adèle.  However, instead of tracing 
her history, this time the conversation quickly moves to her present care and the person 
charged with her education, the governess Jane.  Blanche and Lady Ingram then engage 
in a repartee which represents the figure of the governess as variously supernatural, 
revolting or comedic.  Blanche explains that “Mary and I have had, I should think, a 
dozen [governesses] at least in our day; half of them detestable and the rest ridiculous, 
and all incubi” (200).  Her mother responds in a vein that is somewhat less supernatural, 
yet equally derogatory, contending that her governesses have been untalented, whimsical, 
and generally annoying.  She claims, more precisely, to have “suffered a martyrdom from 
their incompetency and caprice.” Miss Ingram agrees, claiming of governesses that “they 
are a nuisance” (201). 
 Green has indicated that just as Jane Eyre was being published, “the Christian 
Socialist reformer F. D. Maurice in London was organizing a series of evening lectures to 
enable governesses to pass an examination that would win them certificates and, the 
organizers hoped, thereby raise their status and salaries” (24).  As Maurice’s efforts seem 
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to be the beginnings, in England, of the movement for organizing governesses into a 
modern profession, with entry requirements and some degree of autonomy, we can infer 
that the anxiety about competence and status were concerns that were shared by the 
gentry—people like the Rochesters, Reeds, and Ingrams, by the governesses collectively 
as they themselves attempted to find and consolidate a position within the emerging 
economy of cultural transmission in nineteenth-century Britain, and by the character Jane 
in the novel.   
 The Ingrams’ notion of the position of the governess, however, seems to imagine 
the figure either as existing outside of the relations of real, material existence (hence they 
are all “incubi”) or as being the sole beneficiaries of their employment by the aristocracy 
and the gentility, thus causing Lady Ingram to imagine herself as a martyr for the 
governesses.  The Ingrams, in other words, construct a governess who becomes a magnet 
for ideas based on fantasy, superstition, and exaggeration, a discursive approach which is 
co-extensive with the extraordinary inversion which occurs between the more or less 
adult governesses and the Ingram children.  This inversion makes of the governess a 
figure who is tormented by the pupils she is hired to train and seems to endorse a 
complete lack of social propriety on the part of the children.  Miss Ingram remarks that 
“‘the best fun was with Madame Joubert. . . . I see her yet in her raging passions, when 
we had driven her to extremities—spilt our tea, crumbled our bread and butter, tossed our 
books up to the ceiling, and played a charivari with the ruler and desk, the fender and 
fire-irons.”  In response to this description, Blanche’s brother, Lord Theodore Ingram, 
adds narrative description which emphasizes the way in which the twins would “turn the 
table”:  “the poor old stick used to cry out ‘Oh you villains childs!’—and then we 
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sermonized her on the presumption of attempting to teach such clever blades as we were, 
when she was herself so ignorant.’”   
 Yet this discourse about the supernatural and perverse character of governesses, 
should be read as more or less residual within the cultural construction of the novel itself, 
and there are several reasons for this.  Within the very context of the conversation among 
the upper classes at Thornfield, the Eshton sisters seem to complicate the “fantastic” 
discourse about governesses formulated by the Ingrams.  Though they, too, narrate 
experiences with their governess which depict themselves as unruly, they give an 
interpretation of their narrative that casts the children, their former selves, as at fault and 
the governess as good-natured and patient.  “She would bear anything,” explains Amy, 
“nothing would put her out.”  Perhaps a more obvious reason for saying that the Ingrams’ 
attitudes are “residual” is provided in the conclusion of the novel, to which I have already 
referred, and which imagines a changed Rochester who is able to marry the former 
governess and teacher Jane.  This narrative choice necessarily entails the rejection of the 
Ingrams and their commitment to an ideology of value strongly connected to birth and 
social class, which is perhaps best considered while keeping in mind that the Ingrams 
voice this commitment in part out of an anxiety toward the threat which Jane indeed 
poses in the competition for Rochester’s love.                              
 The consideration of the narrative’s closure, however, is premature, requiring as it 
does a more thorough examination of the way the novel poses the problem of the 
governess Jane and the family that employs her.  For what we can observe in the novel, 
along with the ascendant notions about a social value which consist in character rather 
than primarily familial or economic determination, is nothing less than a nearly 
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overwhelming anxiety about the way in which English education will be carried out in 
the era of emergent industrialism.  If we are to take account of this anxiety, we will have 
to read with an eye towards the similarities and differences between Jane and the other 
characters in the novel, paying special attention to the comparisons which can be made 
between Jane and the charge whom she is to tutor at Thornfield, Adèle.  For, in some 
ways, Adèle functions as a kind of double for Jane in the narrative—both are cast as 
pupils and as Rochester’s wards at points in the novel.  And, further, the very fact that 
Jane has found employment at Thornfield speaks to a boundary between the aristocratic 
home and the modern, charitable institution of education that is passable, at least under 
certain circumstances.  But, in order to do justice to the nuances of the literary 
imagination by which Brontë depicts Jane’s social conflicts, we will also have to read 
with a kind of double focus.  This is the kind of double focus to which Green alludes 
when she says that Jane was “both removed and exemplary” when it comes to 
understanding the profession-based consciousness gradually being developed by 
organizations such as the Governesses’ Benevolent Institute and by individuals such as F. 
D. Maurice at the middle of the nineteenth century.  But, in its double focus, this way of 
reading should also extend its historical purview to include, for example, the alliance 
suggested in the narrative between the aristocratic gentry and the merchant class when 
Jane’s benefactor, a wine trader, bestows upon Jane an inheritance that allows her to enter 
into marriage with Rochester, a well-to-do landowner.  Even more interesting is the 
eventual and problematic rejection of colonialism in favor of something more like an 
English conservative feminism, whereby Jane refuses St. John’s religious mission to 
India.  But for the present it is necessary to return to the narrative of Jane and Rochester’s 
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early courting rituals and the discussions that occur there concerning Adèle, in order to 
better elaborate and frame the novel’s discourse about education, class, and domesticity.      
 Jane, in taking on Adèle as her pupil has, so to speak, reached the top of her 
profession.  Out of a school (Lowood) of eighty pupils, Jane had previously become one 
of only four or five teachers.  Most of these, at least as they are earlier described in the 
narrative, were not themselves pupils of Lowood school.  We are not told precisely what 
the outlook of the students at the school is, but from what we know about Jane’s case and 
the poor conditions of the school which result in an outbreak of typhus, they can’t be 
excellent, though they do improve with the modifications made in the wake of the 
pandemic.  Naturally, the students present quite a contrast from the child, like the Reed or 
the Brocklehurst girls, who might receive instruction from a governess.  If the prospects 
of such schoolchildren did improve, it was likely as a result from a change of prospects 
for the extended family, but in Jane’s case, her stepmother doesn’t remarry and the only 
son becomes a profligate.  That Jane’s exceptional achievement is rewarded with one of a 
small handful of positions at a very small wage, even though she is quite young, perhaps 
says something about the real limits of a meritocracy in the face of the institutions of the 
aristocratic family.   
 Those institutions form one of the central points of anxiety in the novel, and the 
brief Adèle narrative imagines some fractures in the constellation which makes the 
governess an integral component in the reproduction both of aristocratic families and of 
aristocratic cultural values.  When Rochester tells Jane how he came to be Adèle’s 
guardian, he represents himself as the mythical figure of the male aristocratic lover.  
Adèle’s mother, Céline, is an opera-dancer, the stereotypical profession of an aristocratic 
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paramour.  Her French nationality further associates her with a decadent, superficial, and 
frivolous aristocracy, which stands in sharp contrast with the staid, plain, “‘frank and 
sincere’” traits of Jane’s upright character (153).  Rochester himself is acutely aware of 
the conventionality of his affair with Céline.  He explains that “[he] began the process of 
ruining myself in the received style; like any other spoonie.  [He] had not, it seems, the 
originality to chalk out a new road to shame and destruction, but trode the old track with 
stupid exactness not to deviate an inch from the beaten center” (160).  Both his love for 
“the Varens,” and her disappointment of him endorse a carefree and indeed almost 
careless sexuality frequently associated with the leisurely aristocracy.7
 But the conclusion of this narrative, the part which explicitly addresses Adèle, 
depicts a different set of feelings and commitments, and, indeed, a different aristocracy.  
After the separation of Céline and Rochester, Céline gives birth to Adèle, claims the child 
is Rochester’s and then, some years later, finally abandons the child to destitution in 
Paris.  Rochester, of course, adopts the child, even though he “acknowledged no natural 
claim on Adèle’s part to be supported by me” (164).  Whereas the narrative begins 
entirely in the paradigm of the rakish aristocracy, by the end, Rochester has succeeded in 
contrasting his own generosity and responsibility with the “frivolous, mercenary, 
heartless, and senseless” conversation of his former mistress and her lover.  The 
conventional narrative of the paramour, at this point, is subverted to some degree, 
recasting Rochester by virtue of the fact that he “he took the poor thing [Adèle] out of the 
slime and mud of Paris, and transplanted it here, to grow up clean in the wholesome soil 
of an English country garden.” 
  
                                                 
7 For a archetypal example of such an ethos, see George Etherege’s Man of Mode. 
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 This decision to “transplant” Adèle, moreover, has the effect of establishing a 
complicated analogy between Mrs. Reed and Jane on the one hand, and Rochester and 
Adèle on the other.  On the one hand, both Jane and Adèle are feminine figures whose 
social and class positions are somewhat precarious—Jane as the adoptive daughter of 
familiar relations and Adèle as the illegitimate child of Rochester’s mistress.  In 
acknowledging her sympathy for Adèle, Jane explains that “Adèle is not answerable for 
either her mother’s faults or yours” (165).  And “now that I know she is, in a sense, 
parentless”—like Jane herself—the latter “shall cling closer to her than before.”   
Thus, even in the novel’s movement from Gateshead to Thornfield and then to 
Ferndean, we are provided with a series of scenes which become progressively more 
explicit about the obligations and responsibilities of the aristocratic household.  At 
Gateshead with the Reeds, young John emphatically reminds Jane that the protections of 
the aristocratic household should not really extend to Jane and that her position there is 
highly vulnerable:  “‘you are a dependent, mama says; you have no money; your father 
left you none; you ought to beg, and not to live here with gentlemen’s children like us’” 
(17, emphasis added).  Moreover, when Jane encounters Rochester’s ward Adèle, she 
refutes this early, literalist and biological understanding of the family and augments 
Rochester’s own begrudging hospitality.  Of course, Rochester’s hospitality is bestowed 
as a direct corollary of his own economic position, which allows him, when asked by 
Blanche Ingram about the costs of rearing his child at home, to answer, quite seriously, 
“‘I have not considered the subject’” (200).  Nonetheless, the eventual fates of the Reed 
siblings indicate that it would have been within Mrs. Reed’s means to raise Jane as one of 
her own, especially as additional children come less expensive, and the particular enmity 
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between these two figures—Jane and Mrs. Reed—remains something of an enigma 
within the plot structure.  The difference between Rochester and Mrs. Reed, on the other 
hand, is the difference between good and bad guardians, one of whom is generous 
towards wards, and one of whom is withholding.    
 But these analogies, which posit Adèle and Jane as dependents or transplants who 
are in some ways similar and Rochester and Mrs. Reed as guardians who are quite 
different, inform the novel’s interrogation of gendered affect.  On the more superficial 
level of the central characters in the narrative, the discourse of gendered affect archly 
acknowledges that sympathy carries with it economic costs.  Indeed, the costs of 
sympathy are too great for nearly all the characters from the novel’s first hundred pages, 
male or female.  Regarding later parts of the novel, we can, as I have hinted above, 
interpret the bodily damage which Rochester suffers, the privation which Jane undergoes 
upon leaving Thornfield, as well as the economically reduced, if more equitable, 
prospects for the couple as examples of the economic “costs” of sympathy and love.  Yet 
what is different about this modern allegory of romance—as opposed to, say, Odysseus’s 
love for Penelope or Paris’s for Helen—is not that there are costs or obstacles associated 
with it, but rather that we are meant to experience these costs as painful losses rather 
than, as formerly, aggrandizements of the prize itself.  Furthermore, the conclusion of 
Brontë’s novel deploys sympathy in a way that adds further complications to this modern 
formulation of gender and desire:  it returns us to a feminized domestic space in which 
Jane has now gained the hospitality which previously belonged only to Rochester or the 
Rivers sisters.  In this new arrangement, it’s difficult to say whether Jane has been 
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elevated to Rochester’s level or whether Rochester is now vulnerable to the kind of 
overbearing guardianship which keeps Bertha Mason locked in the attic.  
In any event, this version of gender distinction, which suggests that certain affects 
are particularly, if not exclusively, feminine, as well as insisting on the sympathetic affect 
as the prerogative of femininity, has raised questions for later generations of women 
writers.  Indeed, the most famous tribute to Jane Eyre, Jean Rhys’s rewriting of the 
narrative from the points of view of Bertha and Edward Rochester, is itself motivated by 
the thematics of sympathy, Rhys seemingly compelled to give voice to a fellow, albeit 
fictional, Creole out of sympathy with her plight.  In the Rhys narrative, we are led to 
understand both that the psychic disintegration which plagues Bertha Mason is a social 
disintegration and that this social disintegration in turn acts as a sort of siren call for help 
and solidarity which Rhys, if not Rochester, heroically attempts to provide.   
When Rochester and Bertha are on their honeymoon, still in the West Indies, 
Bertha (whose name is Antoinette, which Rochester eventually refuses to call her) 
explains the ritual singing which the servants surreptitiously perform around the family 
house where they are vacationing.  She then goes on to explain how this song fits her into 
the social context of the island, a context which she feels is becoming increasingly 
fleeting and hostile to her. 
‘Did you hear what that girl was singing?’ Antoinette said. 
‘I don’t always understand what they say or sing.’ Or anything else. 
‘It was a song about a white cockroach.  That’s me.  That’s what they call 
all of us who were here before their own people in Africa sold them to the slave 
traders.  And I’ve heard English women call us white niggers.  So between you 
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[sic] I often wonder who I am and where is my country and where do I belong and 
why I was ever born at all. 102    
In this last paragraph, Antoinette, or Bertha, lapses into the kind of delirium which 
Deleuze and Guattari describe in their Anti-Oedipus, where a small detail—in this case 
the song—seems to escape all context, escaping out onto ever wider terrain, terrain that is 
simultaneously social, unbounded, and highly antagonistic.8
                                                 
8 For an explanation of the social causes of delirium, see Anti-Oedipus, by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. 
  Rather than seeing the song 
about the white cockroach for what it is, namely an insistent reminder of her own history 
precisely within the milieu of the Indies, she takes it to be the very opposite of this, a 
moment of cultural amnesia or paranoia which makes her wonder “where is my country.”  
Though her maid Christophine exhorts her to “have spunks and do battle for yourself,” 
Antoinette begins to experience the foreclosure of her own identity and subjectivity as the 
race relationships on the island and the fluctuations of the colonial structure make her, a 
Dominican Creole, stand in materially as the agent of white oppression on the island.  
And, though she almost escapes this fate by becoming indigent, and therefore harmless, 
the antagonisms between her family and the African West Indians become exacerbated as 
her mother makes one last attempt to reconnect with the economic elite of European 
Colonialism by marrying Mr. Mason.  She explains that “the black people did not hate us 
quite so much when we were poor.  We were white but we had not escaped and soon we 
would be dead for we had no money left” (34).  Yet after the new alliance with the 
wealthy Mason, “it had started up again and worse than before, my mother knows but she 
can’t make him believe it.”  At first glance, these observations seem to have moved 
somewhat far afield of the subject of affect and the construction of feminism within the 
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text of Jane Eyre, yet we will see that there is indeed good reason to argue that the 
fluctuations in colonial fortunes is intimately bound up with gendered affect.  I will also 
attempt to demonstrate, in the next section, that this concern with the colonial enterprise 
is only superficially distant from the main trajectory of the narrative itself, and that the 
construction of a pedagogical yet romantic feminism in the novel depends upon the 
repudiation both of Bertha’s legitimate claim to marriage and of the missionary project 
which St. John River’s will undertake in India.  It goes without saying, of course, that 
both of these figure as subtle yet distinct reminders of the proximity of colonialism to the 
main strata of the story.  In the next section and the conclusion of this essay, I will return 
to the colonial dimension of Jane Eyre, via a brief summary of the history of gender 
difference and commentary on gendered affect in the Victorian era.        
 
Gendered Affect, Public Spaces, Feminist Anti-Imperialism 
 Brontë’s narrative has strong resonances with an interpretive problem which has 
gained currency recently with those critics interested in the historical configurations and 
determinations of gender.  Specifically, such critics have asked about gender difference 
as a construct which is embedded in and sanctioned through aesthetic and artistic works.  
Regarding dramas performed in eras antecedent to the Victorian, Phyllis Rackin notes 
that “as the term gender roles indicates, there is an important sense in which gender is a 
kind of act for all women [and men],” though no less potentially painful for all that (29).  
Rackin situates her analysis in the shift in theatrical representation between the 
Renaissance and the Jacobean periods.  Rackin examines John Lyly’s Gallathea (c. 1587) 
as more or less representative of the first and consistent with the traditional “idealized 
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image of the adrogyne.”  In the treatment of the two main characters’ gender—both of 
them are female—the narrative responds to a relative indifference within early English 
Renaissance culture towards gender difference in the context of marriage arrangements.  
Though their gender identity, revealed near the end of the play, threatens to obviate the 
marriage, “a kind of celestial sex-change operation” will set things right, and “one of the 
girls will be changed into a boy; we are not told—and the girls do not care—which one” 
(30).  This play’s paradigmatic representation of indifferently gendered domesticity, 
however, comes to be replaced by a more essentializing distinction between the genders 
over the Jacobean period, perhaps best exemplified in Ben Jonson’s Epicoene, where 
androgyny is now represented by way of “the satirical portrait of the hermaphrodite,” no 
longer a figure of transcendence but of ridicule.  At the end of this period, Rackin 
observes, females became subject—to varying degrees, no doubt—to The Lawes 
Resolution of Women’s Rights (1632), which asserted that “all women are understood 
either married or to be married” (30 in Rackin), and therefore as accessories to the male 
gender.  It is not difficult to anticipate then, that this early moment of distinctly gendered 
identities would foreshadow an equally disadvantageous discourse about the separation of 
distinctly gendered spheres of action which becomes pronounced in the Victorian period. 
 Brontë’s writings, however, seem to embrace the ideas both of distinct identities 
and of distinct spheres which are appropriate to the female.  In her chapter on the 
Brontë’s in Relative Creatures:  Victorian Women in Society and the Novel, Françoise 
Basch points out something of this fact when she recounts Brontë’s “rare comments on 
feminism” (161).  In these comments she responded to Harriet Taylor’s “Woman’s 
Mission” in The Westminster Review, an argument for the removal of barriers to women 
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entering the professions.  “When I first read the paper,” wrote Brontë, “I though it was 
the work of a powerful-minded, clear-headed woman, who had a hard, jealous heart, and 
nerves of bend leather; a woman who longed for power and never felt affection” (in 
Basch 161).  This rather ad feminem excerpt from Brontë’s response indicts Taylor 
precisely in those ways which most strongly correspond to the Victorian ideology about 
women: namely, that they are creatures made up primarily of nerves and heart.  The 
nerves shouldn’t be too strong, nor the heart too ambitious, and if either part defied 
expectation, it was for want of never having been exposed to feminine “affection,” 
though we might paradoxically presume that it could be a male who would have offered 
that emotional nourishment.  In any event, the basic assumption of this part of Brontë’s 
response to Taylor invokes all of the old hermaphroditic suspicious—maybe Taylor’s 
fault is that she is too manly—familiar since Jonsonian theater.  We might thus expect 
Brontë’s insistence on the desirability of clear gender distinctions to play into a generally 
regressive stance about gender relationships, domesticity, and pedagogy.  However, I will 
suggest that such an anticipation is disappointed in Jane Eyre, if not undone entirely. 
 In the St. John narrative, and in his failed proposals to Jane, Brontë extends the 
discourse of gendered affect to a discourse about gendered spaces.  The St. John narrative 
invokes the distinction between gendered spaces from Jane’s earliest appearance at Moor 
House.  After she has recovered from the illness which inaugurates her stay there, Jane 
discovers a domestic intimacy with Diana and Mary, whom she could join “in all their 
occupations; converse with them as much as they wished, and aid them when and where 
they would allow me” (391).  This intimacy and the comfort which Jane finds in it is 
closely related to its physical setting, the middle-class household:  Jane informs us that 
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Mary and Diana “loved their sequestered home” and that she, too, found in it “a charm 
both potent and present.”   
 By contrast, St. John maintains a relationship of distance to both the house and its 
denizens.  “As to Mr. St John,” relates the narrator, “the intimacy which had arisen so 
naturally and rapidly between me and his sisters, did not extend to him” (392).  Unlike 
the sisters, who are sequestered at Moor House, St. John “was comparatively seldom at 
home:  a large portion of his time is devoted to visiting the sick and poor among the 
scattered populations of his parish,” thus emphasizing the contrast between the stationary, 
feminized domestic space and the mobile, masculine space of vocational work.  When the 
sisters remonstrate against his persistence in weather that is “very unfavorable,” he 
discounts their objections, saying “and if I let a gust of wind or a sprinkling of rain turn 
me aside from these easy tasks, what preparation would such sloth be for the future I 
propose myself?” (393).  His response simultaneously invokes a strenuous masculinity 
unhampered by concerns for personal safety while also subtly criticizing the domestic 
refuge as a space of inactivity. 
Of course, Jane soon becomes a teacher at the new village school, thus removing 
her from the domestic arrangement at Moor House.  This change not only places Jane in a 
context that is distinct from the middle-class home, it also threatens to substitute St. 
John’s missionary masculinity for Jane’s newfound domesticity.  As he offers Jane the 
position of headmistress of the new school, he explains that “Morton, when [he] came to 
it two years ago, had no school: the children of the poor were excluded from every hope 
of progress.  I established one for boys: I mean now to open a second school for girls” 
(397).  This offer of employment foreshadows a trajectory in the narrative whereby St. 
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John will request Jane not only to work for him, but to do so at the cost of entering into a 
marriage with him that will doubtless be short on romance.  At this point, the dialectic 
which begins with the marriage romance in Lyly’s Gallathea seems to be complete:  
whereas gender was previously an insignificant barrier to romantic love and, eventually, 
marriage, in the St. John narrative, marriage and romantic love are figured as 
insignificant casualties in the service of a masculinist notion of work and colonial 
mission.  It is her rejection of this equation, I would contend, that makes Brontë’s 
particular notions about gender so compelling. 
 
Conclusion 
         To conclude, then, and to return to my original contention about a narrative 
resolution which can be institutionalized, I have read between two figures of Jane Eyre, 
either of which might answer the question, who is the main character of Jane Eyre?  I 
have tried to shy away from the answer which Jean Rhys has suggested, namely that the 
main character of the novel is Bertha Mason.  Instead, I have more strongly relied upon 
Laura Morgan Green’s reading, which implies that Jane as a teacher should have been the 
protagonist, or would have provided a better one.  That Jane the wife overshadows Jane 
the teacher accounts for Green’s disappointment in the novel’s failure to render a 
“public” resolution.   
 There are several objections which one might make to Green’s reading, however.  
Of course, the novel’s resolution lies in marriage, not in pedagogical employment.  This 
much is self-evident.  However, given this, one must question Green’s project from the 
start:  if the resolution of the novel isn’t written in terms of a pedagogical situation for 
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Jane, perhaps pedagogy is not the central theme of the novel, important as that theme 
may otherwise be.  The central conflict of the novel for Jane is how to negotiate a 
position within her social milieu that is acceptable for a person like herself.  Pedagogy 
becomes one of the means to such a position, but, as the novel demonstrates, pedagogy is 
emphatically not that position.  This is not merely to state that the “pedagogical 
expectation” which Green places upon the narrative is unwarranted but rather that such 
an expectation does not take into consideration the fuller play of conflicting energies 
within the plot.      
 Green’s claim that Jane Eyre is constructed around an “interior” (Jane’s) that 
“cannot be externalized” can be taken less seriously.  As a first-person account, the entire 
narrative is vulnerable to the charge of being overly determined by Jane’s “interior” 
thinking.  Furthermore, no narrative is ever fully “externalized.”  There is always 
something left unsaid, despite efforts to make totalizing gestures or to pretend that a 
given narrative has reached the end of the world and of experience.  In this regard, it’s 
difficult to make a special argument for the case of Jane Eyre; as a narrative, the novel is 
structurally determined to be inadequate, but, in the end, this is the defining characteristic 
of narrative sui generis.  
 Indeed, it makes more sense to contend with Green’s implied argument about the 
character of social and public spaces in nineteenth-century England.  For it seems that in 
Jane Eyre, as Green suggests, the larger stakes are about the role of these public spaces in 
the formation of an English culture that had been traditionally determined by the 
aristocracy and which was now being subjected to new kinds of pressures.  The struggle 
between, for instance, aristocratic hegemony and the new awareness about the power of a 
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woman’s mind or the status of pedagogical work manifests as a larger discourse in the 
novel about the character of social spaces—whether these spaces are imagined as 
primarily public or private.  As Hsin Ying Chi argues in Attic and Artist: A Study of 
Poetic Space in Nineteenth-century Women’s Writing, the representation of social spaces 
was frequently informed by gender stratification.  Chi writes that “man is symbolically 
the main structure of the social system represented as a mansion while woman is 
subordinate to man, just as the attic is attached to the house” (102).   
 In a powerful argument, Chi asserts that “locked in the attic, Bertha reveals the 
true picture of women’s position in society—a neglected woman in a neglected place.”  
In this passage, the critic settles upon what must surely be one of the central elements of 
Jane Eyre: namely, place and setting themselves.  What, after all, would the novel be 
without the cruel indifference of Gateshead, the puritanical regimen of Lowood, or the 
grandeur of Thornfield?  Even the reduced manor at which the novel concludes is 
carefully chosen to resonate with an emotion that combines failure and success, gain and 
loss.  Furthermore, Chi convincingly argues for the way in which the social spaces of the 
novel are heavily determined by the genders of those who occupy them: “if buildings are 
tropes for social categories [or identitites], Thornfield represents Rochester’s identity 
while Bertha’s identity can only be found in the attic.”  Chi concludes by asking “what 
does civilization bring to women?”  Her answer is that “they have no position, no space 
beyond the walls of the house, or the attic actually, not even at home or in society.”  This 
certainly is the case with Bertha, who destroys Thornfield Hall by igniting a fire which 
ironically clears the path for the marriage between Rochester and Jane.  However, to 
assert that Jane, on the other hand, has “no place . . . at home” is difficult to reconcile 
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with Green’s claim that Jane’s embrace of a domestic space at the end of the novel is 
precisely the novel’s weakest point.   
Indeed, we have to accept that race and geographical identity (Bertha is a Creole, 
after all) bear no insignificant weight in the novel, thus stipulating that Jane’s treatment 
as a woman is different from Bertha’s.  But it must be admitted that there is, however 
briefly, a kind of collusion between Bertha’s destruction of Thornfield and Jane’s 
desire—as I have already mentioned, the destruction of Thornfield makes Rochester and 
Jane’s marital plans legitimate.  The fire and Bertha in a sense provide cover for the 
surprise which the reader feels at Jane’s tacit endorsement of the destruction of 
masculinist aristocratic space and the simultaneous transformation of English cultural 
forces.  To provide an example of this transformation, we should consult a passage in 
Jane Eyre which presages that passage with which I began this essay.  The earlier passage 
in the novel is also a sort of homecoming:  it describes Jane’s return to Thornfield after 
her visit to Gateshead, her old childhood home, and just as she is beginning to experience 
“new-born agony” surrounding her feelings for Mr. Rochester.   
As she returned to Thornfield, Jane “felt glad as the road shortened before [her]: 
so glad that [she] stopped once to ask what that joy meant” (274).  Of course the joy is 
the anticipation of having “the privilege of again looking upon Mr. Rochester, whether he 
looked on me or not.”  It only adds to this excitement that once the two meet, Rochester 
refers to Thornfield as Jane’s home, although Jane plans to leave soon because of the 
feigned agreement between Rochester and Miss Ingram.   
But the most important part of the passage takes the guise of a rumination which 
foreshadows the reunion at the end of the novel, at Ferndean.  Jane considers that “I knew 
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there would be pleasure in meeting my master again,” and then, after several 
qualifications, insists “there was ever in Mr. Rochester (or so I thought) such a wealth of 
the power of communicating happiness, that to taste but of the crumbs he scattered to 
stray and stranger birds like me, was to feast genially” (275).  By the end of the novel, the 
roles of guest and host, caretaker and ward have, of course been reversed—though still 
the smaller “sparrow” (488), Jane is the one who purveys to Rochester.  And, though this 
promulgation occurs in a domestic rather than an educational setting, it undoubtedly 
involves a reversal that would have been impossible had it not been for her pedagogical 
training and the pedagogical situation which first brought her to Thornfield. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
The “True Golden Gold”:  Exchange, Counterfeit, and Learning in Our Mutual Friend 
 
As several critics have noticed, Our Mutual Friend develops the thematics of 
incontinence; it seeks to represent adequately the notion of a loss of control.  In terms of 
the narrative’s social significance, this loss of control is prefigured or coextensive with 
the death of the father figure (in Mr. Harmon) at one extreme.  One critic, Larisa 
Tokmakoff Castillo, has pointed out the failing of the word of the father, embodied in the 
Harmon will, to control social arrangements from beyond the grave.  In “Between ‘the 
Cup and the Lip’: Retroactive Constructions of inheritance in Our Mutual Friend,” she 
points out that “Pleasant Riderhood, Lizzie Hexam, Jenny Wren, Eugene Wrayburn, John 
Harmon, and even poor Twemlow are bound by their fathers’ demands” (52).  Yet 
Castillo also shows the failure of the desire of the father because “when enacted, the will 
does not close itself off” (45).  Instead, the will “remains open to any number of readings, 
which all engage, and thus reconstruct, a past.”  Furthermore, Lauren M. Goodlad has 
indicated that one of the most compelling moments in the narrative is the loss of control 
which the schoolmaster undergoes.  But in these two moments, the figure of the will and 
of the headmaster who cannot keep his head, we are presented with two different 
moments—two different oedipal moments—within the larger context of patriarchal 
capitalism.  One is a moment of cross-generational relationships; the other is a moment of 
intra-generational relationships.  As the status of the father figures becomes more 
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ambiguous, the relationships between the siblings becomes more dynamic and, 
occasionally, more dangerous, or so the narrative would have us believe. 
 If we are to understand the narrative of Our Mutual Friend as one intimately tied 
to “the puzzles of a modern liberal society” (Goodlad 160), then it may be worthwhile to 
read the Harmon Will as a metonym for the national patrimony: the will establishes the 
bases upon which the new generation will form alliances and antipathies; it decrees at the 
same time as it forbids, determining the share each character will receive in the new 
arrangements.  At the same time, the narrative itself mimics this function of the will: by 
imagining some alliances as allowable and others as impermissible, the narrative 
structures social relationships as well as social exclusions.  Yet this is not all the will and 
the patrimony accomplish, for what they represent is a kind of void in the social order, a 
void which is foreshadowed when Harmon sends his son away to school across the seas.  
The great Harmon fortune, in turn, acts as a kind of anti-matter which sets the narrative in 
motion.  At first, it simply disturbs, as in the case of Bella Wilfer:  “The idea of being a 
kind of widow, and never having been married!  And the idea of being as poor as ever 
after all . . .” (OMF 37).  But before long, it positively draws characters into an orbit of 
action, and this is true whether we speak of Boffin, Wegg, Rokesmith, Lightwood, or 
Wrayburn.  The numerous questions we are compelled to pose regarding these characters 
speaks to the incontinence of the narrative and its social world.  Who is Rokesmith?  
What will happen to Charlie?  To Lizzie?  These questions have resonance precisely 
because the trajectories of capitalism are drawing into their orbits nearly all of the 
characters in the novel.  In general, then, what the novel represents is a social order that is 
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undecided, one in which “Christian and civic ideals are disrupted by bourgeois social 
ambitions” (Goodlad 163). 
 Another way of describing or explaining the social formation of this novel is that 
offered by Paul A. Jarvie in Ready to Trample on All Human Law:  Financial Capitalism 
in the Fiction of Charles Dickens.  In Jarvie’s reading, metonymy, or contiguity, is the 
primary rhetorical device around which the narrative of Our Mutual Friend is ordered.  
Metonymy is deeply concerned with the way values circulate, exchange, and transform 
between locations.  Socially speaking, metonymy in the novel corresponds to a phase of 
capitalism which is characterized both by the petite-bourgeois accumulation of the elder 
Harmon and by the venture capital of the Veneering circle, and especially the Lammles 
and Fascination Fledgby.  At the fictional level, metonymy is roughly equivalent to the 
power of money to exchange; rhetorically its defining traits are closer to that of similitude 
than analogy.  The metonym in Our Mutual Friend further adds to the thematics of 
incontinence by reminding us of the power of commodities and the creations of humans 
to take on a life of their own beyond the control or will of their originator. 
 Now, as Jarvie would be the first to admit, the connection between narrative and 
commodity is hardly new or untheorized.  But what I propose is to examine more closely 
the relationship which obtains Our Mutual Friend between narrative and commodity on 
the one hand and learning and counterfeit on the other.  For it becomes clear early in the 
novel that learning, like money, is meant to ascribe some kind of social status to its 
bearer:  Boffin seeks to redress his neglected education by asking Wegg to read from a 
historical narrative—Boffin believes it to be the Decline and Fall of the Rooshan Empire, 
but of course it is of the Roman.  The narrative of Charlie Hexam describes a youth who 
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wants to improve his outlook in life.  Bella’s conversion is instigated by Boffin’s reading 
about and impersonation of misers.   
These examples are haunted by the counterfeit, however.  The acts of 
impersonation and fraud which accompany the text’s invocation of literacy necessarily 
shape the text’s discourse about the value of learning itself.  I will ask, then, with Roland 
Barthes in S/Z, the question raised, perhaps, by every narrative:  “What should the 
narrative be exchanged for?  What is the narrative ‘worth’”? (89).  Barthes explains that 
narrative, like Jarvie’s metonymy, “is determined not by a desire to narrate, but by a 
desire to exchange:  it is a medium of exchange, an agent, a currency, a gold standard” 
(90).   
Though Barthes is speaking of a text somewhat different from Dickens’s, still one 
may wonder whether the paradigm of exchange, imbricated as it is within the idea of 
narrative, isn’t a useful tool to understand the representations of learning which the novel 
offers.  If it is useful in this regard, however, it is precisely because exchange posits the 
possibility of counterfeit.  Without exchange, counterfeit poses little significance.  With 
the appearance and preponderance of exchange, the counterfeit assumes a singular role in 
determining not only monetary, but social and literary value.  As I pursue this 
investigation, I will focus on three distinct plot lines:  the Boffin/Wegg narrative; the 
Headstone/Wrayburn/Lizzie plotline; and, finally, the Boffin/Rokesmith/Bella plotline, 
the narrative most central to the novel.  I will conclude by arguing that this last plotline is 
the most challenging of the three, because the counterfeit gains a positive valuation.   
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The Boffin/Wegg Narrative:  Parodies of Education 
As a result of the death of Mr. Harmon and his two offspring, Mr. Boffin finds himself 
the heir to the Harmon fortune.  For the most part this fortune takes the form of “dust 
heaps,” large piles of detritus which contain a motley assortment of items, some of which 
are nonetheless presumably quite valuable.  The haphazard mixture of value in these 
heaps no doubt further speaks to the working of metonymy in the novel’s narrative 
structure.  But even more important is the effect which the transfer of this value to Mr. 
Boffin has upon him.  For the transfer of this value to Boffin legitimates a newfound 
social pretension in the Boffin couple.  As he explains to Silas Wegg on his first visit to 
the Bower, “‘Mrs. Boffin . . . is a highflyer at Fashion.’”  And, although Mr. Boffin 
explains “I ain’t as yet as Fash’nable as I may come to be,’” in the course of the novel he 
will come to share Mrs. Boffin’s perspective on the advantages of being fashionable (54).  
In the meanwhile, Boffin hires Wegg to add a veneer of culture to the establishment.  
Wegg, in turn, sees his own prospects rise. 
 The novel does not, however, license Wegg’s enlarged outlook in the same way 
that it does Boffin’s.  Boffin may serve to show that learning and reading are appropriate 
undertakings for the pastors in the society.  But the man he hires to transmit these 
accomplishments, Wegg, embodies “the most terrifying elements of mimesis,” namely 
“impersonation”—that is, Wegg counterfeits a true literary man, and he all too easily 
fools Boffin (Gourgouris 8).  Obviously, Wegg and Boffin are contrasting pairs;  One’s 
social pretensions are legitimate, the other’s aren’t.   
In Robert Baker’s reading, Dickens deploys these two characters to illustrate the 
difference between “moral illiteracy” on the one hand and “moral lucidity” on the other 
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(57).  This is a contrast which Baker sees at work throughout the novel, and it allows us 
to group Lizzie with Boffin and Headstone with Wegg.  Baker is correct to refer to the 
moral dimension of the novel, because in it learning and morality ultimately take a stand 
against avarice.  But Baker doesn’t fully explain the devices by which Dickens constructs 
the differences between the clear and the confused in the novel.  Because he doesn’t 
account for the role which private property plays in the novel, he can’t adequately 
account for its moral dimension, either.  The division between the clear and the confused 
permits us to see a pattern in the novel’s discourse about learning.  But it’s exactly the 
confusion of values—human, monetary, and literary—which the novel depicts so well.  
Sometimes this confusion is utopian; sometimes it is truly narrow.  In order to assess this 
confusion, we first we need to ask about some of the ways in which the discourse of the 
novel achieves the separation between the two kinds of characters and what the 
implications for this separation are. 
 In order to appreciate the effects by which Wegg’s moral confusion is 
constructed, it is perhaps necessary to observe that he is immediately insinuated within a 
context of commodification:  the novel focuses as much attention on the “few small lots 
of fruit and sweets that he offered for sale,” and the “choice collection of halfpenny 
ballads,” as it does on describing Wegg himself.  Thus Wegg is cast between what 
apparently are two different worlds:  the world of simple, hard commodities and the 
world of literature and learning.  Tore Rem has noticed that this conjunction seems to 
have a degrading effect upon language: with Wegg, writes Rem in Dickens, Melodrama, 
and the Parodic Imagination, “words are reduced from vessels of ideas . . . to vehicles of 
mechanistic exchange in a capitalist system” (137).  In what follows, I will examine the 
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function of literacy, commodification, and parody to suggest that the Wegg/Boffin 
narrative doesn’t simply deploy metonymy, as Jarvie would have it.  Rather, metonymy 
undergoes a failure in the figure of Wegg—that is, Wegg represents a threshold beyond 
which metonymy will not function smoothly.   
 Catherine Gallagher, in her chapter “The Bioeconomics of Our Mutual Friend,” 
has pointed out the shortcomings of Silas Wegg as a “literary man”: 
 To Wegg’s mind, texts are things to be subdued; although he can collar and throw 
them by finding spoken sounds for the printed signs, he often cannot attach 
meaning to them. . . . Boffin hires the incompetent Wegg to read Decline and Fall 
of the Russian Empire aloud.  Wegg marshalls all of his antagonistic power agains 
Gibbon, but far from conquering the volumes, he and his auditor “decline and 
fall” into extended confusion. 113 
Of course, the reader of Our Mutual Friend is likely to agree that Mr. Boffin’s choice of a 
tutor is rather idiosyncratic:  Wegg is not connected with any particular establishment of 
learning and ranks on the social scale alongside the fish mongers or rag dealers of Henry 
Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor.  Still, the critical rejection of Wegg as 
educator seems to be based on the wrong reasons.  Wegg, after all, isn’t alone in 
declining into “extended confusion” when faced with a long and difficult text like 
Gibbon’s.  Nor is the inability to attach meaning to signs necessarily a failure of 
education—it would seem a frequent occurrence in the self-education of any individual.  
What makes criticisms like Gallagher’s salient, however, is precisely the closeness of 
Wegg to a legitimate educator.  This closeness is a result of the intentional parody of 
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which Wegg forms a metonymic part—a parody whereby disinterest assumes a central 
role in the narrative and in education. 
 When we first meet Wegg, he’s associated with narrative as a mode of 
imaginative invention.  He parks his stall on “the corner upon which the side of the house 
gave,” and has “settled it with himself in the course of time” that he stands in a certain 
relationship to its denizens (43, 44).  And “over the house itself, he exercised the same 
imaginary power as over its inhabitants and their affairs.”  Obviously, part of the 
narrative is aimed at a comic presentation of Wegg and his misinterpretation of the 
people and things around him.  But, at the same time, readers should pause at the 
meaning of these imaginative acts, upon which representations it seems Wegg is 
dependent for his development.  The thin difference between falsification and 
imagination should be apparent in the way Wegg “knew so little about the inmates [of the 
corner house] that he gave them names of his own invention.”  On the other hand, this act 
of naming is a desperate attempt to somehow fit into the real social and geographical 
setting in which Wegg finds himself.  At the same time, however, it is, as the narrator 
states, an act of “invention,” parallel to the very action of the narrator—the “‘Miss 
Elizabeth,’ Master George,’ ‘Aunt Jane,’ and ‘Uncle Parker’” forming a kind of cast of 
characters in Wegg’s own theater of the absurd.  Though the narrative claims that Wegg 
has “no authority whatever for such designations,” we might ask the same of any 
narrative, especially ones that are self-evidently fiction. 
 It is equally unnerving about Wegg that he is so public a man of learning, or of 
half-learning—that he sells his ability in the cold, anonymous market-place.  Unlike 
Headstone or Charlie, who teach at a regular school with its formal setting, Wegg makes 
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his learning available for immediate hire in the streets—and thus he represents learning in 
a way that is unspecialized, bereft of the amenities and spatial arrangements usually 
associated with it.  For Wegg, learning is more or less like his stash of “apples” which it 
gives one the “face-ache to look at”: something that can be purchased in small amounts, 
on the spot, and in full view of the plebian public.  Thus Mr. Boffin discovers Wegg, as 
Boffin tells him, “because you was singing to the butcher; and you wouldn’t sing secrets 
to the butcher in the street, you know” (48).  By emphasizing that Wegg wouldn’t be 
singing secrets, Boffin is both anticipating any objections about his eavesdropping and 
underscoring the very public character of Wegg as a “literary man.” 
 The status of Wegg as a “literary man,” is, naturally, highly dubious.  In fact, it is 
so much in doubt that when Mr. Boffin suggests the term, Wegg responds with a “‘N—
not exactly so, sir.’”  And yet, with just an ounce of suspended belief as well as of 
encouragement, Wegg is finally able to come round to the label: “‘Why,’” Mr. Boffin 
reminds him, “‘you know every one of these songs by name and by tune, and if you want 
to read or to sing any one on ‘em off straight, you’ve only to whip on your spectacles and 
do it!’”  Faced with this rejoinder, Wegg submits, agreeing, “‘we’ll say literary, then.’”  
The reader perhaps is not so easily convinced as Wegg about his merits as a “literary 
man.”  But this failure of conviction, which the narrator problematically shares with the 
reader, is a highly complex matter, one which, I would argue, is intimately bound up with 
the larger transactions of institutional literary power and aesthetics within the novel.   
 In order to elaborate these determinants and to bring the significance of the Wegg 
character into a more direct light, I will turn once again to the essay by Paul A. Jarvie 
titled “Among the Dying and the Dead:  Metonymy and Finance Capitalism in Our 
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Mutual Friend.”  Jarvie explains that “Our Mutual Friend’s . . . fundamental project is 
metonymy.  That is,” he continues, “the novel seeks to understand and arrest the process 
by which ‘value’ moves from commodity to commodity, a process which seems, in 
capitalist society, to operate more or less autonomously.”  The other name for metonymy 
is contiguity, and this contiguity stands for the contiguity of values in a capitalist society, 
whereby one value is exchanged for, or becomes, another value.  Jarvie further describes 
metonymy as a kind of “hungry desire . . . to continue to link random items ad infinitum, 
regardless of any ‘transcendent meaning’” (117).  But we must be careful in following 
Jarvie’s work, because it seems that he would have us slip back and forth between the 
rhetorical figure of metonymy or contiguity and the figure of the commodity in the 
capitalist society.  What needs to be done more thoughtfully, despite Jarvie’s intriguing 
suggestion, is to trace the ways in which the commodity and the rhetorical figure contrast, 
as well as the ways in which they are the same—for to suggest that they are identical is 
immediately to withdraw their difference.  But to suggest that they can be compared, as 
Jarvie does, is immediately to suggest that they have similarities. 
 Wegg is first of all linked within a narrative chain, a chain which ties him to his 
“undesirable corner,” the “house at the corner,” his “hardest little stall of all the sterile 
little stalls in London,” and with the small stock of hard commodities which he sells from 
it.  Obviously, not all of these objects are commodities in the way that his hard stock and 
gingerbread are, closely related as they may be to Wegg.  We do, however, seem to be 
within the purview of metonymy in this opening description of Wegg’s appearance, as 
the description moves through its inventory almost for the sake of linking “random items 
ad infinitum.”  Moreover, the way the metonymy works at this point is by treating Wegg 
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and his commodities as setting: he is not yet really a character.  The narrative emphasizes 
this point by stating that “all weathers saw the man at the post,” even as the weather 
changes from various types of malevolence.  At this point in the narrative, Wegg seems 
to blend in seamlessly with what would ordinarily be termed the elements of setting or 
nature. 
 In contrast, when it comes to human interaction, Wegg is a “wooden man.”  In 
other words, he seems to have no interior, but responds to passers-by on the basis of their 
identity, not of his:  “thus, to the rector, he addressed a bow, composed of lay deference . 
. . to the doctor, a confidential bow, as to a gentleman whose acquaintance with his inside 
he begged respectfully to acknowledge.”  Wegg is held in an odd state of suspension 
between object and person.  In a passage relevant to understanding this character and his 
ability to shift between mere object and street performer, Rem has written that “through 
its dual tendency both to anthropomorphize things, houses, and place and to see people as 
inert objects, Dickens’s writings evince at once both a surplus and a deficit of life” (124).  
According to this argument, we might assert that Wegg indeed exhibits a surplus of life, 
but that this life is insincere and unreal, finally a deficit of what was thought to be 
excessive.  This argument invokes the classic romantic interpretive trope of life and 
death, but it doesn’t address the problem of metonymy or of the parody by which Wegg 
is soon treated in the narrative. 
 Such an explanation as Rem’s, furthermore, doesn’t help us to understand the way 
that Wegg is working in regards to commodification and the commodification of 
language which he represents.  Wegg seems to be a commodity to the very core of his 
being.  He has sold one of his legs to Mr. Venus, and he sells his very speech as a way to 
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make a living.  Yet there are interruptions to the flow of commodities around Wegg that 
is different from, say, the river from which Gaffer Hexam and Rogue Riderhood extricate 
valuable refuse or the dust heaps which serve a parallel purpose for Harmon and the 
Boffins.  The most powerful reminder of the limits of Wegg’s commodifiability is his 
“dropping” into poetry, which he does free of charge as a sign of friendship to the 
Boffins.  And, though, as Rem has indicated, the poems which Wegg recites have been 
adaptated from popular ballads, we are nonetheless justified in assessing Wegg as 
possessing some “imagination.”  Furthermore, Rem provides us with a clear explanation 
as to how Wegg functions as a humorous character in the narrative.  In fact, Rem is able 
to declare that Wegg “is a parodist.”   
 But I am more concerned with the way Wegg is an object, rather than a subject, of 
parody.  Why does the narrator create a character who is unable to convincingly 
commodify himself and turn what learning he does have to honorable profit?  For 
instance, what is at stake in the scene when Mr. Boffin asks him the difference between 
the “Rooshan” and the Roman Empire?  “‘The difference, sir?’  Mr. Wegg was faltering 
and in danger of breaking down, when a bright thought flashed upon him” (57).  Wegg 
excuses himself from answering the question by referring to the presence of a woman in 
the company:  “Mr. Wegg thus came out of his disadvantage with a chivalrous air, and 
not only that . . . [he] turned the disadvantage on Mr. Boffin, who felt he had committed 
himself in a very painful manner.”  Or, when Wegg has completed his customary repast 
and then announces, “‘And now, Mr. Boffin, sir, we’ll decline and we’ll fall!’” seemingly 
as a way of conveying a not very auspicious outlook on his own reading talents (181). 
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 Obviously, this parodying of Wegg fits within Baker’s thesis about moral and 
intellectual clarity, both of which Wegg substantially lacks.  But the parody of Wegg, as I 
have thus far only implied, breaks up the easy comparison of metonymy and 
commodification—or, at least, it further problematizes the conclusion that 
commodification is working in every direction in the novel.  It does not allow, for 
instance, Wegg to become a legitimate tutor in the way that Jane becomes one in Jane 
Eyre.  Instead, Wegg fails to obtain to that level of “disinterest” which David Lloyd and 
Paul Thomas have identified as that which, in the later Arnoldian theory, “the men of 
culture come to represent” (7).  As someone who is excessively self-interested, who 
accepts every possible amenity from the Boffins, denies himself nothing, and eventually 
enters into a plot to secure some part of the Harmon inheritance for himself, Wegg does 
not at all fit within the paradigm of the independent man of letters.  He is a counterfeit.   
 That position, of the man of culture, I would argue, is reserved for the narrative 
voice itself and the characters with whom it aligns itself.  In the process of establishing 
itself as the voice of the legitimate “literary man,” over and against Silas Wegg, the 
narrating voice re-encapsulates all of the problems which I have been discussing up to 
this point.  That is, the commodification, immorality, and self-pretension of Wegg 
become devices which put him in contrast with the narrative voice, which, by its very 
knowledge of Wegg’s shortcomings represents itself as the legitimate pedagogue while 
simultaneously establishing itself as the correct vehicle for the novel’s pedagogical 
project.  What becomes apparent is that the narrator claims authority—the authority of 
the teacherly writer—through parody and the display of the power to parody the 
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shortcomings of Wegg, and, as I will demonstrate shortly, the shortcomings of Headstone 
as well. 
 By way of concluding the discussion of Wegg, that “‘precious old rascal,’” it may 
be worthwhile to recapitulate some of the ideas which the discourse develops concerning 
the relationship between learning and value.  Ultimately, these ideas can only be part of 
the contradictory framework for human experience which is the mark of ideology and of 
ideation.  We might first of all summarize the Wegg narrative by pointing out that the 
narrator has determined that—unlike Bella, the “true golden gold”(773)—Wegg turns out 
to be a charlatan.  On the one hand, this position is secured at the level of the merely 
proaieretic:  Wegg does of course turn into a greedy extortionist who tries to extract from 
the Boffins something entirely unacceptable to the norms of society.   
By the same gesture, Wegg’s credentials as a man of learning or as a tutor are 
undone by an aesthetics of disinterestedness, true value, authenticity, etc., which 
accompany the text’s observations about Wegg’s immorality and incompetence.  These 
latter, in fact, seem to converge and become indiscernible one from the other.  It’s as 
though the discourse of the novel had to conflate, or to confuse, the two—immorality and 
incompetence—in order to dismiss Wegg:  his immorality it would seem becomes a sort 
of alibi for his incompetence.  Thus Mr. Boffin, by the end of the narrative, would still 
have been willing to accept Wegg’s services as tutor, were it not for his attempt at 
extortion:  “‘I am sorry, Wegg,’ said Mr. Boffin, in his clemency, ‘that my old lady and I 
can’t have a better opinion of you than the bad one we are forced to entertain’” (770).  
Wegg, by transgressing the laws of legitimate exchange, ultimately succumbs to the 
confusion whereby the text equates him with a mere commodity.  As a result, Wegg’s 
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transgressions confirm the suspicion that he is not a true man of learning, one who in 
some way would be independent of commodity exchange. 
 The closure of the Wegg narrative offers one last example of how the narrative 
voice parodies Wegg and thus insinuates itself as the real “golden gold” when it comes to 
learning.  As Mr. Boffin has offered Wegg one final chance to name a price for departing 
and so to set himself up again in the marketplace, Wegg complains, “‘it’s not easy to say 
how far the tone of my mind may have been lowered by unwholesome reading on the 
subject of Misers. . . . All I can say is, that I felt my tone of mind a-lowering at the time.  
And how can a man put a price upon his mind!” (771).  This use of parody is quite 
different from mere irony.  It is parodic because it doesn’t deny the truth of what Wegg 
says, on some level.  If Wegg’s monologues were meant ironically, one would have to 
read it as asserting that in fact a man can put a price upon his mind—that the idea of 
valuing the mind, with all of its connotations of learning, individuality, and morality in 
terms of a simple monetary number were acceptable.  This has been refuted in the novel 
by the example of Bella, who finally comes to sympathize with Rokesmith even though 
he has no money to speak of.  But, with parody, it’s the speaker who is mocked, not the 
sentiment—as if the narrator were to say, “who is Wegg, this incorrigible manipulator, to 
speak of a mind not having a price, true as that assertion may be?”  Through parody, the 
narrator is able both to dismiss Wegg and to retain his sentiment in the name of a 
“genuine” voice of learning, one who truly understands the “value” of disinterested 
inquiry. 
 Nonetheless, there is a deeper structural irony at work here, one which further 
mystifies the relation of literature to learning, and this irony operates by way of 
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mystifying the value of learning which Wegg already misrepresents.  Because, as I have 
just explained, the narrator essentially agrees that the mind is something beyond price and 
beyond monetary exchange, the assertion of the narrator’s authority is also an assertion of 
authenticity which denies commodity exchange.  The authentic article of learning is 
beyond representation, as are the very terms of the possibility of that representation.  
Thus the novel can only lay claim to the position of legitimate educator to the extent that 
it represses the knowledge that, as a narrative, it too is a commodity, which can be bought 
for so many shillings or pence.  In this sense, the narrative is both utopian and 
conservative. 
 
The Headstone/Wrayburn/Lizzie Plotline:  Education, Class, and the Aesthetics of 
Authenticity 
The Headstone plot is more dispersed than the Wegg Narrative, the former encapsulating 
not only Bradley Headstone, Eugene Wrayburn, and Lizzie Hexam, but Charlie Hexam, 
and ultimately Mortimer Lightwood as well.  Were one to continue to trace the 
relationships between characters in the novel, one could do so through the figure of 
Lightwood, who is Mr. Boffin’s solicitor, and one could then proceed to the characters 
already examined in the previous section, as well as to the Veneering Circle and the 
“Voice of Society.”  The multiplicity of characters in this plotline inflects the stakes it has 
for understanding representations of learning in the novel.  While, in the previous 
narrative strand, Wegg could bear comparison with the Boffins for being “charmingly 
vulgar,” Headstone and his antagonist, Wrayburn, are of seemingly different social 
worlds and, thus, transport themselves according to quite different idioms.  They form the 
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center of a plotline that includes a number of characters, and, as such, represents much 
wider social strata than do the street vendor Wegg and his dust-dealing benefactor.  And 
because Headstone is a schoolteacher, his narrative has perhaps the most of any of the 
three narratives to say about learning taken in the normative context of the school.  Yet, 
as I will show, this normative context is developed, or treated, in a way that is in 
dialogue, once again, with the text’s own bid for authentic knowledge. 
 In some senses, the narrative voice plays a smaller role in the Headstone plot than 
it did in the Wegg narrative.  Nonetheless, much as in the development of the narrative of 
Wegg and Mr. Boffin, the representation and the critique of learning in the Headstone 
plot emerge with strong assistance from, though not exclusively by means of, the 
narrative voice.  In other words, we have to read closely the narratives of Headstone, the 
wooden, mechanical schoolteacher, and Eugene Wrayburn, the idle “old-boy,” in the 
hopes that by understanding their construction through the narrative voice, we might 
better be able to arrive at some positive statement about the text’s aesthetic representation 
of the possibility of learning in the English 1860’s.  Finally, I will argue that one of the 
strongest devices by which Dickens develops this narrative, but one which still leaves us 
with many ambiguitites, is originality. 
 Much like Carlyle’s description of education in Sartor Resartus, the depiction of 
school in Our Mutual Friend places learning on an axis that shifts immediately from 
chaos to rigid mechanism, with no middle ground.  The school in which Charley first 
studies is characterized by the former malady:  it is “an exceedingly and confoudingly 
perplexed jumble of a school, where black spirits and grey, red spirits and white, jumbled 
jumbled jumbled jumbled, jumbled every night” (209).  Part of the confusion is supplied 
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by the incongruity between the students and their lessons:  “young women old in the 
vices of the commonest and worst life, were expected to profess themselves enthralled by 
the good child’s book, the Adventures of Little Margery.”  This latter title describes the 
idyllic existence of a village girl of five years’ age, who shares her porridge “with singing 
birds,” and “denied herself a new nankeen bonnet, on the ground that turnips did not wear 
nankeen bonnets.”  The understanding of the adult pupils is similarly hampered, if not by 
the content of their reading, then by the method.  Though the adults are allowed to read 
the more edifying New Testament, it is “by dint of stumbling over syllables and keeping 
their bewildered eyes on the particular syllables coming round to their turn,” and thus 
they “were as absolutely ignorant of the sublime history, as if they had never seen nor 
heard of it.”  As for Charley, he nonetheless “had risen in the jumble, taught in the 
jumble, and been received from the jumble into a better school,” the school of which Mr. 
Headstone is the headmaster. 
 Mr. Bradley Headstone and his female counterpart, Miss Peecher, represent the 
polar opposite of “the jumble.”  Whereas the jumble is a chaos, the headmaster and 
headmistress of Charley’s new school represent rigid formality in learning.  Mr. 
Headstone “had acquired mechanically a great store of teacher’s knowledge.  He could do 
mental arithmetic mechanically, sing at sight mechanically, blow various wind 
instruments mechanically, even play the great church organ mechanically.  From his early 
childhood up, his mind had been a great mechanical stowage” (211).  For her part, Miss 
Peecher is much the same:  “she could write a little essay on any subject, exactly a slate 
long, beginning at the left-hand top of one side and ending at the right-hand bottom of the 
other, and the essay should be strictly according to rule.”  This contrast, between the 
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overly chaotic jumble school, and the overly mechanical learning which Mr. Headstone 
possesses, ought to give us pause in our reading.  What does it signify?  What is in 
question in this difference between two extremes? 
 On the one hand, this oscillation between mechanism and chaos seems to 
represent Dickens’s symbolic contempt for the nineteenth-century project of school 
reformers like Sir James Kay Shuttleworth “to remake the working-class child in the 
middle-class image” (Southerland, in Goodlad, 167).  For Bradley Headstone is the 
quintessential representative of such an attempt at class transformation:  in describing his 
learning, Dickens also hints that “if young Bradley Headstone, when a pauper lad, had 
chanced to be told off to sea, he would not have been the last man in a ship’s crew” (211-
212).  The import of this passage is two-fold.  First, it informs us that Headstone was in 
fact a pauper lad, which is of a piece with his present discomfort in his “decent” clothing.  
Secondly, the description of Headstone as a robust youth seems to imply that he would 
have “fit in” had he followed a more virile calling as a sailor, perhaps in the military.  
Here, the discourse of the novel represents the conundrum of the headmaster in terms that 
invert the common associations of professional and vocational difficulty and comfort.  
The novel wants to claim that Headstone would likely have met with an easier success 
had he gone to sea as a youth, but that, unfortunately, he has chosen a career that involves 
difficulty—which the narrative registers as a sartorial discomfort.  Thus the narrative 
discourse enacts a double bind concerning the social project of improving the pauper 
lad’s condition:  it claims the general inferiority of the initiative on the basis of its real 
inevitable difficulties.  Similarly, the education of the lower classes faces two equally bad 
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alternatives:  their education, the novel here suggests, will undoubtedly be dogged either 
by a chaotic disorder, a rigid mechanism, or both. 
 On the other hand, there is further significance to the specific way Headstone has 
been trained, significance which has to do both with the novel’s own claim to 
authoritative knowledge, and with the way Headstone’s identity as a teacher is 
constructed.  To begin, in Headstone, the novel once again deploys a parody of one of its 
central characters in order to buttress its own claim for a kind of literary authority.  By 
stating that Headstone had “acquired mechanically a great store of teacher’s knowledge,” 
the narrator is outlining one possible kind of learning against which the narrative’s own 
knowledge can be compared.  One way to describe this learning is as acquisition, or the 
acquisition of skills.  Gert J. J. Biesta has written that “the most common—and 
presumably most influential—conception of learning sees learning in terms of 
acquisition:  the acquisition of something external, such as knowledge, values, or skills, 
something that existed before the act of learning and that becomes the possession of the 
learner as a result of learning” (67).  I will discuss the importance of Biesta’s theory in 
considering the formation of Headstone’s identity as it plays out in contest with 
Wrayburn in a moment, but for the present I want to draw attention to the way in which 
Headstone’s education is centered around the process of learning knowledge in a way 
that mechanically prevents him from forming his own sense of self.  The narratives about 
Headstone continually represent his own lack of self-confidence, as, for example, when 
he is speaking with Lizzie Hexam and, finding that as “nothing [was] said on the other 
side, he had to begin again, and begin with new embarrassment” (335).  Headstone 
obviously knows facts, but on the formation of opinion, and especially of his own 
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opinions, he is less well equipped.  All of this may seem somewhat self-evident, but in an 
intriguing way, it prefigures a certain logic which obtained about literature itself when it 
first was introduced into the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a logic about 
the distinction between techne and humanistic knowledge which has persisted into the 
twentieth century.  In “The Organisation of Literary Knowledge:  The Study of English in 
the Late Nineteenth Century,” Carol Atherton has reminded us of English’s “perceived 
lack of academic validity, and . . . the belief that it was concerned with judgment rather 
than knowledge, making it difficult to teach and assess” (221).   
 In Atherton’s text, we are presented with a narrative whereby the ephemerality 
and ambiguity of literary value were a detriment to its entrance into the establishment 
universities.  In Dickens’s novel, however, we are offered quite a different possibility, 
one in which the very teachability and straightforwardness of certain academic 
disciplines contrasts negatively with some other version of cultural authority.  To what 
does this other cultural authority correspond?  Of what is it representative?  On the one 
hand, it’s tempting to think of this cultural authority as representative of the old-boys 
network and its unspoken rules of cohesion as the cultural authority which the narrative is 
contrasting with the mechanical learning of the pauper classes; in this reading the text 
would therefore endorse the figures of Lightwood and Wrayburn as the social “pastors” 
of this early liberal-democratic society.  I would contend, however, that such a reading is 
ambivalent, at best, as Lauren M. E. Goodlad has pointed out.  Nonetheless, the 
comparison in the novel between those figures who are receiving or have received the 
pauper lad’s education and those who are part of the genteel establishment deserves some 
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interrogation if we are to understand the representations of learning which the novel 
develops.   
 If we are to understand the conflict between Headstone and Wrayburn, both of 
whom pursue the affections of Lizzie Hexam, it is helpful simultaneously to understand 
the different ethos which pertains to Headstone and Wrayburn and to understand their 
respective positions within the trajectory of modern education.  Biesta has written that the 
modern paradigm of education “is expressed in the idea that the aim of education is to 
reach a state of rational autonomy” (14).  Biesta traces this notion through several authors 
back to Immanuel Kant, who summarizes the Enlightenment project as “man’s release 
from his self-incurred tutelage through the exercise of his own understanding” (in Biesta 
35).  But this notion, too, serves as a contrast to Headstone, for in the descriptions of him, 
we are led to believe that the mechanical nature of his learning indicates a poverty of 
humanistic sensibilities.  Were he to possess these sensibilities, his learning might be 
more his own and less mechanical.  In this sense, then, we can think of Headstone as a 
failure of modernity—he fails to obtain to the level of autonomy which constitutes the 
ideal of modern humanistic education.  But once again, this ideal of autonomy is one that 
can be appropriated by the narrative voice itself, just as the ideal of disinterestedness was 
appropriated through the parodic treatment of Wegg.   
 It’s hardly surprising, then, that Headstone becomes an object of conscious 
exclusion from the rational community of modernity—personified in such characters as 
Lightwood and Wrayburn.  In other words, Headstone is treated by these apparently 
hegemonic characters according to the paradigm of what Biesta, following Zygmunt 
Bauman, calls “the stranger.”  Biesta, again tracing the writing of Bauman, names two 
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ways in which modernity deals with the figure of the stranger:  the anthropoemic method 
or the anthropophagic method.  It is the latter which concerns us here.  The 
anthropophagic approach to modernization, as well as its failure, is apparent in the text’s 
representation of Bradley Headstone as someone who is attempting to achieve 
indifference, for lack of better language.  He would like so much to become simply 
another anonymous member of the ruling, or at least idle, hegemonic class, constituted by 
the likes of Wrayburn and Lightwood, the old college fellows who are now partners in a 
law office which sees little work. 
 The discourse of the text produces Headstone as an other:  even though he is 
never “seen in any other dress” except his eminently respectable “decent black coat and 
waistcoat,” “there was a certain stiffness in his manner of wearing this, as if there were a 
want of adaptation between him and it” (211).  In describing Headstone this way, the text 
positions him within the anthropophagic tendency of modernity at the same time as it 
shows the impossibility of this tendency.  Obviously, in simply wearing his respectable 
outfit, Headstone indicates the desire to escape his pauper upbringing.  Yet the narrative 
won’t let this escape proceed easily—he, and we readers, must be repeatedly reminded of 
his original sin.  Therefore, Headstone is perpetually invoked as a figure under erasure, 
whose origins and destination must be continually confused.  In plainer language, he is a 
figure who cannot evade his own origins despite the text’s occasional desire to erase 
those origins.  Not only is he positioned within the logic of the anthropophagic tendency, 
he is the site where that tendency is undone:  by his association with an institution that 
seeks to integrate society—the school—he is indelibly marked as insufficient and lower 
class. 
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 But the question still remains of how one should read this indelible marking of 
Headstone, a class marking which presumably also indicates a kind of powerlessness in 
the character.  In whose service is this marking made?  What is in question in designating 
a character in such a way, or in the textual arrangement that relates Headstone, Charley, 
Lizzie, and Wrayburn?  We cannot pretend that the class content of the Headstone 
narrative, any more than the text as a whole, has a revolutionary import and that the state 
of affairs in the novel are completely renewed on the basis of this character—it seems 
that the outcome of Headstone’s narrative is too bleak for anything of this sort to occur.  
It may be equally less apt to imagine something like a micro-politics, in Deleuze’s sense, 
to be at work around the character of Headstone.  Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to 
think about the strange movement in which he is involved and implicated, a movement 
which is transected enough by that typically modernist tendency of alienation as to render 
the small grouping considered here unsettled.   
 One of the features of the text which causes many of the characters distress is the 
problem of paternal relationships, and more specifically of absent fathers.  John 
Harmon’s dilemma is precisely that he is caught up in the desire of his deceased father 
for him to marry Bella.  Another deceased father in the novel, Gaffer Hexam, has, unlike 
the Harmon elder, left no patrimony for his son, though the two have also parted on 
spiteful terms.  Before his death, Gaffer had denounced Charley as an “‘Unnat’ral young 
beggar!’” when the son left home to attend school full-time.   
It is not surprising that the family has consequences for learning and the kinds of 
authorship which it licenses.  After all, the novel’s first conceits are a will and an 
inheritance, themselves instruments for the propagation of the bourgeois family.  But 
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who, the text asks, will act as surrogate family for the children orphaned by the deaths of 
their parents?  Obviously, in the case of John Harmon, the answer is the Boffins, who 
figuratively adopt both John and Bella while literally adopting Sloppy, the former ward 
of the church.  For the Hexams, the situation is more complicated.  In Charley’s case, it 
seems that Headstone fills the role of surrogate father.  It also seems, briefly, that 
Headstone might fill the role of both father and husband for Lizzie, a combination 
familiar to the Victorian era.  Yet Lizzie refuses Headstone’s bid to fill the roles of 
husband/father, and this refusal acts as a catalyst for the ensuing drama around 
Headstone, Lizzie herself, Charley, and Wrayburn.  Wrayburn is Headstone’s main 
competition for Lizzie’s affections, and through the competition between these two 
characters the text articulates and elaborates a number of aesthetic values.   
Furthermore, one of the main elements which frames the contest between 
Headstone and Wrayburn is their class origins and the aesthetic values which have their 
moorings in those origins. Headstone, we will remember, is of the pauper class, while 
Wrayburn represents inherited wealth.  On this line, the characters move slowly, idly, 
gracefully.  Wrayburn and Lightwood have no destination, because their destination is 
already achieved, and it is that towards which, it would seem, all human endeavor strives.  
This is why T. W. Heyck, in The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian 
England, writes that “everyone who possibly could aspired to the status of gentleman and 
thus to free himself from dependency and servile work” (21).  Just before their first 
interview with Headstone, Mortimer tells Eugene, “if I could find you in earnest for a 
minute, I would try to say an earnest word to you” (277).  Mortimer’s hypothetical proves 
that the time of the old-boy network is one of insincerity, of self-assurance, of easy 
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confidence.  It’s not clear that this time is any less rigid than Headstone’s own rhythm, 
however.  In an earlier part of the novel, when the two young lawyers are introduced for 
the first time, Wrayburn explains the way in which “My Respected Father,” or “M. R. F.” 
has disposed of his children according to his own wishes from their birth, thus giving 
them little range of choice in their own development.  Eugene reports that “when my 
eldest brother was born,” he became heir to “the Family Estate.”  The second brother has 
it decided for him that he will become a member of the church; the third, that he will go 
into the Navy.   
 All of this indicates a certain kind of rigid custom in relationships across 
generations, from fathers to sons.  But the novel simultaneously seeks to portray 
Wrayburn in a light that is not so formal or rigid, one that posits him as a carrier of that 
certain je ne sais qua which establishes Wrayburn as the heir to an elite class privilege.  
For example, one may contrast the easy attitude toward names and naming held by 
Wrayburn on the one hand and the care taken by the Boffins when it comes to the 
questions of names.  As the Boffins venture upon adopting a child in remembrance of the 
deceased John Harmon, Mr. Boffin reminds his wife, “‘we must take care of the names,’” 
indicating the way in which Mr. Boffin sees himself as part of a society consisting of real 
individuals with real individuality.  By contrast, when he first meets Headstone, 
Wrayburn emphasizes that it is unimportant that he learn the schoolmaster’s name.  Upon 
the schoolmaster’s formal suggestion that it may matter little, Wrayburn makes the most 
of his opportunity, saying “‘it does not concern me at all to know.  I can say 
Schoolmaster, which is a most respectable title’” (280).  Later, he describes a similar 
sentiment by telling the schoolmaster “‘I don’t think about you.’”  Wrayburn makes 
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similar rhetorical gestures in making up names for other characters, such as Mr. Aaron 
for Riah or Mr. Dolls for Jenny Wren’s father.  What all of this ease with names and 
insouciance as to their particularity implies is a certain degree of loftiness, to be sure, but 
also a capacity for imagination, however self-centered that may be.  Ironically, Wrayburn 
has control of the social script, because he has control of the names and of naming, and 
he uses them in a way that fits his own needs, without bothering too much how well the 
script which he creates matches empirical or objective reality.  As an aside, it’s possible 
to deduce the text’s commit to authenticity by the way it seems to punish Wrayburn, 
along with Wegg, for attempting to appropriate the fictive function which the novel views 
as its exclusive property. 
 This ease with names is consistent with the organic character of mind which 
Wrayburn possesses.  On the one hand, this organicity of mind may be descried in the 
hunt and chase scenes involving Wrayburn and Headstone—cruel as they are, these 
scenes involve Wrayburn in acts of imagination or at least of spontaneity.  Furthermore, 
Wrayburn reminds Lightwood about the last-minute character of his learning in school, 
further dramatizing the spontaneous nature of his mind:  “‘when we were at school 
together, I got up my lessons at the last moment, day by day and bit by bit; now we are 
out in life together, I get my lessons up in the same way” (523).  In terms of the fraternal 
relations in the novel, then, Wrayburn, bolstered by his inherited wealth, represents an 
easy, confident spontaneity. 
 At times, these fraternal relations threaten to undo the customs and strictures of 
society altogether.  In the early stages of what must be thought of as a bachelor narrative, 
Eugene suggests to Mortimer that they shut themselves up in a lighthouse and that doing 
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so would be a vast improvement over the doldrums of polite liberal culture:  “‘Lady 
Tippins couldn’t put off to visit us, or, better still, might put off and get swamped.  
People couldn’t ask one to wedding breakfasts.  There would be no Precedents to 
hammer at, except the plain-sailing Precedent of keeping the light up’” (140).  Though 
his reverie is here directed towards Lady Tippins and the recent wedding of the Lammles, 
Wrayburn is nonetheless simultaneously reflecting on his own incorporation into this 
version of polite society, as he also reports that his “‘respected father has found, down in 
the parental neighborhood, a wife for his not-generally-respected son.’”  However, in 
imagining an existence in which “Lady Tippins couldn’t put off to visit us,” Wrayburn 
must be nominated as one of the voices most antagonistic to the narrative thrust of the 
entire novel, as the former is through and through constructed, in part, on the basis of 
such formal social ceremonies.  By imagining the abandonment of these ceremonies, 
Wrayburn is engaging in the old cynic device of “defacing the currency,” claiming, as it 
were, that he no longer wishes to trade upon the currency of his society. 
 The class position of Headstone, on the other hand, involves the necessity of 
earning one’s station, a requirement which has vague resonances with the Stations of the 
Cross.  Thus Headstone is represented as a strangely martyred Christ figure, full only of 
the latter’s deathly significance but offering no possible life in compensation.  Headstone 
emphasizes the notion of station in his interview with the Secretary Rokesmith about 
tutoring Sloppy.  The Secretary digresses on the subject of the Hexam family, asking if 
the sister suffers “‘under any stigma because of the impossible accusation . . . that was 
made against her father’” (378).  In response, the headmaster takes the question in a 
somewhat perversely personal way.  “‘The sister,’” he responds, “‘suffers under no 
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reproach that repels a man of unimpeachable character, who has made for himself every 
step of his way in life, from placing her in his own station.  I will not say raising her to 
his own station; I say, placing her in it.’”  This aesthetic, like that of inheritance, is one 
which also has the potential to deface the currency of society:  for in imagining himself to 
have created “every step of his way in life,” Headstone erases the social nature and the 
national character of the kinds of educational schemes, such as the teacher-pupil 
programs, which reformers had devised to improve the teaching profession in the 
nineteenth century. 
 How does one account for this mutual destructiveness—the tendency to deface 
the social currency—in both Headstone and in Wrayburn?  And why does it form a kind 
of black hole around the character of Lizzie, whom we might say is transected by both of 
these speeds:  the speed of inheritance as well as the speed of earning?  One might 
usefully turn to Charles Van Doren’s A History of Knowledge in answering these 
questions, to be reminded that “until quite recently, most human beings, otherwise much 
like ourselves, lacked the conception that is so obvious to us of how to earn money.  The 
phrase, ‘to earn a living,’ would have been incomprehensible to them” (245).  Here, Van 
Doren is speaking of the era with which we are concerned and the problems which the 
money economy posed for the evolution of English society in the nineteenth century.  
One might indeed say that part of what is determining the Headstone/Wrayburn/Lizzie 
dynamic is the new monetary regime implied by industrial capitalism and the kinds of 
aesthetic and pedagogical commitments which it produces. 
 This kind of monetary regime has the potential to pit earning against inheritance, 
and, in the figures of Headstone and Wrayburn, it does just that.  Both characters are held 
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in a kind of extended competition, and while Wrayburn explicitly acknowledges being 
unable to “‘look to the end’” of his pursuit of Lizzie, Headstone is capable of little better.  
Thus the two pursue one another, at the same time that they pursue Lizzie, Bradley 
hounding Wrayburn with the conviction that he knows where she is.  There can be no 
doubt, of course, that through all of this, Wrayburn maintains the upper hand.  J. Hillis 
Miller, in Others, has already anatomized what he calls “Headstone’s insane jealousy” 
(56), but he has only hinted at the strangely homoerotic and fratricidal character of this 
jealousy.  When Lizzie answers that she is “‘quite decided’” that she will never consider 
marrying him, Headstone exclaims, “‘then I hope I may never kill him!”—an indication 
of the extent to which this monetary regime has unleashed a powerful fraternal animosity 
which is intimately bound up with the more normative hetero-social romantic energies in 
the text. 
 Behind all of the fraternal violence, however, rests the will and the patrimony and 
the failure of this patrimony to restore society and revive it—we might say that, in this 
novel, one is witnessing the decadence, literally the de-cadence, of a certain kind of 
monetary regime, keeping in mind that decadence, for all of its aesthetic appeal, also 
implies a certain kind of social violence or violation.  Here, Miller is once again 
instructive.  Miller explains that “energy . . . names an impersonal power in which all the 
novel’s characters participate” (55).  Following Northrop Frye, he suggests that “this 
hidden energy is both destructive and creative, both Thanatos and Eros.”  Finally, Miller 
suggests that this energy “provides the drive for behavior on the surface, but that 
behavior rapidly becomes mechanical and sterile unless there is a periodic reimmersion in 
anarchic depths.”  This way of formulating the problem, however, can only be viewed as 
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a double bind.  There seems to be no alternative between an energy that is as much 
destructive as creative and, on the other hand, a “reimmersion in anarchic depths,” 
symbolized by the frequently deadly Thames, in which Gaffer Hexam, Rogue Riderhood, 
and Bradley Headstone all drown.  One cannot assert that by virtue of casting the text and 
its reader into a double bind, Miller’s theory is any less valid.  But, ignoring the 
patrimony and the fraternal struggle at the center of the novel, Miller has presented the 
mechanical behavior most commonly associated with Headstone in an incomplete light.   
 One is tempted to call the kind of desire into which Headstone, Wrayburn, and 
Lizzie are triangulated as hermaphroditic.  At the same time, however, it may be wrong to 
speak of Lizzie as a desiring subject at all—perhaps this narrative allows only for 
masculine desire and feminine flight.  Riah, himself a surrogate father, tells Lizzie that 
“‘there are times of moral danger when the hardest virtuous resolution to form is flight, 
and when the most heroic bravery is flight’” (420).  This occlusion of Lizzie’s desire may 
ultimately be bound up with the text’s precondition as a patronymic—Our Mutual Friend 
of course referring to the heir to the Harmon fortune, John Harmon himself.  Ultimately, 
the desires of men—fathers, brothers, would-be lovers—smother Lizzie’s desire and 
prevent it from having a chance to be realized or even articulated.  If feminine desire is 
allowable, if it can speak, it is the preserve of the more affluent Bella, rather than the 
economically disadvantaged Lizzie.  For Lizzie, desire only takes the form, at least until 
near the end of the narrative, of a virtual representation of her own desire.  Her flight 
from London to work by the mills allows her to crystallize her own desire in the form of 
cherished memories and self-indulgent hope, as she explains to Bella.  If she were to go 
out of hiding, Lizzie tells Bella, “‘I should lose some of the best recollections, best 
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encouragements, and best objects, that I carry through my life.  I should lose my belief 
that if I had been his equal, and he loved me, I should have tried with all my might to 
make him better and happier, as he would have made me’” (514).  Her preference for 
Wrayburn thus places the narrative into a third kind of chronometer, one full of 
subjunctives, hypotheticals, and “would haves,” which are necessary to negotiate her 
unexpected reconciliation with Wrayburn.  By virtue of this chronometer, the novel 
registers their union as improbable and difficult, but not impossible.  
 There is, of course, a kind of sisterly affection between Lizzie and Bella which 
obtains as a kind of foil for the competition between Headstone and Wrayburn.  But one 
can observe that it is masculine competition which most strongly informs the novel’s 
discourse about education.  Wrayburn is highly aware of the conflicts that are in question 
in the battle between himself and Headstone.  Not long after Lizzie has fled to the 
countryside, Headstone begins to follow Wrayburn around the city, hoping to discover 
something about Lizzie’s new whereabouts.  Once Wrayburn becomes aware that he is 
being followed, he turns the tables on Headstone by leading him on wild goose chases 
that reveal nothing—as, indeed, Wrayburn knows nothing—but which cause Headstone 
to undergo “‘grinding torments’” (530).  On the night when Lightwood accompanies 
Wrayburn in this game of pursuit, the latter tells the former that “‘the boys of Merry 
England will begin to deteriorate in an educational light, if this lasts long. . . . The 
schoolmaster can’t attend to me and the boys too.’”  Thus Wrayburn imagines a new 
variation on the oedipal theme, one in which Wrayburn himself is in competition with the 
boys of England for the attentions of Bradley Headstone.  In the contest between the self-
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advancing Headstone and the socially promoted Wrayburn, the child students of 
Headstone’s school soon become unwitting participants. 
 It is now time to make clear a first hypothesis about the narrative exchange which 
operates throughout the novel.  The stakes, once again, concern literary value.  The 
hypothesis runs thus: that there exists, between the narrator and characters in this text, a 
kind of credit system whereby, as one sees in the earlier case of Wegg, the text gains—or, 
more precisely, the narrator gains—at the expense of the character.  The narrator is able 
to construct a discourse about proper aesthetic values by describing and developing 
characters in particular ways.  The discourse, however, must not make an entire mockery 
of the characters.  As serious literature, the novel must construct characters with whom 
we readers are at least partly sympathetic.  Yet by showing us the shortcomings, as well 
as the achievements, of the characters, the novel will posit itself as the entity which 
knows the proper delimitations of aesthetic power in mid-nineteenth-century England.   
 To return to the figure of Bradley Headstone and to what the narrator discloses 
about him:  by the time Wrayburn has made Lightwood aware that the former is being 
followed by the schoolmaster, Headstone has already, in the eyes of the narrator, made 
his descent into criminality.  The narrator informs the reader that, on the night when the 
two lawyers go abroad with the intention of tormenting the schoolmaster, “the state of the 
man was murderous” (532).  The narrative goes on to tell us further about a kind of 
schizophrenic behavior on the part of the schoolmaster, whereby at night be becomes a 
person entirely different from who he is during the day.  The text states that “tied up all 
day with his disciplined show upon him, subdued to the performance of his routine 
educational tricks, encircled by a gabbling crowd, he broke loose at night like an ill-
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tamed wild animal.”  Once again, the narrator deploys the same rhetorical devices which 
construed the rhetorical training of Charley as either too chaotic in the “jumble school” or 
too rigid, as in the case of Headstone’s instruction.  The coincidence of these two tropes 
begs the question of whether the discipline isn’t invoked by the narrator as a bulwark 
against encroaching barbarity, just as wildness is invoked as the failure of discipline.   
 This trope, of the split personality or split affect, and the fact that it is applied to 
one of the novel’s central pedagogues is a complicated affair.  On the one hand, it implies 
an ever greater social division, to the point where the unity of the human person, 
Headstone, is no longer tenable.  Headstone’s fracture seems to be the opposite of the 
kind of union which Frye accords to the romantic mode of narrative.  Rather than a union 
and a reconstitution of society, this text promises the greatest degree of fragmentation, at 
least as far as the headmaster is concerned.  This marks a narrative desire and project 
different from that of Jane Eyre, where the properly trained pedagogue could indeed form 
the unit around which the greater romance of the novel would consolidate. 
 Perhaps one ought to pay close attention to the use of doubles which Dickens 
makes in order to complicate the normal sense of romance and social reconstitution of 
Our Mutual Friend.  Rather than merely focusing on the failure of a love plot between 
Headstone and Lizzie, perhaps it is instructive to look at a closely related plotline, that 
one whereby Headstone makes a pact with Rogue Riderhood.  Headstone, in chapter 
eleven of the third book, offers to pay Riderhood in exchange for information about 
Wrayburn and Lizzie.  But, of course, this agreement, when viewed from a distance, has 
more to it than simply a money deal.  In a sense, Riderhood has many parallels with 
Gaffer Hexam, and could almost be viewed as a substitute father figure for Lizzie:  
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Riderhood and Gaffer were once business partners, signifying the degree to which the 
two families represent the same socio-economic class.  Headstone, by contrast, at first 
appears an unusual member of this company, though one mustn’t forget that by 
suggesting he might have succeeded “in a ship’s crew,” the narrator invites the reader to 
consider him in the light of what Rogue Riderhood calls himself, namely a “‘waterside 
character’” (145).  The close resemblance between the two characters is further 
emphasized in the narrative description of Headstone in the first chapter of the fourth 
book.  As a bargeman approaches Pleshwater Weir Mill Lock, the narrator informs us, 
“the bargeman became Bradley Headstone, in rough water-side second-hand clothing” 
(616).  For once, the schoolmaster is comfortable in his clothing, as opposed to the decent 
clothing which he usually dons.  The narrator explains that “whereas, in his own 
schoolmaster clothes, he usually looked as if they were the clothes of some other man, he 
now looked, in the clothes of some other man, or men, as if they were his own.”  Perhaps 
it is necessary to further inquire about this apparent identity between the two men as well 
as about the apparent implication concerning the futility of this once pauper-lad in trying 
to attain the heights of respectability. 
 Here one must return to Biesta’s insight about the creation of modern society:  
“modern society can ultimately be understood as a (the) rational community” (58).  
Furthermore, one needs to view the characters and the plot which they develop and which 
develops around them not merely as entertainment, but as commentary upon the way in 
which aesthetic and cultural values are organized, or disciplined, in order to create the 
boundaries between what is acceptable and what is not in modern cultural codes.  One is 
tempted to pose the question once again of Biesta and Bauman’s analysis of the 
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regulatory methods for policing the boundaries of those codes, a process in which the text 
takes part.  Their two terms, the anthropophagic and the anthropoemic, describe two such 
methods for regulating and, indeed, constructing the stranger to the rational community.  
Perhaps it does not need to be mentioned that Rogue Riderhood and Bradley Headstone 
are both strangers in the middle of the text.  The anthropophagic method is a means to 
erasing the difference which the stranger elicits.  The anthropoemic, on the other hand, is 
a means of “‘banishing’” the stranger from the ordered universe, of vomiting him forth.  
By drowning the two characters in the Lock near the conclusion of the work, the narrator 
ultimately destroys the possibility of the integration into society of either the poor 
scavenging class or of the more respectable, self-made professional who has benefited 
from the available state institutions. 
 Nonetheless, the fact that these two characters suffer a kind of collective or 
communal death suggests that a reading which would simply abolish the two from the 
collective imagination of the text must be questioned.  This is especially so, given that, as 
Vincent Newey has remarked in The Scripture of Charles Dickens:  Novels of Ideology, 
Novels of the Self, “Dickens treats Headstone seriously and with respect” (255).  The 
conclusion of the Headstone narrative is, of course, not in marriage to Lizzie, but in a 
kind of burial-marriage to that other waterside character, Rogue Riderhood, who is an 
obvious kind of masculine and paternal substitute for Lizzie.  These two characters fall 
prey to that anthropoemic mode in the regulation of modern contemporary codes:  they 
are both spat out, in a sense, into the “ooze and scum behind one of the rotting gates” of 
the lock.  Their discharge suggests a kind of solidarity between the two, symbols of the 
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larger Victorian society’s inability to register the schoolmaster’s and the river-man’s 
position and belonging within that society. 
 Though such a reunion or reformation of the cultural codes must be postponed 
within this narrative, there seem to be latent signs of its possibility:  on the one hand, the 
place of their death as aquatic would signify a good chance of rebirth.  The placement of 
Riderhood’s eyes as “staring upward” seems to be consistent with a Christological 
reading in which the two figures are either sacrificed or slated for resurrection and/or 
redemption (783).  The “iron ring” with which Bradley “held tight” Riderhood 
emphasizes their close connection in death.  Of course, all of this is very slight and 
subdued compared with the overall significance placed upon these characters and the 
roles that they are to play in something like an “acceptable” cultural authority for the text. 
 The most anthropophagic moment, on the other hand, occurs when Riderhood 
enters the school and provides an impromptu lesson to the students about rivers and what 
one finds there.  After a moment in which the students stare quietly at Headstone, 
Riderhood says scornfully, “‘I ask your pardon learned governor. . . . It was a bit of fun 
of mine’” (776).  In this statement, Riderhood continues his odd parody of Headstone 
which he begins by quizzing Headstone’s students.  In a sense, this scene dramatizes the 
attainment to the respectable, institutional society on the part of Headstone, as Riderhood 
easily displaces the former and his lessons with his own quizzing on geography.  And this 
parody further serves the purpose of emphasizing the close connection between the two, 
one which had been established earlier in the narrative by virtue of their common 
appearance at the Lock, as well as by their common dislike of Wrayburn.  Finally, the 
two “look at each other,” and then “Bradley . . . turned his face to the black board and 
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slowly wiped his name out.”  In this act of self-erasure, Headstone underscores the codes 
of the text which prevent him from being an active, vital participant in the happier 
romantic plots of the novel.  Equally important, he erases his own identity in an act of 
anthropophagic denial of difference.     
 Like Wegg, Riderhood becomes a figure for narrative parody.  But, whereas the 
parody of Wegg implied in the narrator qualities of disinterestedness, in Rogue, the 
parody produces sentiment and contemplation as the desirable cultural values according 
to which the textual code is to be interpreted.  Aware of its textual antecedents which 
would produce nature as a source of sentiment,9
                                                 
9 For an example of this, see Catherine Belsey’s chapter on “Expressive Realism” in Critical Practice.   
 the narrator observes of Riderhood’s 
lock that “‘the voice of the falling water, like the voices of the sea and wind, was an outer 
memory to a contemplative listener, but”—and here is the contrast—“not particularly so 
to Mr. Riderhood” (614).  The narrator goes on to make a comparison between an 
appreciation for the sound of the water and for wine.  The way in which this comparison 
works is somewhat complicated, but it is worth rehearsing.  The text resists the kind of 
biblical transformation between water and wine at work in this narrative which is doing 
interesting things with the idea of redemption and resurrection, socially and collectively 
construed.  Instead, at this particular textual moment, the wine itself becomes 
“sentiment,” or one might say appreciation.  Thus the narrator explains that “wine must 
be got into a butt by some agency before it can be drawn out:  and the wine of sentiment 
never having been got into Mr. Riderhood by any agency, nothing in nature tapped him.”  
On the one hand, this information seems to be a straightforward invocation of a rough 
and tumble character who has no appreciation for finer things.  He is dry and course, 
whereas the refined are sufficiently full and lubricated (see, for example, the description 
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of the Veneering dinners).  But the description of Riderhood becomes peculiar to the 
extent that we realize that the idea of nature drawing out sentiment or producing a kind of 
jubilant intoxication is a cultural trope, stemming from the pastoral and the rural idyll 
through the romantics, once again, in whom self-realization is intimately bound up, in 
Wordsworth, with the description of natural scenarios.  Thus Riderhood, by contrast, is 
constructed, according to, or at least in conversation with, codes which position him 
simultaneously outside the tradition of learning and, as a result, incapable of sentiment or 
thoughtful reflection.  At the same time, however, the cultural code by virtue of which 
Riderhood is being constructed, namely, nature as a catalyst to reflection, cannot help but 
be undone to some extent by virtue of the fact that Riderhood, a shallow, unreflective 
character, is placed within it. 
 One might assume, as I have implied, that the counterpoint to Riderhood or to 
Headstone in the narrative is Wrayburn and his associate and friend, Lawyer Lightwood.  
One can adduce a number of examples which might strengthen this assertion, the first of 
which is the contrast between the speech and understanding of Riderhood as opposed to 
that of the lawyers.  As I have already noted, the lawyer Wrayburn is gifted with a certain 
capability for speech and for imagination, one which allows him to treat names in a free 
and easy manner and which generally allows him a creative spontaneity in his way of 
thinking.  I highlight these comparisons in order to more fully bring out some of the 
class-determined aesthetic commitments which the text is forced, and forces us, to 
negotiate.   
 One of the most memorable of these, the encounter with “Mr. Dolls” aside, is the 
passage in which Rogue Riderhood enters the offices of Lightwood and Wrayburn and 
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asks to “be took down” (144).  Throughout this passage, the narrator draws attention not 
only to the humorous irregularities of Riderhood’s speech, but also to his unfamiliarity 
with the conventions of legal practice, which in turn provides fodder for further displays 
of arrogance and teasing on the part of the lawyers.  When he first arrives at the office, 
Riderhood insists that he is there on “‘tickler business.’”  This contraction exemplifies the 
jovial derision which both the text and the lawyers aim at Riderhood, a derision which 
employs a kind of comedy based on linguistic limitation.  The humorous aspect of 
Riderhood is, of course, further reinforced by his ironic invocation as an “Honest Man” 
who earns his living by the sweat of his brow.  Riderhood explains that, as he does not 
want “‘to risk being done out of the sweat of my brow,’” he wishes “to be swore in.”  At 
this point, Lightwood responds in a colloquial vein, saying “‘I am not a swearer in of 
people, man,’” indicating that he is able to move between idioms, even though the 
reverse is not true of the vulgar Riderhood.  Wrayburn contributes his usual ascerbic wit 
to the conversation by explaining that Lightwood “‘can swear at you . . . as can I.  But we 
can’t do more for you.’”  In this comment, Wrayburn is all confidence, precision, and 
insolence at once.  To mark the difference between his light and playful mind with that of 
the murkier Riderhood’s, the text relies upon Riderhood’s blind faith that writing is the 
medium of truth and upon Riderhood’s inability to correctly articulate the conventions of 
the legal profession.  He refers to an affidavit by muttering “‘Alfred David,’” thus 
underlying his confusion about legal jargon.  Finally, Lightwood accepts Wrayburn’s 
suggestion to take up writing utensils, “deferring to the man’s [Riderhood’s] sense of the 
binding powers of pen and ink and paper.”  The import of the derision of Riderhood’s 
faith in written language, however, extends beyond his own particular linguistic 
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limitations.  In this scene, one may argue, the text points to its own awareness about its 
shortcomings as literal truth—and in fact Riderhood’s falsehood, his prevarication, 
despite being “took down” with pen and ink, seems to support this hypothesis. 
 But to examine the degree to which the text develops this sense of the failure of 
written language to communicate literal truth in relation to the character Riderhood—and 
for what does this stand symbolically?  For a literate imagination?  For Culture as a 
whole?—one might trace two further aspects of Riderhood in tandem to what turns out to 
be yet another curious pairing in the text, that of Riderhood and the Lawyers, especially 
Wrayburn.  The first point of comparison between Riderhood and Wrayburn, besides 
their different understanding of language and legal language in particular, is the language 
which describes their respective embodiments of profession.  One should be fully aware, 
at this point, that Wrayburn’s professional position is one of idleness, and thus his 
relation to his profession is nominal at best.  He is a debtor in reality, even if his official 
training allows him to call himself a lawyer.  There is a similar ambivalence around 
Riderhood and his occupation, even though he is of a distinctly different class from 
Wrayburn—denoted not least of all by his hackneyed language.  The text, with 
Riderhood’s complicity, further identifies Riderhood simply as “an honest man” who 
earns his living by the sweat of his brow.  But in this instance, the qualifier serves much 
to the same purpose as Eugene’s mentions of “‘the absorbing nature of my 
profession,’”—namely, it is an ironic gesture which evades the literal professional 
identity of the character in question (528).  If it’s undoubtedly the case that Riderhood is 
not “an honest man,” one may also observe that, by giving his occupation as a kind of 
“‘character,’” Riderhood is tacitly supporting a gentlemanly assumption about identity 
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and work, a discourse which he ultimately shares with Wrayburn.  This discourse 
maintains a great deal of discretion concerning vocation, allowing for a considerable gap 
between description and substance.  The aesthetic choice which underlies this discretion, 
whether one chooses to call it evasive or cynical, could also be explained by reference to 
class.  The deployment of professional titles which are only nominally descriptive could 
be derivative of upper class or genteel hegemony, but in Riderhood’s case, it functions as 
an object of parody which nonetheless ultimately reinforces that hegemony.    
 Where Riderhood and Wrayburn differ, as I have already implied, is in their 
consciousness and their reflectiveness.  We have already seen the degree to which 
Riderhood and Headstone lack the reflectiveness which the public school gentleman 
Wrayburn possesses, albeit problematically.  This sense of reflectiveness, itself finally an 
example of authenticity, becomes especially pronounced towards the end of the text, 
replete with its descriptions of water imagery.  What I want to suggest, in concluding my 
analysis of this narrative, is that the water and nature imagery towards the end of the text 
helps construct a narrative discourse, once again, about the literary values according to 
which the text asks to be read.  Ultimately, the text elaborates a stance of equivocation 
regarding Wrayburn’s aristocratic authenticity.  On the one hand, authenticity seems to 
represent a desirable quality, one consistent with notions of independence and self-
consciousness.  At the same time, it can represent a threat to a society more or less 
strongly controlled by normative constraints.      
As Wrayburn walks along the riverbank after his interview with Lizzie in the 
mill-town where she works, his thoughts begin to mirror the dynamics of nature:  “the 
rippling of the river seemed to cause a correspondent stir in his uneasy reflections” (680).  
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The river and the stream of Wrayburn’s thoughts are both “tending one way with a strong 
current.” Though there is an obvious contrast here between Wrayburn and Riderhood or 
Headstone, the latter of whom is described by the narrator as “a man of rapid passions 
and sluggish intelligence” (533), the text does not privilege Wrayburn in an 
uncomplicated way, either.  Like the image of the moon in water, his thoughts “started, 
unbidden, from the rest, and revealed their wickedness.”  The aquatic dimensions of the 
scenery sets up an interesting calculus whereby depths, integrity, forces, and caprice are 
all interrogated and weighed by the text in its attempt to negotiate the problem of 
authenticity. 
 One can already see the degree to which reflectiveness is problematized in the 
text.  On the one hand, one might expect the water as reflectiveness and Wrayburn to 
form a dyad which is opposed to either Headstone or Riderhood.  At the same time, one 
might then expect the text to embrace this pairing as part of its own inclusion in the filial 
line of texts which runs through the romantic idiom of nature as a source of conscious 
self-expression.  But, if we are to return to Lauren Goodlad’s reading of Wrayburn, we 
will be reminded about the limitations of such an interpretation.  One of the problems is 
that Wrayburn’s reflectiveness doesn’t encourage him to behave honorably:  he 
understands the wrongfulness of his predisposition to turn Lizzie into his mistress, but 
this insight isn’t enough to make him do the right thing.  As Goodlad points out, although 
“Dickens endows him with a psychological depth and moral potential, . . . Dickens’s 
support for Wrayburn’s character is profoundly ambivalent, a ‘riddle without an answer’” 
(181).  The contradiction inheres in that while the narrator endows the more refined 
Wrayburn with a degree of reflectiveness, this reflectiveness isn’t enough to overcome 
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the social antagonisms which shape the text.  As Goodlad explains, Wrayburn and 
Headstone are ineluctably caught up in “relentless oppositions” whose upshot is “always 
their foundation in class” (183).  Ultimately, for Goodlad, “Dickens’s underlying 
resistance to the myth of the public school gentleman ends by impressing itself directly 
on the body of Eugene Wrayburn” (186).   
 But, of course, there is an important lesson to be learned from Wrayburn’s fate, 
which points to a specific transformation of aesthetic ideals.  For it cannot be doubted 
that there is a certain textual pleasure taken in the assault on the public-school gentleman 
Wrayburn.  The injury of Wrayburn, of course, also involves a kind of catharsis and, in 
this respect, the novel mixes the tragic genre with the romantic one implied in his 
ultimate union with Lizzie.  What is in question in this relationship and in the way it is 
enabled by Headstone’s attack on Wrayburn is, once again, a set of aesthetic values and 
the class moorings to which they are attached.  As Wrayburn himself acknowledges, he is 
really in no position to actually marry his love, Lizzie.  As a representative of patrician 
culture, his relation to a woman from a waterside character could hardly be one of 
equality.  And, as Lizzie acknowledges, this puts her in danger; thus she reminds him of 
“‘the distance and the difference between us’” (675).  The problem which the narrative 
poses is how to affect a union between these two characters in a way that still allows for 
Lizzie to maintain her feminine virtue.  In this respect the narrative develops according to 
a dynamic of resentment, that emotional charge which Nietzsche elaborated so well in the 
Genealogy of Morals.  The sense of this analysis, briefly put, is that resentment is the 
feeling of the lower classes towards the higher classes, a feeling of powerlessness and 
enmity.  This resentment (ressentiment is Nietzsche’s word) evinces itself from a point of 
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view that is simultaneously Lizzie’s and the narrator’s.  After Lizzie and Wrayburn have 
their evening encounter near the waterway by the Paper Mill, the narrative follows and 
evaluates Wrayburn’s reflections on his own problematic situation regarding Lizzie.  His 
“thoughts . . . revealed their wickedness” and his “conclusion” concerning his 
reminiscences is “feckless.”  That is why there is a sense of catharsis in his physical 
abuse—the sight and description of this suffering paragon of society allows the purgation 
of resentment towards him.  This catharsis simply reveals the nature of the social 
antagonisms which the text must navigate.  Once he is punished, then he can be accepted 
within the matrix of demotic values which the book celebrates. 
 The textual articulation implied in Wrayburn’s injury and the textual denouemnet, 
then, embraces a new ideal of a “democratic gentleman.”  This is most succinctly stated 
in the final dinner party of the society which forms around the Veneerings.  Throughout 
the novel, this group has been lampooned by the narrative as pretentious and shallow, 
trading on artifice and surfaces rather than that other aesthetic value of authenticity.  The 
fact that Dickens could construct such a group, equate it so forcibly with society at large, 
and yet undermine it in his depictions deserves more thought than it has yet been 
afforded.  The full effect of this group is to provide a kind of anonymous, indifferent, yet 
self-congratulatory coloring to a faction of society which seems to serve in some senses 
as a metonymy for English society at large.  In the final meeting of this group in the 
novel, the marriage of Lizzie and Wrayburn comes up for discussion.  When Podsnap, 
who is accustomed to dismissing anything that “might bring a blush” to the cheek of his 
daughter, attempts to end the conversation about the “‘horrid female waterman,’” the 
meek Twemlow defends this marriage as a matter of the feelings of a gentleman.  
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Famously, Twemlow remarks that “‘when I use the world gentleman, I use it in the sense 
in which the degree may be attained by any man.’”  Thus the whimsy and caprice which 
Wrayburn has exhibited all during the novel are reclaimed, in his redemption, as positive 
values.  These values are part of a new conception of the gentleman, a conception which, 
theoretically at least, is open to anyone, rather than being the special province of those 
educated at the public school.   
 This ending, as one which embraces a new universal, democratic ideal, cannot 
simultaneously altogether denounce the programs of pauper youth training or the trials 
and challenges faced by the pauper.  Of course, Headstone falls apart completely in the 
course of the novel and eventually dies in a fight with Riderhood.  But he is only one of 
two characters in the novel who follow the path of the pauper turned headmaster, the 
other one being, of course, Charley Hexam.  It is the latter, who, perhaps better than 
anyone in the novel, has “correctly” learned the game of upward social mobility.  
Certainly, Charley has been read as a type of self-centered egotism.  Newey remarks that 
“blind to any but his own interests, he sees everyone, beneath or above, solely as 
instruments of his betterment or as hindrances to it” (249).  But this is not entirely true; 
one could suggest that his attempt to match his sister with his schoolmaster makes a 
certain practical sense, even if it is highly unromantic.  It might not be entirely altruistic, 
but it’s not entirely self-serving, either.  Whatever the merits of that particular suggestion, 
towards the end of the novel, Charley tells Headstone that he “‘will become 
respectable,’” and this seems accurate.  He has learned what Headstone did not:  namely 
a resigned submission to his proper place and sphere, with the acknowledgement that 
there exist for talented youth proper avenues for advancement.  This more conservative 
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and dispassionate attitude is an important practical complement to the tact, whimsy, and 
reflectiveness of the democratic-gentleman ideal of authenticity.  In the next section, I 
will examine a third plot line, that of Bella Wilfer, which is perhaps the novel’s most 
idealized response to the new “discipline of money.”   
 
The Bella Wilfer Narrative:  Learning the Property Script 
The Bella Wilfer narrative continues, or extends, the negotiation of social aspiration and 
value in nineteenth-century English literature.  In this sense, it’s possible to understand 
the book as the kind of novel Robert Colby called “an instrument of learning.” This 
particular novel negotiates contradictions concerning the legitimate uses and attitudes 
towards money in relation to marriage and domestic life.  In order to examine this 
negotiation, one needs to be attuned to the way in which texts think generally.  The 
proposition that texts think at all may be somewhat startling, so for guidance in this arena 
I once again enlist Stathis Gourgouris’s Does Literature Think?.  There are two main 
points which I take from this Gourgouris in explaining how texts think:  the first has to do 
with what he calls the “object of knowledge,” which “each text posits . . . by means of its 
form, its horizon of possibility (the explicit or implicit positions taken up within its 
social-historical range), and the conditions under which it is read” (11).  Though 
“literature has no a priori cognitive object,” Gourgouris maintains that literature can be 
said to know, or at least to think, and that reading is essential to this process, because “the 
text’s internal existence (its singularity) comprises the various moments and contexts of 
its performance, in which reading is, of course, fundamental.”  The second aspect of 
Gourgouris’s theory which I will also want to keep in mind as I examine the Bella 
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narrative is that which defines a notion of subject effects.  Gourgouris writes that “insofar 
as the text speaks (has something to say, in ordinary language), it enables the reader-
subject to have a sense of his/her position or to have a sense of his/her effect in a wider 
historical domain:  the particular subject effect that creates the differential experience of 
individual location in a specific social-historical frame” (12).   
 Of course, Gourgouris’s hypothesis about the nature of “reading” and literary 
“knowledge” is more general than mine as it is meant to cover more ground.  
Accordingly, I must refine his ideas and elaborate how they fit and work within an 
interpretation of Our Mutual Friend.  What I wish to bring attention to is the fact that 
character inevitably inflects our own understanding of our “reader-subject” position, 
which is the primary focus of Gourgouris’s theory.  That is to say, when one traces out 
the influences of the text, whatever else one might say about them, one must insist that 
the characters, as well as the reader, respond to those influences, thus creating a field of 
multiple forces, whose ultimate limits it is not my present project to define.  For the 
moment, it is enough to have highlighted the fact that reading is a process that is as 
immanent to the text, with all of its relationships between narrative, description, 
character, etc., as it is to the empirical experience of the reader.  This process furthermore 
entails the production of that “object of knowledge” to which Gourgouris refers as well as 
the thought of which it is an object.  But I would like to think of this thought and this 
object not as necessarily rigorously falsifiable constructions, like a syllogistic deduction.  
Instead, I prefer to think of them as full of affects, dramatizations, and attempts to 
become adequate to the concept.  Thinking in this respect is not like Shakespeare’s 
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schoolboy who can easily spin off the ages of man; instead, it is comprised of mistakes, 
half-measures and uncertainties. 
 Obviously, at the core of the “object of knowledge” of Our Mutual Friend lies the 
patrimony, the inheritance, which drives the narrative and the textual desire of the novel 
and which stands as a representative of private property.  It is this object which the novel 
“thinks” first and foremost.  Bella’s father, R. W., indicates the contradictory and rather 
anonymous appearance of private property in a family conversation early in the novel.  
Bella asks her father, “‘when old Mr. Harmon made such a fool of me . . . what do you 
suppose he did it for?” (41).  Her father, indicating the mysterious appeal of property in 
the narrative, replies, “I doubt if I ever exchanged a hundred words with the old 
gentleman.  If it was his whim to surprise us, his whim succeeded.  For he certainly did 
it.” 
 Of course, the loss of opportunity to wed the heir to the Harmon fortune produces 
its own set of difficulties, which in themselves are highly ambiguous.  And these are the 
types of ambiguities which, I would argue, are constitutive of the type of thinking that 
literature performs—one might suggest that one way of contemplating literary thought is 
as a series of attitudes towards its object.  Again, that object, in the Bella plotline, is the 
inheritance and the private wealth for which it stands symbolically.  As Bella explains 
regarding the inheritance of the property and the loss of that opportunity, “‘there never 
was such a hard case!’” (36).  At the same time, Bella reminds us that the proposition 
itself is quite “‘ridiculous.  It was ridiculous enough to have a stranger coming over to 
marry me, whether he liked it or not. . . . It was ridiculous to know I shouldn’t like him—
how could I like him, left to him in a will, like a dozen of spoons, with everything cut and 
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dried beforehand, like dried orange chips.’”  One can, with this passage, begin to observe 
the contradictory discourse and attitudes which the text is to articulate around the will.  
As Bella here observes, the will is dehumanizing, turning her into a mere object that can 
be traded as if she were material wealth itself.  In this sense, she is forced into a kind of 
identity with the object world.  Yet despite the possibility of this deprivation, Bella is by 
no means immune to the usual enthusiasm for vast wealth.  Thus, while she deplores the 
insults of her own “hard case,” she simultaneously claims that “I love money, and want 
money—want it dreadfully” and “I hate to be poor, and we are degradingly poor, 
offensively poor, miserably poor, beastly poor.”  What these apparently coherent 
statements about money simultaneously indicate is an ambivalence about social 
aspiration and value, one which is inextricably intertwined with the narrative about the 
Wilfers as a family.  Thus, the novel thinks the question of private property from the 
point of view of the family and domestic relationships, which context seems to justify the 
regime of private property itself.  Rather than providing a rounded reflection, which 
would admit that wealth and poverty are twin sides of the same coin, the novel elaborates 
the various affects appropriate to and derivative of the regime of private property from 
the point of view of the family, and particularly the lower middle-class family. 
 In the course of this elaboration, the text develops a number of attitudes and 
postures vis-à-vis the will and the conditions which it was to place upon Bella, including 
the accession to a large amount of property.  These attitudes include dejection, 
embarrassment, avarice, compunction, remorse, and elation.  All of these are attempts on 
the part of the narrative to negotiate the text of property.  But we must examine more 
closely the aesthetics which this text articulates around the object of the will and private 
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property.  What kinds of aesthetic commitments, in other words, does this text make in 
negotiating the arrival of a new regime of money, one which says goodbye to hoarding 
and to the dustbins of accumulation in order to formulate a new role for money which has 
the family as one of its nuclei? 
 Chapter nine of the first book, “Mr. and Mrs. Boffin in Consultation,” finds Mrs. 
Boffin in search of that elusive yet ever-present figure in the book, society:  “‘Now, I’ll 
tell you what I want, Noddy,’ said Mrs. Boffin, smoothing her dress with an air of 
immense enjoyment, ‘I want society.’”  Mr. Boffin asks if it is “‘Fashionable Society,’” 
in particular, that she wants, and she answers with an emphatic “‘Yes!’” (96).  All of this 
stems from the fact that, as Mr. Boffin explains, “‘we have come into a great fortune, and 
we must do what’s right by our fortune; we must act up to it.’”  Already, one can see that 
money in this plotline is treated in a manner which renders it anthropological, something 
that must be done right by.  Furthermore, the text seems to be establishing a problematic 
which it will then develop over the ensuing pages—namely, what is the relationship 
between this large fortune and society?  Is society comprised only of the very fortunate, 
or is it larger than that?  No doubt, with the inclusion of the Wilfers, who rent their house, 
in the Boffin circle, the text suggests a larger social sympathy.   
 The first set of affects which the Bella plot articulates around this problem of 
wealth, society, and the family, are comprised of stubborn independence mixed equally 
with embarrassment.  Bella conjectures that “‘when the Harmon murder was all over 
town, and people were speculating on its being suicide, I dare say those impudent 
wretches at the clubs and places made jokes about the miserable creature’s having 
preferred a watery grave to me.  It’s likely enough they took such liberties’” (37).  By 
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being associated with the inheritance, Bella has become an object for speculation, a kind 
of publicly traded good, or at least so she imagines.  Of course, the luxury which she 
believes the inheritance would have bestowed stands in stark contrast to the conditions in 
which the family presently finds itself.  The conditions of the Wilfer family are described 
by the mother as “‘conscious though independent poverty’” (105).  This statement is 
consistent with the generally proud bearing of Mrs. Wilfer, though it also carries with it 
some of the ineluctably argumentative cast of the family as a whole.  Indeed, throughout 
the first interview with the Boffins, Mrs. Wilfer begins most of her statements by saying 
“‘pardon me,’” indicating all at once attitudes of propriety, independence, and 
argumentativeness.  Nonetheless, Bella accepts the Boffin’s invitation to join their 
establishment, though, in doing so, the mother, at least, retains a modicum of self-respect 
by insisting that “‘when . . . Bella accepts an invitation, she considers herself to be 
conferring qui-i-ite as much honour . . . as she receives’” (107).  Though there is 
undoubtedly some truth to the observation that Bella has been singled out for special 
treatment by the narrative because of her beauty, there is also a sense in Mrs. Wilfer’s 
assertion of defensiveness that she cannot quite escape the awkwardness implied in 
accepting what she calls the Boffin’s attempt at “‘patronizing’” the young Bella. 
 Nonetheless, the Boffin’s patronage is crucial to the development of the Bella 
plotline.  By virtue of the Boffin’s patronage, Bella’s prospects become enlarged, as the 
Boffins promise that they will settle some of their wealth upon her, especially in the form 
of a marriage dowry.  Their patronage sets the stage for the development of the romantic 
plot between Rokesmith and Bella, with the Boffins imagined as surrogate parents for the 
latter.  It also allows for the indulgence of a utopian wish which does away with all of the 
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scarcity and depravity of private accumulation and which allows Bella, a member of the 
renting class, to luxuriate in material abundance.  This advance in the Bella plot further 
positions Bella in such a way that the text can ask about the comparative social value of 
wealth and where it stands in the scale of human society.  By forming a “society” around 
the figure of Bella, the Boffins denote themselves and their circle a double for that other 
circle, the Veneering circle, the former symbolizing long-standing family ties and a union 
between the servant class, the lower classes, and mercantile property, while the latter 
symbolize the nouveau riche and speculative finance capital.  Naturally, the text 
dramatizes a kind of competition between these two versions of society, pitting 
mercantile against finance capitalism. 
 Part of the problem which the patronage poses is that of social aspiration and the 
possibility, at least, of social advancement and what they mean for competing ideas about 
social station.  One might recall, as a moment in counterpoint, Charley Hexam’s speech 
to Bradley Headstone, when he insists he will remain “‘strictly respectable in the scale of 
society’” (694).  As a young man, he implies that steady work and dignified, lawful 
behavior will naturally lead to improved prospects.  As a woman, Bella’s position is more 
ambiguous.  Her dilemma seems to ask to what degree it is consistent with honor, in her 
era, to accept patronage, an ancient form of social bonding.  As a potentially coalescent 
figure, Bella becomes a catalyst for shaping the identities of those characters who share 
her society.  Of course, it is well to remember that, as the Bella narrative progresses, it 
ultimately serves the purposes of, in Donald Hall’s words, “fixing” the identity, not only 
of the class-ambiguous Boffin, but, more emphatically, the younger John Harmon, whose 
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identity has already been radically altered to that of John Rokesmith in the course of the 
novel (3). 
 Hall’s larger thesis, about the threat of non-conforming or weird women, women 
who do not conform to the norms of middle-class, heterosexual, domesticated women, 
however, must be modified to indicate the degree to which even such “normative” 
women can provide a kind of threat to masculine property relations, to the degree that 
they refuse or even entertain the idea of refusing those relations.  In other words, it 
seems, on the one hand, that Bella, of all the female characters in the novel (consider 
Jenny Wren’s parental bearing or Betty Higden’s fierce independence), is the least likely 
to rebel against patriarchal property relations and the inheritance of the Harmon estate.  
Yet, in some sense, her normativity puts the whole equation into greater danger; for, if 
she ultimately does reject the class standing of John Harmon, for example, she will upset 
a delicate balance which allows her femininity to become somehow “representative” in 
the novel.  If Bella’s investment in reproductive, heterosexual normativity were retracted, 
then that normativity would be significantly undone by the narrative; on the other hand—
and this is a larger point about fiction which Hall mentions briefly and which says 
something about its subversive quality in general—there must be some threat, and this 
threat must be allegorical, or else there can be no psychological investment in the 
narrative on the part of the reader.  That is, as literary theorists have shown from time 
immemorial, plots rely on crises for their effects, crises to which an audience can in some 
way relate.  These crises can be existential, more or less “social,” structural, etc.—the 
range of crises upon which fiction can rely is perhaps infinite, but it is part of what makes 
narrative fiction readable. 
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 In Our Mutual Friend, however, what is in question is the degree to which Bella 
herself, and we along with her, though perhaps in slightly different ways, will learn to 
read the script of private property.  For, as I have already indicated, without that script 
enlisting her affect, stoking it up, calling it forth and finally eliciting its support, 
patriarchal capitalism would be a less seductive trope within the novel.  Thus the novel 
puts into question a whole series of attitudes, commitments, and desires around the 
questions of gender and capital.  In this interrogation, it becomes paramount that Bella 
invests into the script of private property, providing it with a properly feminine alibi.  At 
the same time, the balance of rewards and incentives entails that Bella undergo a 
conversion—that she learns “acceptable” attitudes regarding wealth, though she is 
arguably deprived, in many ways, of social agency and the independence which her 
mother insists is her “‘natural abode.’” 
 The Bella narrative is ultimately a romance, and this entails the renegotiation and 
consolidation of social strata and social values.  To reiterate, the Bella narrative involves 
a solidarity between the lower classes (Bella herself), the servant class (the Boffins), and 
mercantile capital (John Harmon).  In keeping with this aspect of the narrative, the 
aesthetic which it articulates, rather than being informed by the “independent Poverty” 
associated with Betty Higden and the Wilfer family at an earlier stage, is instead 
concerned with the lines of communication between the several classes and the 
distinction between humans and property which can be speculated in.  Thus Bella asks 
Rokesmith, in response to his first marriage proposal, “‘was it not enough that I should 
have been willed away, like a horse, or a dog, or a bird; but must you too begin to dispose 
of me in your mind, and speculate in me, as soon as I had ceased to be the talk and the 
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laugh of the town?  Am I forever to be made the property of strangers?’” (367).  Here the 
text is resurrecting that theme which is central to it, the question of the role of strangers, 
of intimacy, and of mutual familiarity in the arrangements of property.  The novel and 
Bella, as its most representative character, seem to ask whether familial relations are 
enough to insure the continuation of humane values in the era of capitalism.  At the same 
time, the novel does emphatically question the comparative worth of wealth and human 
decency.  This is the work which the “pious fraud” (752) performs and to which I will 
now turn in concluding my analysis of the Bella narrative. 
 The pious fraud is that through which John Harmon puts Bella.  The pious fraud 
also transforms or, to use more religious language, converts Bella, and shows that she is 
indeed the “‘true golden gold’” (753).  The pious fraud is that whole plot which the 
Boffins and John Harmon employ in order to test Bella and “‘prove’” her real worth, or, 
in other words, to authenticate it.  In the disclosure of the pious fraud, Mrs. Boffin reveals 
that this proof is based upon Bella’s ability to “‘stand up for you [John] when you was 
slighted, . . . to show herself a generous mind when you was oppressed, . . . to be truest to 
you when you were poorest and friendliest, and all this against her own seeming 
interest’” (754).  In this speech, Mrs. Boffin is once again articulating, both for the reader 
and for the text, a set of values which is consistent with the idea of disinterestedness as a 
form of self-denial which is simultaneously generous, sympathetic, and authentic.  And it 
is the possibility of the continuation of these values within a market system that 
seemingly pervades all the facets of social life which the text interrogates.  Obviously, the 
fact that the novel ends by rewarding Bella with all of the Harmon wealth and the 
luxurious home, replete with an aviary and a nursery, complicates the notion of 
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disinterestedness which it articulates at that earlier moment of Bella’s self-renunciation in 
favor of common decency.  But earlier in the pious fraud, Bella articulates a position that 
is truly utopian, embodying what must be a noble virtue that seems entirely discordant 
with most of the possible social positions which the novel offers. 
 That earlier moment—the crisis of the pious fraud, as it were—comes when Mr. 
Bofin relieves Rokesmith/Harmon from his post of secretary on the grounds that he made 
the ill-advised attempt at courting Bella mentioned above.  Mr. Boffin, upon dismissing 
Mr. Rokesmith, informs the latter that he has “‘heard of these doings of yours . . . from a 
lady with as good a headpiece as the best, and she knows this young lady, and I know this 
young lady, and we all three know that it’s Money she makes a stand for—money, 
money, money—and that you and your affections are a Lie, sir!’” (581).  At this point in 
the narrative, Bella finally renounces Mr. Boffin and the greedy attitude towards money 
which he represents:  she asserts that “‘as a man of property you are a Demon!,’” and she 
insists that she “‘won’t have money.’  Keep it away from me,’” she continues, “‘and only 
let me speak to good little Pa, and lay my head upon his shoulder and tell him all my 
griefs.’”  She has thus rejected the patronage of the Boffins and accepted the reality of 
her own familial and somewhat poor origins.  In Robert Higbie’s words, “Bella rejects 
materialism by rejecting the ‘bad’ Boffin, replacing the materialist ideal she has tried to 
believe in with an unselfish one that exists in imagination” (151). 
 The phrase “in imagination” is essential here, because it speaks to the way in 
which the text imagines certain ideals, certain values, and certain aesthetics, and enlists 
and entertains them in ways that are often contradictory.  I have indicated that the 
pronouncements about the text which might follow from the pious fraud and the 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE ‘TRUE GOLDEN GOLD’ 
155 
  
 
 
statements that it allows Bella to make are in some conflict with the actual conclusion of 
the novel, which rewards Bella’s unswerving faith in her husband with luxurious wealth.  
How, in other words, does one reconcile Bella’s renunciation of the “materialist ideal” 
with the emphatic return of that ideal in the novel’s closing pages?  In this case, perhaps 
no reconciliation is possible, and perhaps it is instructive to recall Adorno’s words about 
the problematic relationship between representation and social reality when he wrote that 
“art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as 
autonomous art” (Aesthetic Theory 225).  Similarly, Bella’s lesson is that humanity isn’t 
finally reducible to the wealthy alone, incapable as this lesson is, even in its own terms, 
of transcending property relations. 
 
Conclusion 
If one is to think about the learning and exchange which occur in the novel in 
conversation with the economy which structures its narratives, it is essential to keep in 
mind the deep divide which this economy dictates, a divide between reproductive and 
productive space.  The scholar Catherine Waters has drawn attention to this dynamic 
within the context of both Marxian critique and the novel Our Mutual Friend.  In her 
book, Dickens and the Politics of the Family, she notes that “by apparently grounding 
other forms of difference in a binary organization of sex, the novel seeks to manage the 
social conflicts associated with the capitalist system” (176).  This, of course, is consistent 
with the thought of Engels, which, according to Waters, stipulates that “capitalism 
involves a split between the realms of production and reproduction, work and home, in 
the organization of society.”  All of this takes on something of a pedagogical air when 
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one takes into consideration that the goal of Dickens’s narrative seems to be, in part, the 
appropriate training of feminine desire vis-à-vis the capitalist order, such that heroines 
are disciplined to perform their gender in a way that not only genders the very space of 
that performance but makes class stratifications quite apparent in the process. 
 To articulate the specifics of the cases, one need only look, to begin, at the change 
in fortunes which Lizzie undergoes and the kind of performance which that change 
allows, in terms of her becoming able to exercise her feminine vocation.  At the 
beginning of her narrative Lizzie works the river with her father, scavenging for debris 
either from wrecks or from the dumping of refuse.  In effect, the family at this point 
exercises a kind of direct consumption of the excreta of capitalism in a way that 
transgresses the ideals of capitalism, as elaborated by Waters, in a number of ways.  On 
the one hand, the Hexam home is furnished with findings from the river, rather than with 
commodities bought in the commercial market.  Thus Gaffer reminds Lizzie that “the 
very basket that you slept in, the tide washed ashore.  The very rockers that I put it upon 
to make a cradle of it, I cut out of a piece of wood that drifted from some ship or another” 
(4).  On the other hand, Lizzie’s class status means that she is apprenticed as a child to 
her father’s trade, rather than going through the elaborate courting mechanisms of a 
middle-class child such as Georgiana Podsnap.  The class situation which prevents Lizzie 
from performing the middle-class ideal of femininity at this point in the narrative is 
undoubtedly part of the reason that Lady Tippins refers to her as a “‘female waterman’” 
at the end of the novel (796). 
 Lady Tippins’s remark captures perfectly not just the double standard regarding 
the differences between class-conceived notions of gender, but also the way in which 
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gendered difference itself is constituted by class.  In this sense, gender in many ways 
comes to stand in for class in the novel, and the possibility which femininity implies is 
very much created through class structures.  Thus, to take the other heroine, Bella, a large 
part of the anxiety which surrounds her narrative is whether she will be able to perform 
all of the acts of consumption that will mark her as both feminine and middle-class.  Even 
the fifty pounds which she bestows upon her father is given over to sartorial purchases 
which help to establish a gendered identity.  Once he is appropriately dressed, he is 
equipped to “‘take this lovely woman out to dinner’” (308).  In the capitalist society, it is 
not just, as Engels had it, that there are two separate spheres, one a masculine site of 
production and one a feminized site of reproduction, although that is certainly a helpful 
insight into understanding what was going on—and to a large extent, what is still going 
on—in industrialized and capitalistic societies.  Simultaneously, however, we can see the 
degree to which consumerism and class restraints help to inform the construction and 
performance of gender.  As Waters has pointed out, the construction of middle-class 
gender has, in large part, to do with this very separation that I have been discussing, such 
that Lizzie moves from a house furnished with found items to one which will be 
furnished with items purchases with Eugene’s money.  Similarly, Bella moves from a 
house in which the family is forced to take on a lodger because of “‘embarrassed 
circumstances,’” to one in which, though economic transactions still might take place, 
they are of a character consistent with purchasing and command of labor, rather than 
selling.  By the delineation of such plotlines, the narrative produces subject effects that 
are invested in the fortunes of private property.   
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 But what is disagreeable about the “message” of the novel is the way it enacts 
disclosure, thereby placing the genuine over artifice.  In this sense, the Bella narrative is 
much the same as Wegg’s—the latter, we will remember, aside from being relieved of his 
position for attempting to blackmail the Boffins, is also parodied by the narrator for his 
poor attempts at impersonating the true literary man.  In this parodying, as well as in the 
pious fraud which is carried out on Bella, the narrative insists on the value of authenticity 
at the same time that it displays the need to “disclose” the contents of the plot constituted 
by the pious fraud.  This interpretation is consistent with Mr. Boffin’s insistence that 
Bella has come through the fraud as “‘the true golden gold’” (754).  Towards the end of 
the book, Bella takes over the narrative of the pious fraud, and it is no coincidence, in my 
opinion, that Bella’s conclusion of the narrative of the pious fraud is nearly coterminous 
with the end of the novel itself—in some senses, then, it is tempting to read the pious 
fraud as a metaphor for the larger narrative.  This is especially so if we consider the way 
in which the narrative seeks to inerpellate feminine desire, calling into being and 
investing it into the workings of a class-inflected social life.  “‘Oh, I understand you now, 
sir!’ cried Bella.  ‘I want neither you nor anyone else to tell me the rest of the story.  I can 
tell it to you, now, if you would like to hear it’” (756).  At this point, Bella has made the 
script of private property her own, even going so far as to speak “the rest of the story” in 
her own voice.  It is not enough, therefore, that she should be subjected to the trial of the 
pious fraud, which in itself is a lesson about the contradictory nature of monetary and 
human relations, but she must furthermore endorse and propound its cardinal—and 
utopian—virtues of generosity and authenticity. 
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 In the case of Lizzie, the lower-class girl from a family of waterside characters, 
the narrative seems to pose the question in a different way.  If she herself cannot obtain 
quite to the level of Bella’s luxury, her narrative responds to the question of who is the 
appropriate person to discipline her desire in a somewhat ambiguous way (Riah is the 
most obvious candidate; Wrayburn or the narrator the less obvious ones).  Nonetheless, 
the overall trajectory of my argument has been to assert that the celebration of the 
incontinence and excreta of capitalism which some critics have either suggested or 
asserted is problematized, as much in Lizzie’s narrative as in Bella’s, by a process 
whereby feminine desire within the context of a capitalist social world is very closely 
disciplined.  In Lizzie’s case, the question develops according to a logic of fraternal 
competition between Eugene Wrayburn and Bradley Headstone.  Waters has drawn 
attention to the “sexual innuendo [which] underlies Eugene’s taunting inquiry [to the 
schoolmaster]” when the former asks the latter, “‘are you her schoolmaster as well as her 
brother’s?—Or perhaps you would like to be?’”  Thus the disciplining of feminine desire, 
in Lizzie, is carried out, in part, in the context of a rivalry between Bradley Headstone, 
with origins in the pauper class, and Wrayburn, a gentleman educated at public school.  
This plotline, towards the end of the novel, enacts the troubling spectacle in which the 
Schoolmaster Headstone violently attacks the genteel Wrayburn.  For Goodlad, the 
physical violence which Headstone inflicts upon Wrayburn indicates that the two “merge 
symbolically into one and the same damaged body” (186).  But the injury which the 
headmaster inflicts upon Wrayburn then licenses the creation of a feminized domestic 
arrangement between Lizzie and Wrayburn.  This consummating domestic arrangement 
in turn envisages the formation of a normative family now on the favorable side of 
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commodity excretion.  The novel sanctions this arrangement by legitimating specific 
positions within the social exchange of commodities.  To this extent, the reformed public-
school boy, the redeemed scavenger girl, and the narrative voice itself unite in the 
affirmation of authenticity, a value ultimately as social as it is literary. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
The Moment of Alice:  Rules and Gentlemanly Learning in the Late Victorian Period 
 
 Writing about Alice’s responses to the questions and suggestions of the denizens 
of the Looking-Glass World and Wonderland, William Empson asserts that  
“she always seems to raise the tone of the company she enters, and to find this all the 
easier because the creatures are so rude to her.  A central idea here is that the perfect lady 
can gain all the advantages of contempt without soiling herself by expressing or even 
feeling it” (In Bloom, 59). 
  When one compares this statement with the one by Florence Becker Lennon that 
the “protean Alice . . . is of course Dodgson himself” (31), one arrives at a perplexing 
question.  Namely, was Dodgson so obsessed with the image of maiden girlhood because 
it allowed him, through some act of transference, a narcissistic fantasy about his own 
purity?  Of course, we’ve known at least since Foucault that questions about the 
psychological life of an author are less than sincere critical pursuits, but here we must 
acknowledge that the question isn’t simply personal.  If, after all, there is a case for 
looking at Dodgson’s particular artistic impulses, it may be because they have something 
special to tell us about the Victorian discourse of learning.     
 I have already commented in a previous chapter about the response Charlotte 
Brontë had to a piece written by Harriet Taylor about the admission of females into the 
professions.  Brontë voiced a sentiment which is not unfamiliar to scholars of the 
Victorian period:  she raised the fear, in a rather ad hominem way, that the author of the 
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piece was in danger of herself becoming, if she were not already, too masculine.  In other 
words, there was, as the quotation demonstrated, a particular worry in the Victorian 
context that the division between the sexes must be kept in check.  Surprisingly, this 
necessity hinged upon the loss that a compromised Victorian femininity would bring with 
it, less than on the loss of masculine privilege.  Of course, the loss of masculine 
distinction always hovered in the background—without the Angel in the House, the man 
would have no shelter from the brutal world—but the gender divide was first and 
foremost thought to operate in the favor of women.  This may be due in large part to the 
fact that nearly all officially sanctioned thought was carried out by men, with true 
freethinkers such as Harriet Taylor being quite rare.  Thus the curious status of Lewis 
Carroll’s two famous children’s stories:  set in a fantasy land seemingly far removed from 
the school, Alice’s adventures are nonetheless imbued with its aura.  For it is common 
knowledge that the books’ main character was based upon a don’s daughter and that they 
have served to teach generations of children and adults what is expected of each. 
 Richard Wallace, in The Agony of Lewis Carroll, rehearses some of the privations 
suffered by boys, especially smaller boys like Dodgson, at England’s schools.  Besides 
the merely pugilistic forms of bullying, sexual humiliation was likely common.  Quoting 
from H. Montgomery Hyde’s The Love that Dared not Speak its Name, Wallace recounts 
the practices of homosexual sex among the students, as well as the practice of calling 
one’s younger lover a “‘bitch,’” not to mention the widespread practice of feminizing 
good-looking boys with epithets such as Molly or Jenny (134).  According to Wallace, 
Thomas Hughes’s Tom Brown’s Schooldays is similarly, though obliquely, referring to 
sexual activities when he writes of the “noble friendships between big and little boys.”  
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Wallace writes that “Hughes can only be pointing to sexual activities, most likely 
youthful homosexual activities among boys of similar age or pederasty when younger 
boys were coerced or enticed into sexual activities by the older boys.  In modern terms, 
many of the boys were raped.”  Informing this sadistic environment was the ever-present 
irony that “while the forgiveness of sin was promised in the chapel, small academic 
errors would produce corporal punishment severe enough to draw blood.” 
 According to Wallace, this contradiction between vicious violence and the 
gentlemanly character it was meant to produce unsurprisingly led to a kind of personality 
split in Dodgson.  In effect, Dodgson was required to respond to two different kinds of 
pressure during his youth (what we might refer to as his formative period):  on the one 
hand, his parents’ and siblings’ image of him as sensitive and perhaps even angelic, and, 
on the other, his schoolmates’ and headmasters’ thoughtless practical joking and 
punishments (though the evidence suggests that the latter consisted only of “impositions” 
in Dodgson’s case).  In effect, what was expected of Dodgson was the same that was 
expected of most English schoolboys:  that they attempt to maintain the appearance of 
social maturity while being subject to a number of psychological and physical cruelties.  
What was exceptional about Dodgson, according to Wallace, is the way in which he 
undid, or threatened to undo, that hard division between the polite gentleman and the 
victim of cruelty.  The medium in which he did this was, of course, his literary works.   
One of the most prevalent methods by which he communicated such messages 
was the anagram.  Like the more familiar acrostic, the anagram involves an 
unconventional method of reading.  The anagram is more difficult to identify and to 
decipher, however, because it is not dictated by pattern in the same way—the relevant 
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letters can be recombined in almost any number of ways, provided that they are all used.  
Wallace references two examples which clearly indicate that Dodgson was fond of, or at 
least familiar with, acrostics.  The first concerns Edward Vaughan Kenealy, “a later 
disbarred defense counsel.”  The anagram at which Dodgson arrived was “‘Ah! We dread 
an ugly knave!’ which uses all the letters and keeps the sense of the story behind the 
name in reflecting some dubious behavior leading to disbarment” (20).  The second 
reference is to William Ewart Gladstone, the famous parliamentarian:  “Wilt tear down 
all images,” “Wild agitator! Means well,” and “A wild man will go at trees,” were the 
anagrams in this case.  Since these are in fact anagrams that Dobson recorded, there can 
be little dispute about Dodgson-Carroll’s fascination with and recognition of the form.  
Still, one is perhaps skeptical when Wallace, going on a hunch about Dodgson’s real or 
imagined homosexual proclivities, reworks the line “Then the bowspirit got mixed with 
the rudder sometimes” from “The Hunting of the Snark” into “To Mother:  Disturbed, I 
themed the worst pig sex with men” (33).   
Wallace himself is aware of the merits of skepticism towards his own hypotheses 
about Carroll’s writing.  In the first chapter of his book, he asks “When is evidence not 
evidence? . . . Is it possible to live a public charade for a lifetime without being 
detected?” (4).  Nonetheless, he constructs a system of rules for identifying and 
interpreting anagrams in Dodson’s works:  all letters must be used from the original 
selection, only complete sentences or grammatical units could be used, the usages “must 
reflect Victorian or earlier usage” (the “themed” above would have been valid at the 
time), and, finally, “a ‘best’ anagram must be sought in each situation, one that appears to 
tie into his life or works.  It’s hard, if not impossible, to rule out the presence of the 
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anagrams which Wallace believes he detects:  indeed, part of the problem with anagrams 
is that it’s impossible to determine when they’re accidental and when they’re intentional.  
As I mentioned earlier, Wallace gives some evidence for Dodgson’s interest in anagrams 
(his interest in puzzles is irrefutable).  There is also evidence that he did use them in his 
works:  the sister “Lacie” who eats treacle at the bottom of the well is an anagram for 
Alice, and Bruno’s wandering eyes read “live” as “evil.”  Furthermore, in a diary entry 
which records the desire to use anagrams in a pandemic fashion, Dodgson reveals that he 
“wrote to [C. S.] Calvery, suggesting an idea (which occurred to me yesterday) of 
guessing well-known poems as acrostics, and making a collection of them to hoax the 
public” (Collingwood 152).  In some ways, this entry accords with Wallaces thesis about 
Dodgson’s anagrams: namely, that they were a way to take in the public, as it were.  But 
for Wallace, the motivations behind this trickery were not simply to play a hoax, they 
were, instead, “constructs for hiding self disclosure along with explicit (primarily) 
homosexual erotic imagery” (7).   
If this were indeed Dodgson’s purpose, he couldn’t have chosen a better medium:  
as the anagram could always be discounted as coincidence, he could indulge the thrill of 
self-disclosure without taking on much of the risk.  In other words, he could disclose as 
much as he wanted without ever really having to worry about discovery.  Still, one is 
somewhat unconvinced of Wallace’s contention that the purpose of this form of 
disclosure was to lead “a secret battle against hypocrisy.”  One of the anagrams which he 
detects in In the Looking Glass defies his own rule about the relevance to Dodgson’s 
biography.  In that story, as Alice is travelling in the train, a railway guard pokes his head 
into the car and says “You’re travelling the wrong way.”  When we read that the railway 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE MOMENT OF ALICE 
166 
  
 
 
guard’s words change to “wary nag whore: evil rotten guy,” we’re left rather puzzled by 
what the import of this anagram might be.  Even if the “nag whore” is Alice and the 
“rotten guy” is one of the passengers on the other side of the car (the scene is illustrated), 
one still wonders what Dodgson’s intention could have been in providing this anagram.  
It doesn’t seem to correspond to anything specific about Dodgson.  Wallace writes that it 
is “one of a number of anagrams which just produce imagery,” though it’s not clear it 
does that either.  Rather than disclosing anything about Dodgson’s person, this anagram, 
if that’s what it is, is simply indulging in vulgar or abusive language for its own sake. 
It’s daunting to think about all the meanings that may be hiding underneath the 
straight content of Dodgson’s works.  And, as the example above illustrates, it isn’t 
always edifying to do so.  Furthermore, it’s not clear to me that it makes a great deal of 
difference, in terms of understanding the anagrams, whether Dodgson was a homosexual.  
For obvious reasons, Dodgson was prevented from developing anything like an effective 
attack on the homophobic mores of the general cultural, and whatever assaults he might 
have managed by using anagrams were going to be undermined, not aided, by their 
covertness.  They may have allowed him to articulate self-disgust, but such articulations 
were in any event unlikely to forward a mature homosexual or homoerotic consciousness.  
And there are other problems with the anagram thesis:  one is that, as the concrete 
recorded examples show, anagrams were usually something which Dodgson thought of 
after reflection upon a name, not necessarily something which he arranged prior to 
composition.  If the anagrams which Wallace detects were in fact intentional, then the 
larger theory about a kind of lingering schizophrenia should probably be revised:  if there 
is some insight into Dodgson’s personality from the anagrams, one would wonder why he 
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was so squeamish about irreverent treatment of biblical topics in conversation, or the 
maltreatment of characters in plays.  Though a certain degree of propriety was expected 
of Oxford dons, Dodgson was known for being abstemious even by those standards.  To 
posit a Dodgson who was simultaneously secretly enamored of smut is to test the limits 
of performance theory. 
The implication of Wallace’s approach is that the Alice stories themselves are 
overtly benign, and the only way to arrive at any subversive messages within the 
Dodgson’s works is via an appeal to the acrostics or other word puzzles.  From this point 
of view, one almost wishes for a sinister meaning to dispel the childhood myth of 
innocence.  But there is much that challenges or potentially disturbs within the explicit 
content of the tales as well.  At this level of content there is an obvious emphasis placed 
upon play and games, aside from the more psychedelic transformations in Alice’s size.  
And, as Kathleen Blake has pointed out in Play, Games, and Sport:  The Literary Works 
of Lewis Carroll, play and games form a productive entry point for thinking about 
Carroll’s works because the rules of social convention which are central to games, after 
all, are important as well for language, play, work, and civilization in general (Blake 15).  
Blake writes that “to [Johan] Huizinga, to the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and, as I 
have suggested, to Carroll too, language itself is a gamelike system of reciprocally 
accepted terms and rules, arbitrary, meaningful only by social agreement” (16).  It would 
seem, then, that Blake’s approach to the study of games in Carroll’s works is more 
productive than Wallace’s precisely because it opens onto questions of larger social 
realities, including, of course, learning.              
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As I have just suggested, rules are an important component of both games and 
play (anyone who takes Kathleen Blake seriously on this topic will refrain from writing 
“mere” play).  Yet there is a difference between the two.  One of the passages which 
helps us to understand the difference between play per se and game is the third chapter of 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, “A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale.”  Alice and a 
group of animals having just escaped from her pool of tears, “the first question of course 
was, how to get dry again” (35).  After the Mouse’s method of telling a dry tale is tried 
and found wanting, the Dodo (often taken to be a representative of Dodgson himself) 
suggests a caucus-race as the “best way to get us dry” (37).  The caucus-race is structured 
just enough to qualify as a kind of game—it involves running around a course shaped “in 
a sort of circle.”  But the rules are so lax that it is still basically simple play:  “There was 
no ‘one, two, three, and away!’ but they began running when they liked, and left off when 
they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over.”  The end of the game 
is abrupt, signaled by the Dodo announcing “‘The race is over!’” (38).  And all the 
participants are left in confusion as to who has won.   
And this tells something about the difference between pure play and games:  play 
and games may both involve rules—and even the injunction to run in a circle is a kind of 
rule.  Indeed, one may also play a game, and thus games usually involve a degree of play 
or playing.  But serious games, while inclusive of both play and rules, tend more towards 
competition than does play per se.  In most games, there is a definite winner and a 
definite loser, while in play, though there may be definite roles, the distinction is not so 
clear.  Thus games raise the sensation of the participants of either winning or losing, and 
one takes a more definite risk in playing a competitive game.  Thus, the amorphousness 
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of simple play can be either reassuring or a bit of a letdown.  This no doubt accounts for 
Alice’s reaction when the Dodo announces that “‘Everybody has won, and all must have 
prizes.’”  After Alice has emptied her pockets to award all the runners, including herself, 
the narrator remarks that “Alice thought the whole thing very absurd.”  This reaction is 
elicited not only because she has been compelled to award herself but because the line 
between play and game has been erased—there is no real competition, but all of the 
participants are treated as winners, as if it had been a serious game.      
Games themselves play a peculiar role in Dodgson’s works.  Usually, as in chess, 
checkers, or the Victorian shuttlecock, games presume a kind of equality of opportunity 
between the players.  The only factors which can influence the outcome of the game are 
the players’ own level of skill, or luck, where elements of chance, such as dice, are 
involved.  And, since the dynamics of a game—it’s rules, structure, etc.—are so limited 
and arbitrary, the results of the game frequently don’t tell us anything important about the 
players except for their relative level of skill.  But in Dodgson, games frequently have an 
element of cruelty and one-sidedness to them.  The classic example of this, of course, is 
the Queen of Hearts and the Croquet Game.  The Queen compels everyone in the vicinity 
to play the game, and that is likely because she knows that she will win.  This foregone 
conclusion, in turn, contributes to the confusion which abounds in the play of the game.  
After talking with the Cheshire Cat, “Alice thought she might go back and see how the 
game was going on, as she heard the Queen’s voice in the distance, screaming with 
passion. . . . and she did not like the look of things at all, as the game was in such 
confusion she never knew whether it was her turn or not’” (93).  The Queen’s repeated 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE MOMENT OF ALICE 
170 
  
 
 
threat of “Off with his head!” adds both to the general mayhem and the sadistic character 
of the scene.   
Indeed, on reading this passage one is reminded of the game mentioned in 
Dodgson’s letter of 5 August 1844 from Richmond School.  In this letter, the boys 
“proposed to play at ‘King of the Cobblers’ and asked me if I would be king, to which I 
agreed.”  From what follows, one can see the way in which a game can function as an 
initiatory prank:  “they made me sit down and sat (on the ground) in a circle round me, 
and told me to say ‘Go to work’ which I said, and they immediately began kicking me 
and knocking me on all sides” (in Wallace 136).  Like the Queen’s Croquet game, this is 
a game that favors certain players at the expense of others.  The King of the Cobblers, 
though, is in fact harsher:  it represents a game where the very fun is in the humiliation of 
the unwitting newcomer.   
  Another kind of game which populates the Alice stories is the word game.  
Frequently, the word games consist of simple puns on homonyms or words that have 
more than one meaning.  In the chapter “A Mad Tea Party,” this latter device is used a 
number of times: “draw” shifts meaning from rendering artistically to gathering liquid; 
well from a noun to an adverb; and beat from counting time to abusing.  At other times, 
the word game—or is it word play?—focuses on the irregularities of language itself, such 
as the expletive “it,” which functions merely as a placeholder.  As the Mouse attempts to 
dry the group with its story, it begins a clause by saying that “‘the patriotic archbishop of 
Canterbury found it advisable—.’” The Duck interrupts, asking, “found what?”  Of 
course, there can be no answer to this question, because the function of the expletive is 
precisely to hold a grammatical position that has no semiotic content.  Despite this, the 
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Duck replies to the Mouse’s answer that it knows “‘what ‘it’ means’” by saying, “I know 
what ‘it’ means well enough, when I find a thing’” (36).  In Through the Looking Glass, 
Carroll experiments with the reverse arrangement, proposing structures that play upon 
semiotic conventions while defying grammar.  The chapter on “Looking-Glass Insects” 
imagines a number of creatures with names that are like portmanteaus:  the “Rocking-
horse-fly,” the “Snap-dragon-fly,” and the “Bread-and-butter-fly.”  I say “like 
portmanteaus,” because, while they exhibit the trait of combining words, they don’t 
combine by shortening, but by the extension of phrases.  This method tests the limits of 
grammatical combination by drawing on the particular capability of nouns to sometimes 
operate as adjectives:  the “horse” in “horse-fly,” by virtue of modifying “fly,” displays 
the properties of an adjective.  In “Rocking-horse-fly,” however, it is asked to be both a 
descriptor of “fly” and the noun which “rocking” describes.  Here Carroll is imagining a 
kind of unstable grammar, where specific elements subsist in two distinct relationships 
and therefore exhibit two distinct properties, which seems to support Deleuze’s argument, 
via the Stoics, about dual existence, though Deleuze makes the argument in the context of 
matter rather than of grammatical relationships.  The names of the looking-glass insects 
are, in this respect, more challenging even than the language of the more familiar 
“Jabberwocky,” which, as critics have noted, maintains the grammatical, if not the 
semiotic, conventions of English.  Now that we have surveyed some of the kinds of 
games and play in the stories, it is possible to move to a discussion of their consequences 
for subjectivity and learning in the Victorian period.     
 Like the grammar of the “Looking-Glass Insects,” the identity of the Alice 
character is divided.  We learn from William Empson that one of the textual precursors of 
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the Alice narratives is the pastoral.  The version of pastoral which the Alice stories 
embody, though, constitutes a child’s story only because of its historical contingency: in 
relying upon a historical form which must be greatly at odds with the nineteenth-century 
reality of the birth of industrialization and the modern proletariat, the return to rural and 
monarchic scenes and characters helps create that sense of dislocation which is so central 
to the effects of the stories.   
Perhaps most obvious among the literary antecedents to Through the Looking 
Glass is William Wordsworth’s poem of 1802, “Resolution and Independence.”  This 
poem describes an encounter between the speaker and a leech-gatherer.  But, even prior 
to the appearance of the leech-gatherer, one can detect similarities between this poem and 
Carroll’s works.  In the second stanza of “Resolution and Independence,” the narrative 
voice explains that “All things that love the sun are out of doors,” a line which speaks to 
the ambivalent stance of the Alice stories towards interiors.  Though domestic interiors 
are invoked in both of the Alice stories, they function as bookends, and, what’s more, 
spaces that are to be escaped.  This indicates one of several aspects in which the 
narratives are subversive—the rejection of modern technological society is signaled by a 
rejection of the middle-class domestic spaces which are its alibi.  Then there is the 
sixteenth line:  “I saw the hare that raced about with joy.”  This passage prefigures the 
appearance of the White Rabbit, but it also insists on a certain ambivalence whereby the 
“joy” can be read as either describing the rabbit’s racing about or the speaker’s seeing.  
This ambivalence helps to construct the child-speaker in a manner consistent with the 
Alice stories—the child is equated with the happy innocence of the animals from fables 
and fairy tales.   
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One could point out, as Leon Waldoff has, that the speaker in “Resolution and 
Independence” is not unambiguously young, though I would suggest that, interesting as 
the hypothesis about the split self of the speaker is, the poem stages a tension around 
youth’s emerging self awareness regarding its own impermanence.  The comparison 
which the speaker performs between himself and the hare (“Even such a happy Child of 
the earth am I”), the invocation of Chatterton, “the marvelous Boy,” and the contrast 
between the speaker and “the old Man” (emphasis added) all speak to a reading which 
specifically dramatizes the dilemmas of youth. 
Yet the textual reference to Wordsworth reminds us that, if only obliquely, the 
Alice narratives also engage in Deleuze’s “pure becoming.”  This becoming, if I read him 
correctly, would unite all attributes, or “incorporels” into a stratum of pure indifference.  
Young and old, before and after, large and small: all are conjoined in this dimension 
which suspends chronology entirely.  Waldoff contends that, regarding the representation 
of self in “Resolution and Independence,” there is “a special complication in that self-
representation lies in the imaginative act of splitting the self” (79).  And he goes on to 
taxonomize the various splits within the self imagined in the poem:  there is the split 
effected by “time” (represented in “early self and the later”); that effected by “vision and 
reality” (the first idealizing the Leech-gatherer, the second recognizing him “as an old 
man”); and finally, by the distance between “subject and object” (the self which 
contemplates the experience versus the one which actually “encountered the Leech-
gatherer”).  We may add to this the split in affect between the joy felt in nature’s 
company and the sadness felt in contemplating the eventuality of old age.  This, in fact, 
seems to be the motivating dramatization behind the poem: the youthful speaker is 
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contemplating the eventual arrival of old age and rebukes itself with a thoroughly 
protestant or even puritanical maxim, asking rhetorically “But how can He expect that 
others should / Build for him, sow for him, and at his call / Love him, who for himself 
will take no heed at all?” (ll. 40-42). 
Yet this way of examining the self, useful as it is in helping us understand the 
contours which might shape it, seems to be taken by surprise by the very fact of the self’s 
division.  But the self would seem to be always already divided, not to mention dynamic 
and occluded.  Thus in some ways, the Alice narratives tell us more about the self than 
does Wordsworth’s poem.  On the one hand, one might argue, again with Waldoff, that 
“Resolution and Independence” functions by way of a movement between states, namely 
from “a state of relative innocence” to “a state of greater awareness and reflectiveness,” 
after the encounter with the leech-gatherer.  As the youth finds solace in the old man, 
saying “I’ll think of the Leech-gatherer on the lonely moor” (l. 140), the poem seems to 
celebrate an essential continuity of human experience.  The speaker has found “so firm a 
mind” within “that decrepit Man,” and thus posits the man as possessing that which the 
youthful speaker had lacked earlier in the poem, namely steadiness.  Thus, earlier in the 
poem, the speaker is still one of the “Poets in our youth.”  Indeed, tracing the fluctuating 
moods of the poet (“As high as we have mounted in delight / In our dejection do we sink 
as low” (ll. 24-25) is one of the devices the poem uses to portray the potential instability 
of youth.  
The Leech-gatherer’s “firm . . . mind,” of course, provides the antidote to such 
mental and emotional volatility.  The choice of the word “firm” is superb:  it at once 
denotes the stability which the youthful speaker lacks while simultaneously implying a 
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congenital freshness which has never died out.  In an odd sort of way, it answers all of the 
difficulties which the speaker poses: it suggests, like the Alice stories, that, in some 
important respects, youth does not necessarily fade, while simultaneously providing a 
model for the youth to emulate in his own old age.  But it is in this regard that the Alice 
stories reveal more about youthful selfhood.  For in Wordsworth’s hands, the self 
becomes a continuity through repetition: we are to assume that, like the Leech-gatherer, 
the poet will remain persistent to the end and “pace / About the weary moors continually / 
Wandering about alone and silently” (ll. 129-131).  Of course, this is a metaphor in the 
case of the poet, but we can infer from the tone of the concluding stanza and the title of 
the poem that the commitment to industrious independence is the real moral of the lyric.  
Nonetheless, in a sense, the youthful self is simply an unformed, deficient version of the 
older, grown self, and is subsumed within it.   
The Alice narratives, and the poem “A-Sitting on a Gate” in particular, stage a 
different relationship between older and younger selves.  This is especially evident in the 
way the poem stages the representation of the old man’s occupation.  At first, the 
treatment of the occupation—or, more precisely, occupations in the Carroll poem, is quite 
similar to that of the Leech-gatherer in Wordsworth’s verse.  In neither poem is the 
occupation of the old man really significant in its own right.  In “Resolution and 
Independence,” it’s not the fact that he gathers leeches which matters, but the persistence 
which makes him “pace about the weary moors continually”—the weariness of the moors 
adding to the difficulties which the constant Leech-gatherer must surmount (l. 129-130).  
Similarly, the symbolic import of his occupation lies in the independence which makes 
him able to endure “wandering about alone and silently.”   
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In “A-Sitting on a Gate,” too, the poetic voice dramatizes a more youthful speaker 
who finds it difficult to subdue his own thoughts in order to absorb the words of the older 
man.  Having asked “‘Who are you, aged man . . . / And how is it you live,’” the speaker 
of the poem finds that “his answer trickled through my head, like water through a sieve.”  
This is strong parody of Wordsworth’s lines “But now his voice to me was like a stream / 
scarce heard; nor word from word could I divide.”  But at the core, the suggestion is the 
same: the speaker’s youth is betrayed by a self-absorption which impedes 
comprehension.   
The difference occurs in the moment when awareness returns: for Wordsworth’s 
speaker, this return allows him “to find / in that decrepit Man so firm a mind.”  In the 
Carroll poem, though, the return of attentiveness has an entirely different connotation:  “I 
thanked him for telling me / The way he got his wealth, / But chiefly for his wish that he / 
Might drink my noble health” (Stanza eight).  Because the focus becomes the speaker’s 
own “noble health,” the old man’s occupation has been drained of all symbolic 
association.  Simultaneously, the old man has been deprived of the status of mentor 
which he held in “Resolution and Independence.”                     
 This failure—or lack—of mentorship in Carroll’s poem could be read as a 
somewhat disrespectful gesture towards the figure of old age, and there is a bit of 
disrespect, or even aggression, towards the old man, such as when the speaker “thumped 
him on the head.”  However, one wonders about the function of this aggression within the 
larger context of the romanticizing of old age in the tradition represented by 
Wordsworth’s poem.  For instance, depending upon the degree to which one agrees to 
read the Carroll poem as in conversation with Wordsworth’s, the aggressive treatment in 
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the former may be also be read as a clue to a more latent, and hence more insidious, form 
of symbolic violence in Wordsworth’s poem, as well as to changing ideas about the 
elderly.  For instance, there is a kind of officiousness in the way the speaker of 
Wordsworth’s poem accosts the Leech-gatherer with “‘What occupation do you there 
pursue? / This is a lonesome place for one like you’” (ll. 88-89).  In this line, assumed 
familiarity is exacerbated by the speaker’s drawing attention to the Leech-gatherer’s age 
with the innuendo “‘one like you.’”  As if this were not enough, the speaker fails to 
follow closely the Leech-gatherer’s response, adding inattentiveness to the rudeness of 
asking personal questions of strangers.  When the speaker at last repeats his earlier 
question, it may be nearly as impolite as thumping the old man on the head. 
 In a rather systematic way, Carroll’s poem and its context are undoing the 
romanticisms upon which the mentorship relationship is constructed in “Resolution and 
Independence.”  Not least of all the techniques used to undo this construction is the White 
Knight’s repeated assurance to Alice that, like all the other apparatuses which he travels 
with, the song is his “‘own invention’” (244).  This insistence on the part of the White 
Knight, easily detected as false by Alice, reveals the way in which independence can be 
fetishized, as perhaps it is in Wordsworth’s poem.  Without really knowing that much 
about the Leech-gatherer, the speaker in “Resolution and Independence” rather 
nonchalantly turns this person with whom he has had a chance encounter into a kind of 
idol.  This idolization of the Leech-gatherer’s firmness of mind and solitary independence 
relieves the speaker of seriously contemplating the more lonely or even dreary aspects of 
his existence.        
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   Furthermore, Carroll’s poem, while mocking the sentiments involved in 
romanticizing old age, also draws attention to the role class or wealth can play in that 
romanticizing.  The virtue of the Leech-gatherer and, by association, the speaker who 
emulates him is parodied in Carroll’s poem by the repeated representation of the old 
man’s earnings in abysmal terms.  The “honest maintenance” of Wordsworth’s Leech-
gatherer is thus transmogrified into sums that are really a mere pittance: “twopence-
halfpenny” in the fourth and “a copper halfpenny” in the sixth stanza of Carroll’s poem.  
This description of the old man’s earnings has, once again, a curious rhetorical effect.  On 
the one hand, it concretizes for the reader the amount that the old man earns by putting it 
into explicitly quantifiable terms.  But by making the quantity explicit, it also draws 
further attention to how Wordsworth’s poem perhaps romanticizes the old man.  Whereas 
the innuendo “an honest maintenance” might mask the fact of the old man’s poverty, the 
revelation of the exact amount of money which he earns draws attention to his meager 
financial situation.  This revelation then in turns makes it more difficult to indulge in the 
kind of mystifying representation which typifies Wordsworth’s speaker.   
This bleary-eyed romanticizing is finally and totally undone in “A-Sitting On A 
Gate” by the closing lines of the poem.  Here the poem shifts from the dialogue between 
the White Knight and the “aged man” which characterizes the poem up to the middle of 
the ninth stanza.  At the middle of the ninth stanza, the poem shifts instead into a 
sustained description of the man, a description which wavers between the maudlin 
(“Whose look was mild, whose speech was slow”) and the ridiculous (“Who snorted like 
a buffalo”).  Not least among the elements which add to the comic treatment of the old 
man is the shift in meter from iambic heptameter—vague enough in its connotations of 
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decorum—to the trotting iambic tetrameter, the rhythm of which can scarcely fail to be 
humorous.    
One might—indeed, one should—ask what importance this way of representing 
the aged man has for our understanding of the child, especially as a subject of learning.  
The effect of this comedy, entirely consistent with that of the poem overall, is to inscribe 
a solid difference between the more youthful speaker and, even more strongly, the 
phlegmatic Alice, on the one hand, and the comic, sentimentalized “aged man” on the 
other.  By undoing the romanticized virtue of the old man, one puts into question the 
status of the aged as that which is to be casually reproduced by the child.  We can see the 
effort to accomplish this reformulation early in the poem as well, in the way the words of 
the old man are treated by the speaker.  Though, like Wordsworth’s speaker, the speaker 
in “A-Sitting On A Gate” fails to attend carefully to the old man, thinking of such things 
as “a way / To feed oneself on batter, / And so go on from day to day / Getting a little 
fatter,” the poem actually quotes the words of the older man rather than relying upon 
indirect discourse to convey the man’s speech.   
Carroll’s poem, in other words, by using a perspective much less given to 
surmise, creates a sharper contrast between the speaker and the aged man.  On the one 
hand, this rhetorical move is consistent with the Victorian tendency to, in Laura C. 
Berry’s words, maintain “the child as child.”  It also exemplifies what Jackie 
Wullschläger describes as “a dawning sense of childhood as a special state, as not just a 
period of training for adulthood but a stage of life in its own right” (12).  At the same 
time, it shows the distance traveled from the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
privileging of an amorphous category of youth (like that of “Resolution and 
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Independence”) to that more irreducibly distinct and specific category of age, the child.  
Wordsworth is not able to imagine the “child as child”—bracketing, for the moment, the 
possibility that he is not concerned specifically with the child at all—because he 
romanticizes the encounter and the harmony between old age and youth.  Ironically, he is 
in some ways anticipating the views of the later mid-Victorians, such as Herbert Spencer, 
who came to forcefully imagine childhood as a determining factor in the shaping of 
adulthood.  But Wordsworth does not yet evince the defining Victorian tendency to see 
the child as a unique self.   
The Victorian conceit of the uniqueness of the child, however, poses its own set 
of problems when it comes to the question learning.  As Wordsworth’s poem suggests, 
one might have, at an earlier time, expected a relationship of inspirational influence to 
obtain between age and its precursor, youth.  This relationship must be troubled to the 
extent that, with Carroll, the uniqueness of the child implies a discontinuity of 
subjectivity and affect between youth and age.  In other words, it seems the Alice stories 
defy what Jan B. Gordon identifies as the “predominant structure of the nineteenth-
century novel”: “something like the Cinderella myth” (19).  Though “domestication 
within a veritable mansion of mirrors [in Through the Looking-Glass] is the consequence 
of the search for meaning and identity,” Carroll’s narratives imagine a feminine 
subjectivity that is able to refuse domestication because it also apparently refuses the 
inevitability of adulthood. 
In this respect, however, Carroll exemplifies a contradiction in the nineteenth-
century conception of childhood: namely, the belief that children, while being a unique 
class of individuals, were also equivalent to humanity itself.  This insistence on the child 
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as the symbol for all that is essentially human relied very much upon the accompanying 
belief in “the importance of play to children” (Elizabeth Sewell 27).  In a letter to May 
Forshall, Dodgson had queried, “Do you ever play at games?  Or is your idea of life 
‘breakfast, lessons, dinner, lessons, tea, lessons, bed, lessons, breakfast, lessons,’ and so 
on?  It is a very neat plan of life and almost as interesting as being a sewing machine or a 
coffee grinder” (in Blake, 11).  Typical of Dodgson’s nonsense poetics, he suggests that 
May would be able to pursue her lessons after having gone to bed and before waking up 
in the morning, undermining the seriousness of intention which is implied by study.  His 
question furthermore emphasizes the changing way in which children were conceived by 
the Victorians.  No longer was it enough to study as a means of preparing for adulthood:  
in order to realize its full humanity, the child must now “play at games.”  Should the 
child neglect to do this, it runs the risk of losing both its humanity and its individuality by 
becoming the spiritual equivalent of “a coffee grinder.” 
One wonders what to make of Dodgson’s reliance upon games rather than lessons 
as the activity essential to childhood, especially in the context of a remark such as that by 
Berry that, in the Victorian period, the child becomes “the repository for certain valued 
and post-Enlightenment traits such as innocence, liberty, and naturalness” (16).  Of 
course, my focus in previous chapters has been on childhood figures who in many ways 
do not conform to this assertion:  Teufelsdröckh is a bit too much the fire-brand, and 
Charley Hexam too much the self-starter to fit comfortably within the paradigm of 
innocent and natural Victorian children.  Perhaps Jane Eyre is the closest to this 
stereotype: her self-righteousness could at a pinch be described as innocent and inspired 
by a love for a kind of liberty.  What really sets the Alice books apart from these earlier 
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works, however, is their failure to in any way represent Alice as being determined within 
the confines of an educational institution or, in other words, a school.  The Hinterschlags, 
the boarding schools, the pauper schools have disappeared in Alice’s dreamworld, being 
replaced by the fantastic settings of Wonderland and Looking-Glass Land.      
 The shift from lessons to games in Carroll’s imaginative construction of the child, 
then, is accompanied by a simultaneous shift of setting away from the school and towards 
a fairyland environment, one which ironically complements a social transformation in 
England which saw the formation of a consensus about the universal need for schools.  
One must also point out a further shift which complicates an understanding of the kinds 
of aesthetic gestures to which Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking-Glass are committed: unlike the earlier texts which I examined, the Alice books 
invite the attention of children readers, while still attempting to maintain their own status 
as a variety of serious literature.  Compared with books like Jane Eyre, the Alice stories 
involve a double movement of reader and representation:  no longer is the child offered 
only to adult eyes and minds as those repositories of innocence or liberty.  Now that 
construct is offered to children as well, as if to offer to them a representation of their own 
prefigured image.  The books do more, however: by suggesting that the stories be read by 
or with parents, the texts insinuate their idealized version of childhood into the 
conversations and discussions between children and adults.  From this point, children will 
be strongly indoctrinated in their own idealization, and this idealization will no longer 
function merely as a repository of value to be admired by adults.  But this only makes it 
stranger that Carroll’s renderings of children would avoid the school entirely, especially 
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in the face of an increasing participation on the part of the state in family life in the forms 
of welfare and education. 
 In order to address these problems even somewhat satisfactorily it is necessary to 
consider the role which gender plays in Carroll’s construction of childhood innocence—
and it may be the case that innocence in the Victorian context is bound up with notions of 
the corrosive influence of the state.  In an era when female students were not yet admitted 
to Oxford, what does it mean that Carroll imagines Alice in such a way that, though her 
mental powers are continually tested, she is never the subject of formal instruction per 
se?  And why is it that just at the moment when childhood and humanity are defined by 
their engagement in games and play, play takes on such an excruciatingly difficult and 
oftentimes futile visage?  Dodgson was, after all, known for sometimes making children 
cry with his attempts to get them to understand his games and puzzles. 
 On the one hand, it’s obvious that the Alice stories are quite bereft of overtly 
political content:  the fairytale settings and animal characters which crowd the books 
seem to speak of a world unstained by calculations of social advantage or political gain.  
At the same time, however, it’s possible to imagine that very refusal of the political and 
social as itself somewhat indicative of a certain kind of utopian wish around the 
contingencies of the production and institution of childhood.  Childhood, of course, is 
never uninformed by class and other distinctions.  More importantly, there are important 
ways in which the representation of Alice squares with a certain Victorian and 
specifically Arnoldian notion of the best self, the self that remains “when the merely 
social is cut away,” to use Catherin Gallagher’s paraphrase of Arnold in her book The 
Industrial Reformation of English Fiction.   
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Gallagher has provided a convincing argument about the development of a set of 
interrelated ideas around the state, politics, and culture in the late Victorian period, 
especially in the influential writings of Matthew Arnold.  Most students of the Victorian 
era will certainly be familiar with Arnold’s “touchstone” theory of culture, whereby 
culture represents the best that has been thought and said.  The political implications of 
this idea are more obscure.  Arnold’s claim about the failure or the danger of modern 
politics is that it tends simply to replicate the already existent social world:  aristocrats 
vote and legislate according to their selfish interests, as do the middle and working 
classes.  The expansion of franchise, therefore, aside from addressing the problem of 
fairness, simply admits more individuals into a process which encourages self-promotion.  
The problem, as he and James Mill both saw, is that politics doesn’t promote legislation 
in the interests of the nation, but in the interests of the particular individual self.  In order 
to develop a self that can promote the interests of the nation, we need to simultaneously 
develop a best-self, not just an individual self.  That best self, of course, is the self that is 
represented in and through culture.  This equation immediately posits that culture is part 
of a national political project of ameliorating self-interest in the name of the common 
good.  The common political good, in other words, is precisely that culture which is both 
the best that has been thought and said, and the least inclined towards self-interest and the 
promotion of that interest.  Furthermore, the best self is simultaneously the self that is 
most universal and least particular.  This universality then nourishes a “harmony” that is 
the ultimate ideal, whether in politics or culture. 
  Thus the connection between the prevailing cultural and political theory of late 
nineteenth-century Britain and Dodgson’s own peculiar aesthetic commitments.  
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Dodgson’s games provided a kind of Archimedean space in the social world of the late 
Victorian period, imagining a kind of controlled contest between players who might be as 
different as an Oxford don and an eight year old girl but whose differences were less 
important in the context of a game of chess.  As Elizabeth Sewell writes in The Field of 
Nonsense, games “demand enclosure, limitation, and rules,” a set of restraints which the 
middle and upper classes were keen to impose in the era of the Hyde Park riots.  Games 
allowed for interaction without demanding social transparency on the parts of the 
participants, and this arrangement must have been congenial to the capitalist and land-
owning classes during the industrial revolution.  It’s often easier to take people’s money 
and order them about under the protection of anonymity, and this is what the ruling 
orders of Britain frequently strove for in the nineteenth century, as the legacy of Bentham 
suggests. 
In a sense, then, there is continuity between the game and the “disinterested 
reason” which Gallagher explains became one of the leading imperatives of late Victorian 
cultural politics.  In this reading, Dodgson’s work might at first be thought to fit within 
the same frame as the cultural and political theorizing of a Matthew Arnold or a John 
Stuart Mill, both of whom believed in the importance of learning and culture in the realm 
of politics, though in slightly different ways.  For Arnold, culture was to be the training 
proper to preparation for political participation: once one had grasped the lessons of 
culture, one could safely contribute to the governorship of the nation.  Mill took this a 
step further by imagining a political system that allowed for plural representation among 
the learned, admission to such status being procured by education, examination, or 
simultaneous pursuit of specific professions.   
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Furthermore, Dodgson may not have depicted explicitly political content (though 
this changes slightly with Sylvia and Bruno), but this would have been in step with the 
cultural politics of the late Victorian era.  This politics precisely sought to de-emphasize 
its grounding in specific class antagonisms, such as the desire of middle-class reformers 
to control the movement and mingling of working-class bodies, by imagining culture as 
the arena in which the individual self is defaced in favor of something more broadly 
human.  So the depiction of Alice, for example, in a dream world far removed from 
political and material contingencies, absorbed in games, such as croquet and chess, 
determined by more or less universal rules rather than personal idiosyncrasies, would, in 
this light, be very much consistent with the cultural norms of the period. 
All of this would follow were it not for two glaring facts:  first of all, the 
insistence on the feminine personhood of Alice and, secondly, the consistent breaking 
down of the rules which supposedly govern the functioning and life of Wonderland.  I 
have already indicated some of the paradoxes around Alice as a female child in the 
Victorian period—especially the tension between the idea that the child, and perhaps 
especially the female child becomes, in the Victorian period, a highly unique individual 
but also an individual which represents universal humanity.  This is a contradiction which 
Dodgson once again reiterates in the preface to Bruno and Sylvia.  There, Dogson writes 
of “those hours of innocent merriment which are the very life of childhood,” thus 
distinguishing childhood from the work which constitutes mechanical adulthood (280).  
Yet those “hours of merriment,” Dodgson writes, are “not wholly out of harmony with 
the graver cadences of life,” the continuity of youth with age emphasizing the former’s 
universality.   
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 Several scholars, such as Alexander Taylor and Gilles Deleuze,10
 Perhaps more disturbing than the failure of normal rules is the realization that 
some rules are personal and idiosyncratic.  Rather than marking a universalist, 
Archimedean space to be filled with more or less identical subjects, some rules define 
and require subjective alterity.  Obviously, the rules are not the same for Alice as they are 
for the Queen.  Indeed, the rules dictate that the Queen decide who will be beheaded, who 
will play croquet and who will be punished by her court.  The rules also stipulate that 
everyone else must abide by the dictates of the Queen.  This is, naturally, a far step from 
Arnold’s idea of the “best self,” whereby “we are united, impersonal, at harmony” 
(Culture and Anarchy, 73).  Instead, Dodgson has imagined a set of rules that imply 
 have discovered 
the keys to the problems which Alice faces in Wonderland, allowing the reader to 
understand the conditions which must be applied in order to solve them, or at least some 
of them, such as the inversion of d/t=s (where t is time, d is distance, and s is speed) in 
Looking-glass Land.  Of course, in Looking-glass Land, everything appears as in a 
mirror, so that speed is the equivalent of time divided by distance, and, hence, the faster 
one goes, the less distance one travels.  To give another example, one might mention the 
disparity between words and meaning, what Deleuze describes as an inability to “to say 
at the same time something and its meaning” (35), which explains the confusion around 
the difference between what the White Knight’s song is called, what its name is, and 
what it really is.  As a final example, though there are many more, one might adduce the 
bipartite nature of matter, such that it is both “five times as warm, and five times as cold” 
(255) in Looking-glass Land. 
                                                 
10 Taylor’s text is The White Knight:  A Study of C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll); Deleuze’s is The Logic of 
Sense. 
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antagonism and rigid identity.  Along with the repeated frustration of conventional rules, 
then, Dodgson imagines rules which are strictly determined by specific subjectivities and 
identities.   
It is not surprising, therefore, that one finds in Dodgson a kind of cultural and 
intellectual commitment that is apparently at odds with Arnold and Mill’s.  On the one 
hand, it wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to suggest that Dodgson shared with Arnold a 
notion of what Gallagher describes as the “independence of a realm of representation” 
which “justified artificiality per se” (264).  This independence, in Gallagher’s argument, 
ultimately undid the strong commitment of English fiction and writing to social criticism.  
Though I haven’t addressed this strain forthrightly in the present study, focusing as I have 
on learning and cultural power, one can view it in such works as Dickens’s Hard Times 
or Carlyle’s Past and Present.  With the advent of a move toward an aesthetic unmoored 
from strictly social determinants, the argument goes, the critical force of the Condition of 
England Question also subsided.  Of course, one would not expect every work of 
literature to address this question anyway, but Dodgson’s Alice books are about as far 
away from it as can be, at least on the surface. 
 Nonetheless, in reading Dodgson, one doesn’t really get the sense that he entirely 
shares Arnold’s strictures about the role of culture vis-à-vis the individual and the state.  
One might say that Dodgson doesn’t share Arnold’s sense of historicity, or to put it 
slightly differently, one might say that he doesn’t share Arnold’s sense of the importance 
of the past.  This is an aspect of Arnold’s argument in Culture and Anarchy which 
Gallagher does not trouble much to attend to, though it very much forms one of the main 
components of his discussion of culture.  If culture is to take us out of our “ordinary 
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selves” (Culture and Anarchy 78), it is first and foremost through the historical forms of 
establishment institutions, such as “a Church which is historical as the State itself is 
historical, and whose order, ceremonies, and monuments reach . . . far beyond any fancies 
and devisings of ours” (11, emphasis added).  This, ultimately, is the core of Arnold’s 
argument, which derives so much of its formative material from religious metaphors.  
The imperative for the English to subside in their Hebraizing in order to Hellenize is a 
call to de-emphasize individual—that is to say, presentist—ad-hoc attempts at social life 
and politics and instead study and learn about historical, collective forms.  Even the 
Arnoldian dictum that culture is the record of the best that has been thought and said has 
a distinctively historical orientation. 
 Of course, there was a presentism to Arnold’s book as well, in so far as “contact 
with the main stream of human life” was meant to be a remedy for the political instability 
which Arnold detected in such events as the Hyde Park riots of 1866.  Interestingly 
enough, however, Dodgson’s notions of culture, or at least of authorship, seemed to 
provide a more compelling invocation of the new in relation to culture, or at least 
authorship.  This idea of the new was not exactly a form of presentism, much less 
futurism, but it did strongly resonate with the cultural ambiguity of the 1860’s, which saw 
the death of Palmerston and the end of the Whig ascendancy which his death seemingly 
presaged.  Further adding to the uncertainty of the moment was the fact that, as 
Humphrey Carpenter writes in Secret Gardens, “the two great religious spearheads of the 
nineteenth century, the Evangelicals and the Oxford Movement, were losing their original 
force.”  The political and religious stagnation of the period doubtless contributed to a 
sense of lapsed conviction within the ideological spectrum as a whole.   
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 Dodgsons’s response to this seemingly amorphous cultural environment was a bit 
different from Arnold’s.  Dodgson had, for one, a slightly different take on the role of 
genius in the creation of culture in the post-Palmerston era.  For Arnold, we will 
remember, the culture to which he aspired took men out of class standing altogether, 
creating instead a kind of universal, if deracinated, human:  “so far as a man has genius 
he tends to take himself out of the category of class altogether, and to become simply a 
man” (73).  Of course, one can immediately throw the supposed impartiality of Arnold’s 
conception into question by pointing out that it was typically the upper class which had 
access to the kinds of intellectual productions which qualified, for him, as culture (though 
there are numerous important exceptions to this rule).  It’s also possible that Arnold 
provides an early example of a rather effective attempt at depoliticizing culture and, 
because culture was to become synonymous with the state, politics along with it.11
 Dodgson, on the other hand, inhabits a standpoint that is less generous than 
Arnold’s but more realistic.  In recalling the “genesis” of Sylvia and Bruno, Dodgson 
compares that work with the earlier Alice books and reveals what he considers to be “the 
hardest thing in all literature”: namely, “to write anything original” (the irony of the 
distinctively working class valuation of the “hardest thing” should not go unremarked) 
(279).  But he also suggests that the conditions of production typical of the working 
classes can never lead to the production of genius.  He explains that he could write a book 
“straight off, page by page” 
 
 If I were in the unfortunate position (for I do hold it to be a real misfortune) of 
being obliged to produce a given amount of fiction in a given time that I could 
                                                 
11 See Wang Hui, p. 691, for a fuller description of “the ideology of depoliticization,” though in a 
sometimes different context.   
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‘fulfil’ my task, and produce my ‘tale of bricks,’ as other slaves have done.  One 
thing at any rate I could guarantee as to the story so produced—that it should be 
utterly commonplace, should contain no new ideas whatever . . . 278  
Being under the obligation to produce a certain quantum of work in a given amount of 
time undoubtedly describes the conditions of production of the working classes, even 
though Dodgson uses the word “slaves” (for a description of English social criticism 
which equated the two, see Gallagher’s text).  In other words, the working conditions of 
the working classes, Dodgson suggests, exempted them, tout court from the production of 
new ideas, of culture, and, if one were to follow Arnold’s logic at this point, from 
participation in the state as well.  For if the working classes, because of the conditions 
under which they labored, were unable to contribute to the higher forms of culture, the 
“best that has been thought and said,” surely that meant that they were in some 
fundamental ways unable to escape their class moorings and realize a share of the 
depoliticized state as well. 
Yet, despite their different conceptions of the political bases of culture, both 
Arnold and Dodgson were intellectually invested in the autonomy of the realm of culture.  
At least in the case of Dodgson, this investment in autonomy was undoubtedly tied to the 
class structures which underpinned the very possibilities of his intellectual work.  At the 
same time, as I will demonstrate, this class-determined underpinning had an odd effect on 
the learning which would come to be broadly labeled “the humanities” and on English 
literature specifically.  Readers familiar with the life of Dodgson will of course know that 
his biography saw him move from Rugby, perhaps the most influential public school (as 
it is called in England) of mid-nineteenth century England, to Christ Church at Oxford, 
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one of the pre-eminent hotbeds for producing influential and accomplished men in the 
same period.  As Morton N. Cohen notes in his biography, Lewis Carroll, Christ Church 
in the nineteenth century matriculated many leading figures, including headmasters, 
chancellors, politicians, professors, and critics.  Dodgson himself, of course, was notable 
first of all for his studies in mathematics (at least until several years after Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland was published), though his performance in the classics was 
also consistently excellent.  This academic excellence, however, belied a certain class 
arrangement in the institutions he attended which inflected the status and conceptions of 
the humanities.   
 The great majority of the students at Christ Church College—as well as at 
Rugby—would have come from the aristocratic and upper middle classes, with academic 
enthusiasts like Dodgson being somewhat rare.  This is not to suggest that the students at 
such institutions were unlearned or insincere, but, rather, that the learning which went on 
there was necessarily inflected by class relationships and attitudes within the larger 
society.  As P. W. Musgrave writes in Society and Education in England Since 1800,  
even after the Reform Act of 1832, the English Aristocratic upper class was for 
many years a powerful group.  To members of this class education for their 
children was not needed for any immediate practical purpose, but more to acquire 
social graces.  This was a leisured class of rulers and their leisure was regarded by 
them as one important symbol of their high status. 10   
The Clarendon Commission of 1864 appropriately “criticized the financial structure of 
the [public] schools as corrupt and the quality of their teaching and academic 
achievements as mediocre,” but “it found such drawbacks to be far outweighed by the 
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character-training provided” (46, 47).  Finally, Cohen explains that, at Rugby, where 
Arnold the elder had emphasized the importance of Christian instruction, “moral behavior 
stood above gentlemanly conduct and gentlemanly conduct above intellectual 
achievement” (17).  What this means is that, in spite of the abundant presence of 
intellectual excellence within the stream which ran from the public schools to the ancient 
Universities, there was an emphasis on class cohesion, behavior, and character which had 
curious consequences for the status of learning in Victorian England.   
 One of the consequences was the relative autonomy of humanistic study as 
Dodgson would have encountered it.  There were several components to this autonomy.  
The first was historical and almost identical with the ideal of culture outlined in Culture 
and Anarchy.  Stephens explains that, though there was some curricular reform in the 
period of Arnold’s reign at Rugby, that reform usually meant including mathematics 
(sciences being almost entirely excluded at this point).  Even at Oxford, Dodgson found 
that many of his students had been poorly trained in mathematics at the public schools.  
Classics, on the other hand remained central to the curriculum.  It was a subject “dear to 
the aristocracy, gentry and schoolmasters . . . and were now accepted by the upper middle 
classes as the hallmark of an élite education.”  The fact that the aristocracy and gentry 
favored the classics is important in the cultural politics of the period because it 
demonstrates a kind of class or interest-group solidarity which allowed them to retain 
great influence within the universities and public schools.  The materials which were 
studied in the prestigious universities, furthermore, were likely somewhat removed from 
any social antagonisms which might have existed in the present.   
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 This already suggests the second component of the autonomy of culture: namely, 
the class autonomy of those who had access to culture (Raymond Williams’s theorization 
of a broader notion of culture which includes working-class culture was still decades 
away).  The public school/ancient university matrix was a system which rewarded 
academics by placing them in a structural context analogous in some ways to that of the 
aristocracy and gentry.  As I have noted above, one of the conceits of the upper classes 
was leisure which, in certain contexts, was equivalent to the notion of the independence 
of the Englishman.  Thus, when a dedicated scholar such as Dodgson had attained a 
certain level of achievement, the natural reward was to allow him a living and remove 
nearly all demands upon his activity.  After the 1858 Ordinance, as a Senior Student, 
Dodgson earned “two hundred pounds per annum” (Cohen 42), or nearly twice what an 
engineer who worked six ten-hour days in a week would make over the same period.  The 
position was his to keep for the rest of his life, and he was not required to do anything to 
keep it, except to not marry or do anything egregiously immoral.  “If he wished,” writes 
Cohen, “he might recline in his easy chair, his feet up by the fire, drink his claret, and 
smoke a pipe for the rest of his life” (43).  There could hardly be conditions of cultural 
production more removed from the constraints of class-based social life or the working 
day demands of the laboring classes which Dodgson described in the introduction of 
Sylvie and Bruno.    
 I am not arguing here, necessarily, that Dodgson should have been more sensitive 
to a wider range of the British social strata in his writing, and in fact, there are mentions 
of the Carpenter and other members of the working classes.  Rather, what I am trying to 
interrogate is a certain notion, or implied assumption, about the status of “culture” and 
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certain of its representative works, and the institutional and social structures which 
contributed to this implicit notion.  Though there is a long history of writing in England 
and even of the notion of culture itself, I would venture that the moment of Culture and 
Anarchy, which is roughly coterminous with the moment of Alice, represents a 
particularly influential moment and, furthermore, that it was perhaps the moment the 
paradoxes and formulations of which have most influenced our own era.  I have already 
suggested the ways in which Arnold’s view of culture represents an attempt to de-
politicize it by stripping bare any class-based determinants to it.  Culture is the 
preparation for participation in the state, yet its very operation on the human being is to 
lift him (or her, though not for Arnold) out of his class particularities and enable him to 
govern in the interests, not just of his own class, but of the whole.   
 What I have further attempted to demonstrate is the extent to which Dodgson’s 
own view of genius coincides with Arnold’s but that Dodgson’s structural position within 
the economy and the institutions of education also implied a certain class-based inflection 
of the seemingly neutral realm of culture.  It is compelling, because writing and learning 
had come such a long way from the days of Shakespeare or Johnson, both members 
themselves of something closer to the working and middle classes.  But Dodgson’s mode 
was also markedly different from the almost factory-like production of novels by a 
Walter Scott or, more contemporaneously, a Charles Dickens, though the latter shared 
with Dodgson a certain commitment to the notion of childhood innocence.  In some 
senses, the mode of “genius” which Dodgson pursued, committed to a kind of leisure 
known only by the aristocracy and gentry, should have seemed a great anachronism, 
given the emergence of electoral reform and industrial revolution.  Yet it seems that the 
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opposite is the case.  Indeed, it seems that what Dodgson’s achievement signified, 
instead, was precisely the permeation throughout Victorian cultural institutions of a set of 
aesthetic values that were largely shaped by nostalgia for the staying power of the 
aristocracy.  Even Carlyle’s demand that the aristocracy now work in order to address the 
problems posed by the Condition of England Question had now been replaced by a plea 
for freedom and leisure, as opposed to the conditions of the slave, as the prerequisite for 
works of “genius.”   
 To make explicit what this meant for learning as it was embodied in children’s 
literature, one should remember several things.  And, as a caveat, anyone who thinks the 
influence of Dodgson’s works can be dismissed as simply writing for children should 
consider that, according to Morton, as of 1993 there existed seventy-five editions and 
revisions of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, 
including “play texts, parodies, read-along cassettes, teachers’ guides, audio-language 
studies, coloring books, ‘New Method’ readers, abridgments, learn-to-read story books, 
single-syllable texts, musical renderings, casebooks, and a deluxe edition selling for 
£175” (134-135).  The books “have been translated into over seventy languages,” and he 
claims, though without evidence, that they are the most frequently quoted books “next to 
the Bible and Shakespeare.”  Though the latter claim may, perhaps, be a bit extravagant, 
childhood reading is clearly saturated with Alice and its particular inflections and 
evasions of social and aesthetic convention.   
 One of the things to keep in mind, then, along with the pervasive influence of the 
Alice books, is that it was an amateur, gentlemanly production, the kind of work which 
finds its parallel today in novels published by tenured professors.  But in Dodgson’s case, 
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the circumstances make the work even more intriguing.  Though Arnold’s universalism 
(culture takes us out of our specific class moorings) and autonomy (culture is distinct 
from ordinary political activity) displays some similarities to Dodgson’s notion of genius, 
it is similar most strongly on the point of autonomy, Dodgson being more reticent to 
discount the traditional class biases in the production of English culture.  Thus Dodgson 
could agree on the autonomy that was requisite for real genius, though, unlike Arnold, he 
thought that genius consisted in creating new ideas more than being steeped in the 
cultural heritage of the past.  Dodgson was more concerned than Arnold, obviously, about 
the problem of innovation per se, but he was also aware, it seems, of the difficulties 
associated with the role of the critical faculties in learning.       
 To quote an example pointed to by Morton, in Sylvia and Bruno, Mein Herr 
explains the old method of examination (Dodgson himself opposed the examination 
system at Oxford) and, specifically the case of a rather muddled professor. 
 It was Moral Philosophy that our idol lectured on.  Well, his pupils couldn’t make 
head or tail of it, but they got it all by heart; and when Examination-time came,
 they wrote it down; and the Examiners said ‘Beautiful? What depth!’ 
  ‘But what good was it to the young men afterwards?’ 
  ‘Why, don’t you see?’ replied Mein Herr.  ‘They became teachers in their 
turn, and they said all these things over again; and their pupils wrote it all down; 
and the Examiners accepted it; and nobody had the ghost of an idea what it all 
meant!’ Complete Works of Lewis Carroll 624 
The sequence has a bit of Carrollian impossibility to it, such as the likelihood that 
pupils who had no real understanding of a subject would subsequently become professors 
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in the subject.  Nonetheless, it emphasizes the importance of critical thinking, rather than 
rote memorization, which points to the importance of individuality or uniqueness in his 
theory of artistic production.  The passage, in other words, represents learning in a way 
which is incompatible with simple uniformity.  Critical understanding can’t be 
demonstrated by means of mere memorization and repetition, yet this somewhat 
indefinable understanding is clearly more valuable than rote learning.  Examples such as 
this demonstrate that critical understanding and artistic production, for Dodgson, both 
adhered to the commitment to originality, individuality, and independence.  Indeed, one 
suspects that perhaps part of Dodgson’s antipathy to the examination system arose from 
the limitations which it placed upon the lecturers in terms of uniformity and repetition—
demanding that one perform a given amount of work in a given time, rather than allowing 
the lecturer to explore the byways of mathematical thinking.        
 All of this has curious consequences for Dodgson’s contribution to the conception 
of the world of letters.  On the one hand, Dodgson’s writings can be viewed within the 
larger trajectory of children’s literature, as outlined, for example, by Humphrey Carpenter 
in Secret Gardens:  The Golden Age of Children’s Literature.  This narrative details the 
evolution of writing for children from the fairy-tale to the chapbooks to the “jolly little 
hand-coloured books which were intended simply to amuse young readers”; and then to 
the early Victorian penchant for books of facts meant to instruct, the evangelical tracts, 
and finally to the more escapist literature of the later part of the century to which the 
Alice books belong, informed by a felt need to escape the financial and social difficulties 
of the period in favor of a happy image of childhood.   
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At the same time, however, literary productions, and Dodgson’s in particular, are 
sometimes described in modern writing in terms which very much reproduce and 
perpetuate the kinds of aesthetic virtues Dodgson extolled when he talked about genius 
and understanding.  In this context, one might adduce as an example Donald J. Gray’s 
review of The Making of the Alice Books:  Lewis Carroll’s Use of Earlier Children’s 
Literature by Ronald Reichertz.  In fact, this review elucidates quite convincingly the 
staying power of the tension between discourses of originality and discourses of influence 
within Victorian studies and, potentially, within literary culture in general.  In Gray’s 
review, which is of course about a book specifically investigating Carroll’s appropriation 
of earlier forms of literature, Gray is eager to prevent the discourse of influence from 
eclipsing entirely the problem of originality.  Gray explains that the latter sections of 
Reichertz’s book details the earlier “themes and tactics Carroll appropriated, adapted, 
parodied, or otherwise deformed into the original shapes and surfaces of the Alice books.  
‘Original’ is the important word in my sentence” (Victorian Studies 43: 4, 653).  The 
tensions around the competing discourses are so obvious as almost to not require 
elaboration:  while the passage begins describing Carroll’s authorship in a way that might 
lead one to believe that writing is a process of incorporation and appropriation, it ends by 
insisting on the importance of the kind of newness which Dodgson saw as imperative to 
literary genius.  Later in the review, Gray resurrects these ideas in a slightly different way 
by contending that “not the feeble playfulness of Carroll’s imitators . . . holds the surprise 
and polish and resonant mystery of any passage of the Alice books.”  Here, the reviewer 
is more insistent that imitation equates to a kind of feebleness in authorship and that 
artistic value is a function of “surprise” (newness again), but also “polish” (a genteel 
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quality) and “mystery.”  In this context, “mystery” surely implies that aura of artistic 
depth which simply can’t be produced by mechanical repetition.  Thus Dodgson, 
concludes Gray, “was a very good writer who used the repertoire of his predecessors to 
create effects that they quite literally could not imagine.”         
 Interestingly enough, this set of aesthetic commitments has come under closer 
scrutiny in more recent discussions about the legacy of Victorian culture.  In Cultivating 
Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic,  David Wayne Thomas has outlined a 
contemporary intellectual and academic situation in which post-modern sensibilities have 
threatened to undo the aesthetic conceits of Victorian liberalism.  While I want to stress 
that I can’t do justice to the length and complexity of Thomas’s text and that I don’t wish 
liberalism to stand in for Victorian culture tout court, I think it fascinating to examine the 
extent to which Carroll’s invocation of aesthetics and learning fits within the matrix 
described by Thomas, as well as those moments where the former throws the latter into 
doubt.   
 
To conclude my discussion, then, I will rehearse the situation as Thomas 
describes it.  Thomas observes a desire on the part of scholars and theorists to return to 
questions of aesthetics “without resorting to a neoconservative nostalgia for a dubiously 
conceived golden era of appreciation” (ix).  Thomas then outlines the immediate task 
which this desire implies, noting that one problem stems from “a prevailing hermeneutics 
of suspicion” which “has so foreclosed on projects of appreciation that readings in 
literature and the arts have gradually become flattened or routine.”  Immediately one 
senses here that the framing of the problem and its surrounding debate adheres to the very 
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problems which also determined Carroll’s figuration of genius:  criticism, or “readings” 
are beginning to display that characteristic of slavish as opposed to creative work by 
becoming “routine,” while simultaneously being drained of their organic content and 
depth by becoming “flattened.”  Once again, we are reminded of the unity of critical and 
authorial tasks, both being informed by a discourse of creative freedom and originality.   
Furthermore, for Thomas, this critical impasse correctly necessitates a return to 
and an examination of the correlation between Victorian liberal culture and aesthetic 
production, especially around the idea of freedom and self-determination.  He writes that 
his “linkage of aesthetic culture and liberal culture is premised on a point of 
methodological critique:  to affirm the integrity and the importance of aesthetic 
experience, we must invoke, at least implicitly, the idea of self-reflecting individuality 
that informs liberalism’s conception of agency and autonomy.”  While he urges the 
importance of analyzing this nexus of culture and aesthetics, Thomas also acknowledges 
that, currently, “liberalism’s distinctive commitment to rational autonomy is widely 
understood to encode a baleful atomistic individualism and to perpetuate dominant 
interests of gender, class, race, and nation.”  I will interrogate further some of Thomas’s 
claims about liberal Victorian culture and aesthetics in the hopes that they will illuminate 
several dimensions of Carroll’s works, especially around the role of cultivation, to use 
Thomas’s term, in the contexts of Carroll’s model of artistic production and the cultural 
politics which informed that production.  Importantly, Thomas reminds us of the 
historical context of the years around the Second Reform Bill, which were precisely the 
era of the composition of the Alice books.  Thomas remarks that it was an era marked by 
“a remarkable array of liberalizing legislative acts,” including acts which “affected higher 
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and elementary education, the civil service, the army, trades unions, the rights of Irish 
Catholics, and much more” (27).   
I don’t necessarily want to suggest that a figure like Carroll fully embraced or, 
more strongly, epitomized, the essential Victorian liberal intellectual—that designation 
might apply to an Arnold, an Eliot, or perhaps a Darwin.  What I do want to argue, 
however, is that Carroll undoubtedly had to struggle with the problems which liberalism 
represented and that liberalism undoubtedly informed the ways in which Carroll both 
represented and failed to represent learning.  In order to do so, I first need to summarize 
one of the distinctions which Thomas makes about kinds or modes of aesthetic and 
cultural liberalism, a distinction between “regulative” and “substantive” liberalism, and I 
need to explain what this distinction implies about liberalism sui generis (14).  To 
summarize what is not a complicated distinction, “regulative” thinking, including 
regulative liberal thinking defines “how” we think, whereas “substantive” thinking 
defines “what” we think about—in other words regulative refers to form and pattern, 
while substantive refers to content.  Though it seems almost obligatory at the present 
juncture to pontificate on the inseparability of form and content, it is worthwhile to keep 
in mind the importance of the distinction when it comes to the particular question of 
Victorian liberal culture.  This is because the nomination of a particular content—the 
what—of liberal thought highlights the way in which this content is, in fact, often empty.  
Furthermore, it begins to demonstrate the connection between the form of liberalism, 
which is simultaneously universalist and atomistic, and the emptiness of its content.  To 
clarify, much of the liberal tendency, at least in Thomas’s view, is encapsulated in the 
famous Kantian dictum about behaving in a manner that is consistent with the way in 
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which everyone should behave in similar circumstances.  This dictum, however, is the 
antithesis of critical reason:  it suggests band-waggoning be considered a legitimate moral 
precept.  More to the point, even if we elide the question of merely swimming with the 
stream, we also must confront the problem that Kant’s dictum, the categorical imperative, 
erases all individual differences while also ignoring the very possibility upon which 
liberal aesthetics is founded:  the emergence of the new and of new moral conditions.  
This structural emptiness will become important as we look more closely at liberalism’s 
construction of difference and its precarious position vis-à-vis subjectivities which are 
not normatively masculine.   
 In the meanwhile, to dispense with Kant, one must remember the psychological 
drama Kant imagines operating in his categorical imperative, whereby the moral subject 
must ask himself—that is, must regulate himself by asking—whether his proposed action 
conforms to the dictates of the moral community, thereby making a law of his own will.  
This process describes precisely the contradictory nature of liberal morality, where law 
and its implied regulation are constantly crossing paths with what would appear to be the 
opposite of law, namely free will.  In asking whether what one proposes is reasonable 
according to the consensus of other, anonymous, moral agents, one is positing what 
Thomas, following Thomas Nagel, denominates “the view from nowhere”—that is, one 
must first of all displace all of the characteristics which make an individual unique, 
considerations which in early eras would have been foremost in ethical considerations.  In 
the aristocratic era of stringent hierarchy, decisions—whether they qualified as moral or 
not can be debated—rested largely on the rights and responsibilities which obtained 
between distinctly defined subjectivities—those between peasant and landlord, between 
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master and apprentice, between parent and child, or between husband and wife.  Though 
it would be wrong to contend that the rules regulating behavior between such constituents 
were never contested, or that such relations entirely disappeared with the advent of the 
industrial revolution, it still is the case that the heavy emphasis placed upon the universal 
subject in moral reasoning was a fairly new development.   
Thus it was that a seemingly new ideal of ethical self-regulation came into being.  
“At issue,” writes Thomas, “is whether this liberal agency—even when understood as a 
view from nowhere amounts to a coherent and historically powerful regulative ambition, 
sustained through what is perhaps modernity’s most fundamental element in cultivation:  
self-reflective agency” (12).  Furthermore, Thomas recounts the way that liberalism’s 
moral subjectivity requires, along with stringent self-reflection, the ability to conform the 
behavior resulting from such regulation to beneficence towards others.  Quoting Maria H. 
Morales, he notes that one version of liberalism, John Stuart Mill’s, “requires a certain 
kind of person:  the kind who can develop concerns with the good of others and can learn 
to take an active interest in sympathetic associations” (11).  It is precisely the importance 
within Victorian liberal morality given both to self-regulation and to sympathetic 
association that marks it as a form of subjectivity highly relevant to the Alice books.   
 
I would suggest that the many invocations in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
alone of concerns for social propriety are examples of the kind of domestic, individual 
morality encapsulated by liberalism.  When the Duchess’s Footman looks at the sky 
while speaking, Alice finds this “decidedly uncivil” (65).  She’s unsure “whether it was 
good manners for her to speak first” to the Duchess.  Alice speaks “very politely” about 
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the Cheshire Cat.  She reminds the pig-boy that grunting is “‘not at all a proper way of 
expressing yourself’” (70), and so on, throughout the text.  These examples doubtlessly 
tend to trivialize morality by placing it in such childish and personal terms, but that is 
probably the exact point of those who criticize liberal morality for its disavowal of 
contentious, collective politics. 
Be that as it may, my present task is to elaborate upon some of the contradictions 
around liberal agency, especially those regarding notions of rules and individuality and 
the way these notions were articulated in the era of liberalism.  In his 1861 tract, 
Education:  Intellectual, Moral, and Physical, Herbert Spencer drew attention to the 
developing social attitudes of the period and their connection to education.  In fact, he 
takes the determinism of education by the social to be a given:  “there cannot fail to be a 
relationship between the successive systems of education, and the successive social states 
with which they have co-existed” (94).  In terms of his own era, Spencer describes the 
relevant developments in terms that by now have become familiar in our discussion of 
Victorian liberal aesthetics and culture.  He notes that “now that Protestantism has gained 
for adults a right of private judgment and established the practice of appealing to reason, 
there is harmony in the change that has made juvenile instruction a process of exposition 
addressed to the understanding.”  In this excerpt, we are reminded of the faults which 
Carroll found in the examinations given by his professor of moral philosophy and which 
stood for learning by rote generally:  the failure of such learning to address the 
understanding of the pupil.  The new emphasis on the understanding represents a new 
understanding of learning in general, one which is connected simultaneously to notions of 
individual conscience and originality in aesthetic production.   
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It may be useful at this point to anticipate the objections of those who will 
remember Cohen’s description of Carroll as “a sharp portrait of an age” (197), or, in 
other words, a typically conservative Victorian for whom “ritual was all.”  But one 
mustn’t make too much of the label conservative, as conservative and liberal were not yet 
the political and cultural antitheses which they are commonly regarded today.  Indeed, 
the fact that today personal responsibility is perhaps a dominant feature more of 
conservatism than of liberalism, at least in the United States, is indicative of an evolution 
whereby personal conscience has undergone a shift in political and cultural valence.  But 
the fact of liberal elements within Carroll’s thinking was not lost on Harvey Darton, who 
wrote that Alice represented “liberty of thought in children’s books” (in Carpenter, 68).  
In any event, I am less interested in defining any political creed to which Carroll may 
have subscribed than I am in exploring a cultural matrix to which he responded.  That 
matrix, of course, is Victorian cultural liberalism. 
Carroll’s invocation of the child figure within that matrix remains problematic, 
and I fear that, rather than arriving at some decisive conclusions regarding the child 
figure, learning, and Victorian cultural liberalism, I have only begun to adequately 
describe some of the many problems which inhabit that matrix.  Indeed, the very figure of 
the child in some ways seems to resist the notion of liberal cultivation, which is one of 
the formulations of the culture which David Wayne Thomas views as “liberal.”  As a 
subjectivity undergoing development and vulnerable to tantrums, the child seems an 
unlikely means of representing the self-regulating conscience essential to liberal 
subjectivity.  At the same time, I would suggest that the valences of originality, 
sympathy, and spontaneity with which Carroll’s works fill the position of the child are, in 
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many ways, entirely consistent with the liberal notions of both culture and personhood 
which developed in the second half of the nineteenth century.  I wish to push this set of 
problems even one step further and ask about the relationship between the girl figure and 
liberal culture in Carroll’s works.   
One of the problems which has emerged in this exploration is precisely the 
problem of the individual and of individual conscience and consciousness, which forms a 
central piece of David Wayne Thomas’s discussion of liberal culture, especially around 
the theme of the “self-reflective agency.”  Herbert Spencer, as I noted above, saw this 
kind of agency as of a piece with the developments of the modern era, “when we are 
learning that there is much more self-regulation in things than was supposed; that labor, 
and commerce, and agriculture, and navigation can do better without management than 
with it” (96).  Besides being an apologetics for laissez-faire political economy, of course, 
Herbert’s text had the curious effect of assuring us that the principles of self-regulation 
could not be extended to education and to the family.  In the matter of raising children it 
is not possible that “each may be trusted, by self-instruction to fit himself, or herself for 
the office of parent” (170).  Indeed, “not only is the need for such self-instruction [in 
parenting] unrecognized, but the complexity of the subject renders it the one of all others 
in which self-instruction is least likely to succeed.”  Thus Herbert assures, it would 
appear, that child raising is an art more complicated than directing the industry of the 
nation.  We have moved a great distance from Carlyle, who viewed learning as one way 
of licensing men precisely to manage the work of the nation, and have arrived at an 
insistence on the equation of the learning and the child.  Simultaneously, we must 
observe the paradox whereby liberal culture, dependent as it is upon a discourse of 
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individual determination and autonomy, in fact itself produces a great number of rules for 
social control and social behavior.  This is, after all, the era of Bentham and Mill. 
There is, however, something more important about personal conscience in the 
way it has come full circle in some discussions about Lewis Carroll himself.  It would be 
interesting to contrast the way that an earlier Victorian, such as Carlyle, represents the 
individuality of his great men with the way later Victorians, beginning as early as Brontë 
and continuing through Eliot, represent the supposedly less heroic individuality of their 
subjects.  Carlyle’s heroes are more intensely unique, less socialized, and more awesome.  
The more or less every-day psychologies which come to be standard later in the period 
are largely absent in Carlyle.  No doubt, there was still the mysterious commingling of 
human spirits, away from the dull mechanical repetition of the industrial factory, but 
those moments are sparse compared with the social criticism which is the raison d’etre of 
Sartor Resartus.   
But when it comes to Lewis Carroll, it’s almost as if we take him at his word 
when he implies, as he seems to do in the “Preface” to Sylvia and Bruno, that in order to 
understand the nature of his artistic creations, we need to first of all acknowledge that it 
was produced under conditions of aesthetic autonomy and originality.  This historically 
determined discourse is apparent in, for example, the review by Donald J. Gray, but it 
also plays a role in U. C. Knoepflmacher’s Ventures into Childland:  Victorians, Fairy 
Tales and Femininity.  In this latter work, the analysis of “femininity” takes the guise, at 
least in the sections on Carroll’s work, of the narrative of Carroll’s own struggle with his 
ambivalent desires around the biographical Alice Liddell, the daughter of the dean of 
Oxford.  This psychological struggle ends, tentatively, with the destruction of his own 
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self-representation in the Humpty Dumpty character, whose “shattering fall signifies 
Carroll’s willed destruction of a madness he no longer finds himself able, or willing, to 
sustain” (219).  One might perhaps lament the development whereby the internal 
psychological events of an author have come to be of central importance to scholars.  But 
this is precisely the point:  there seems to be no escaping the historical conditions of 
literary production which place so much pressure on the individual mind of the author as 
a precondition for the genuinely aesthetic and as an ideal of learning. 
 The ideal of autonomy, then, has come to play a more or less determining role in 
the readings of Carroll’s, and I must admit that part of my project in this chapter has been 
to articulate some possibilities for escaping the enclosure implied by the idea of aesthetic 
autonomy.  In order to so, I have tried to throw into question the status of that organon of 
liberal aesthetics and cultivation, the “genius” whose “true sense,” according to that 
eminent Victorian liberal, John Stuart Mill, is “originality in thought and action” (in 
Thomas, 30).  I will conclude by way of mentioning that, even though Carroll is by no 
means the perfect representative of what we might call Victorian cultural liberalism, his 
representation of the girl figure in the Alice books is inextricably bound up with that 
liberalism’s discourse about autonomy and learning. 
In order to rearticulate this point once more, it is helpful to turn to a text the aim 
of which is somewhat more broadly cultural than Knoepflmacher’s, namely James R. 
Kincaid’s Child-Loving:  The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture.  Drawing upon the 
groundbreaking work of the sociological historian Phillipe Ariès, Kincaid notes that 
“prior to the eighteenth century, says Ariès, nobody worried about soiling childish 
innocence because ‘nobody thought that this innocence really existed.’  Now, however, 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE MOMENT OF ALICE 
210 
  
 
 
the notion that the child was innocent, valuable, and weak became common” (72).  Thus 
the convocation of such bodies as The National Purity Congress in the nineteenth 
century.  Kincaid is particularly insightful in noting “that innocence is a faculty needed 
not at all by the child but very badly by the adult who put it there in the first place” (73).  
Ironically, this need for innocence in the child is part of a larger matrix whereby the 
author continually inserts himself or herself into the position of the child, or whose 
subjectivity blurs with that of the child in representation.  In the process, the adult takes 
on the role of the “true child,” while the child herself becomes a “false child.”  “Using 
Lewis Carroll as a familiar example,” writes Kincaid, “one might say that Alice plays 
brilliantly her false-child role, never is a true child, never responds to Carroll himself 
when he enters as a true child, as the Dodo, gnat, or White Knight.  We do, thus, get a 
strong sense of a true child in these books. . . . but that true child is not Alice” (196).  It 
is, instead, Lewis Carroll himself, of course.   
 I cannot claim that Carroll’s Alice books represent a quintessentially liberal 
moment in Victorian cultural politics.  I do contend, however, that his particular 
configuration of genius as autonomous, and “genuine,” were consistent with predominate 
conceptions of aesthetic production and moral life in the Victorian period, and that these 
tenants have been nominated as “liberal.”  And there seems to be something about the 
representation of the girl in Carroll’s work that is also consistent with a liberal Victorian 
concern that government and aesthetics be autonomous from the political life of English 
society.  Ultimately, the notion of authorship which informs Carroll’s critical 
understanding of his own works subscribed to the deep mystery of human conscience, 
feeling, and character which was simultaneously an ideal of learning, particularly 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE MOMENT OF ALICE 
211 
  
 
 
humanistic learning by the latter half of the period.  Thus, in explaining his Alice books, 
he wrote 
  The why of those books cannot, and need not, be put into words.  Those 
for whom a child’s mind is a sealed book, and who see no divinity in a child’s 
smile would read such words in vain; while for any one who has ever loved one 
true child, no words are needed.  For he will have known the awe that falls on one 
in the presence of a sprit fresh from God’s hands, on whom no shadow of sin, and 
but the outermost fringe of the shadow of sorrow, has yet fallen.  Complete Works 
of Lewis Carroll, 8   
Of course, it’s telling that in order to represent the ideal, the “true child,” Carroll decided 
upon a decidedly upper-class female, rather than the little, stunted chimney sweep, “the 
lower class child” who “is wasted by typhus, ripped apart with cancer of the scrotum” 
(Kincaid, 82).  The preference for the upper-class girl as the figure most representative of 
childhood, and for childhood as the figure most representative of innocence and 
originality, and finally, for that genius represented by innocence and originality as the 
uppermost aesthetic concern for Carroll, represents a problem incisive to Victorian liberal 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
The Fateful Strength of Metaphors:  Middlemarch and Intellectual Passion 
  
With George Eliot’s Middlemarch, one moves to a perspective decidedly different 
from that of the Alice books: the girls have grown up to become young ladies and there 
is, indeed, a maturation and an expectation of adult life.  Nonetheless, the preoccupation 
with a gendered perspective remains and, once again, this preoccupation relates to an 
inflection or an iteration of the idea of learning in the Victorian period.  I hesitate to 
suggest that what we observe in the textual examples I have adduced, along with the 
present one—the last in my study—form something like an evolution of literary 
representations of learning.  There are changes and continuities between all of the works I 
have chosen, but the changes aren’t generally smooth, and they don’t form an obviously 
recognizable pattern.  They all have their quirks, as it were.  Furthermore, they don’t 
epitomize a decade:  Sartor Resartus is likely not a work representative of the 1830’s as a 
whole, nor can the Alice books necessarily be read as generally indicative of literary 
production in the 1860’s. 
 Yet Middlemarch is a classic, perhaps more so than any other of the texts around 
which I have formed this study.  And from its earliest pages, it concerns itself with 
representative consciousness.  Thus the narrator relates that Dorothea Brooke’s “mind 
was theoretic, and yearned by its nature after some lofty conception of the world which 
might frankly include the parish of Tipton and her own rule of conduct there” (6).  One of 
the tensions of the novel is that which inheres in the seemingly obvious disjuncture 
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between Dorothea’s mind and her situation.  Half-committed to a notion of universal, or 
at least European cosmopolitanism, the novel, in figures such as Dorothea, reveals an 
anxiety about the position of English country society within a world that is becoming, 
potentially at least, more interrelated. 
After describing some of the traits of Dorothea’s stern morality, the narrator 
observes that “such elements in the character of a marriageable girl tends to interfere with 
her lot, and hinder it from being decided according to custom, by good looks, vanity, and 
merely canine affection.”  Evaded in this description of “custom,” but evident in any 
number of passages elsewhere in the book, is its use as a social lubricant for a segment of 
society which is generically parochial and middle class.  The world of Middlemarch—
itself a name suggesting both centrality and puritan resolution—is a world of genteel, 
moneyed, familial relations, where custom dictates much, both in the relationships 
between genders and in socioeconomic status.  Lamenting Mary Garth’s poverty, for 
example, Mrs. Vincy contemplates “if she had some fortune left her—a man marries his 
wife’s relations, and the Garth’s are so poor, and live in such a small way” (66).  Her lack 
of family fortune, in Mrs. Garth’s view, makes Mary likely to become a governess.  Thus 
wealth, custom, occupation, and standing are mutually determining.  Mary’s lack of 
wealth codes her, according to the customs of this genteel and rural society, as a 
candidate for wage labor rather than marriage into a position of greater financial 
independence.   
 This is one of the contexts—perhaps the main context—for understanding the 
function of learning in this novel.  The first marriage of the novel, that between Casaubon 
and Dorothea, promises to satisfy the desires of the latter precisely because it offers her a 
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kind of apprenticeship in the world of scholarship, somewhat removed from the regular 
routine of female domesticity.  Casaubon has undertaken courtship of Dorothea with the 
aim of finding an aid for “his great work—the Key to all Mythologies” (40).  Similarly, it 
is in light of the pursuit of such a work that Dorothea imagines her marriage to him.  The 
match would allow her to fulfill her wish to learn the ancient languages taught to men at 
the old Universities, and those “provinces of masculine knowledge seemed to her a 
standing-ground from which all truth could be seen more truly.”  This masculine 
knowledge, in turn, will fill the gap between Dorothea’s ideals and her convictions.  “As 
it was,” the narrator observes, “she constantly doubted her own conclusions because she 
felt her own ignorance:  how could she be confident that one-roomed cottages [which she 
had contemplated constructing] were not for the glory of God, when men who knew the 
classics appeared to conciliate indifference to the cottages with zeal for the glory?”  With 
the aid of a husband who is also a tutor, such as Casaubon promises to be, Dorothea 
expects to gain certainty about the relative merits of her philanthropy and her learning.  
 The description of knowledge as “masculine” also foreshadows the way in which 
knowledge and learning will frequently be gendered throughout the novel.  For instance, 
when Dorothea’s uncle, Mr. Brooke, pays the newlyweds a visit, he finds that Casaubon 
has begun to teach Dorothea the Greek alphabet.  With typical parataxis, Mr. Brooke 
protests, arguing that “such deep studies, classics, mathematics, that kind of thing, are too 
taxing for a woman” (42).  When Casaubon informs Mr. Brooke that he is teaching her 
“to read the characters simply,” and not, presumably, to understand vocabulary or syntax, 
Mr. Brooke relents, acknowledging that “without understanding, you know—that may 
not be so bad.”  Still, he suggests that a woman should have a measured command of 
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“music, the fine arts, that kind of thing.”  The narrator excuses Dorothea’s ignorance in 
such “domestic music and feminine fine art,” begging “the small tinkling and smearing in 
which they chiefly consisted at that dark period.”   
 Of course, this gendering of learning is not Eliot’s invention:  it was endemic to at 
least a section of Victorian society, and the cases of the Reed sisters and Jane in Jane 
Eyre give partial evidence for this claim.  In Middlemarch, this gendered distinction 
inflects another of the romance plots as well:  that between Rosamond Vincy and Tertius 
Lydgate.  Lydgate, having responded to an invitation from Mr. Vincy to dine at his 
residence, engages Rosamond in conversation after the dinner repast.  When they discuss 
music, Lydgate makes clear the status of music as a largely feminine pursuit which enters 
into the courting and entertaining rituals between the sexes.  On the one hand, he 
“regretted that he had not heard her sing the other day at Stone Court” (102).  He himself 
has not studied music, he reveals, “but the music I don’t know at all, and have no notion 
about, delights me—affects me.”  In brief, it has a function perfectly suited to 
augmenting the attractiveness and ornament of a potential spouse without taxing the 
intellect.   
 This impression is heightened by the narrator’s assertion that Rosamond 
“diligently attended to that perfection of appearance, behaviour, sentiments, and all other 
elegancies, which would find in Lydgate a more adequate admirer than she had yet been 
conscious of” (107).  In a world where the entrance of females into the professional realm 
was highly restricted, marriage could be a highly anxious matter for a young woman such 
as Rosamond.   Learning and aptitude could operate as a sort of enticement into a 
financial arrangement which would have great ramifications for the woman’s material 
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security.  Of course, for Rosamond, there is no great risk of actual penury, and her 
marriage strategies are linked more to a concern for social status than to dire financial 
need, despite the couple’s eventual bankruptcy.  The narrator explicitly links Rosamond’s 
accomplishments to “her own standard of a perfect lady,” which she strives to meet by 
being “active in sketching her landscapes and market-carts and portraits of friends” and 
“in practicing her music.”  The narrator observes further that “she found time also to read 
the best novels, and even the second best, and she knew much poetry by heart.” 
 The benefits or desirability of what must be called, peut de mieux, feminized 
learning is not unanimously endorsed within the narrative of Middlemarch, however.  For 
instance, “Mrs. Plymdale thought that Rosamond had been educated to a ridiculous pitch, 
for what was the use of accomplishments which would all be laid aside as soon as she 
was married?”  Similarly, “her aunt Bulstrode . . . had two sincere wishes for 
Rosamond—that she might show a more serious turn of mind, and that she might meet 
with a husband whose wealth corresponded to her habits.”  Indeed, I would suggest that 
even the inclusion of novel reading as one of Rosamond’s ladylike pursuits establishes a 
level of self-consciousness within Middlemarch that sometimes verges towards criticism 
of the gendered division of learning.   
 One of the ways the novel elaborates a further criticism of the gendered division 
of learning is by comparing, and indeed interchanging, the language used to talk about 
learning and the vocabulary of love.  In introducing some of the background of the 
character Lydgate, the narrator describes a period of voracious reading in Lydgate’s 
youth.  The materials digested during this phase are quite reminiscent of feminine 
reading:  he devours “Rasselas or Gulliver,” along with “Chrysal, or the Adventures of a 
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Guinea” (92).  Finally, “one vacation,” he sets to discover in his guardians’ library some 
work “which might have some freshness for him.”  He opens a volume of “an old 
Cyclopædia” and chances upon an article on anatomy, and “the moment of vocation had 
come.”  His desire for “freshness” had come in the form of “a presentiment of endless 
processes filling the vast spaces planked out of his sight by that wordy ignorance which 
he had supposed to be knowledge.”  In other words, he had become disabused of the 
notion that the (feminine) reading in which he had customarily indulged qualifies as 
knowledge, realizing instead that it is empty verbosity masquerading as learning.  The 
subject of anatomy, on the other hand, represents true, scientific knowledge.  In this 
scene, the narrator discounts her own art in the process of recounting Lydgate’s discovery 
of “an intellectual passion.”  For if well-known authors such as Johnson can be construed 
as “wordy ignorance,” what, one wonders, does that suggest about the status of the 
present narrative vis-à-vis learning?  Is the narrator being ironic in suggesting that 
literature doesn’t convey learning, or is she being appropriately modest by 
acknowledging the real gap between the linguistic and cultural learning associated with 
the subjective field of literature on the one hand and the scientific terrain of falsifiable 
propositions on the other?   
 In the next paragraph, however, this seeming discount of the value of literature as 
learning is bracketed by a metaphor whereby profession is compared to marriage, in a 
move that underlines masculine activity in both.  It is as if marriages, like careers, were 
undertaken at the initiative of solitary men rather than of two individuals.  In this section, 
the narrator asks, “is it due to excess of poetry or of stupidity that we are never weary of 
describing what King James called a woman’s ‘makdom and her fairness,’ never weary 
 MATRICES OF SUBJECTIVITY 
THE FATEFUL STRENGTH OF METAPHORS 
218 
  
 
 
of listening to the twanging of the old Troubadour strings, and are comparatively 
uninterested in that other kind of “makdom and fairnesse” which must be wooed with 
industrious thought and patient renunciation of small desires” i. e., the object of 
intellectual passion? (93).  “In the story of this passion, too,” the narrator asserts, 
expanding the metaphor, “the development varies:  sometimes it is the glorious marriage, 
sometimes frustration and final parting.”  However, in this passage, marriage and 
intellectual passion, or profession, co-exist in a relationship that is more than 
metaphorical:  a bad marriage can issue in professional catastrophe as well.  As the 
narrator observes, “not seldom the catastrophe”—in professional life—“is bound up with 
the other passion, sung by the Troubadours.”   
 On the one hand, the representation of profession—here imagined to be an 
extension of intellectual passion—is cast very much from the perspective of the man.  It 
is an amorous pursuit for the man, rather than a joint undertaking for the couple, and the 
woman occupies a position which allows her to either successfully sanction or frustrate 
the desires which originated with the man.  But the story of love and profession begins, 
ab ovum, with the man.  In this formulation, learning, like the woman, becomes an object 
for the man’s pursuit and, ultimately, either his mastery or his destruction.  The 
feminization of learning, as a passion more or less cognate with a bride, therefore places 
unreasonable burdens on both man and woman. 
 At the same time, however, this emphatic, if peculiar, gendering of learning, and 
the way that it is cast in matrimonial terms is only part of the picture.  Accompanying this 
metaphor is a lengthy discussion of Lydgate’s position on a number of topics of concern 
to the general public in or around 1829, the year in which the novel is set.  For instance, 
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Lydgate is resolved not to sell drugs himself, but to “simply prescribe” medicines.  This 
allows him both to respect the professional arrangement between pharmacists and 
physicians codified in the Apothecaries Act of 1815, as well as to elevate the standing of 
his own profession by separating its practice from that of the “unscrupulous ignorance 
which had taken no degrees.”  In other words, he would follow medical propriety rather 
than share the practice with uncertified herbalists of dispensing both diagnosis and 
medication. 
 The elaboration upon Lydgate’s profession extends, at least momentarily, beyond 
its comparison with marriage and its influence in social and professional standing:  it 
extends to the actual biological research upon which his professional passion operates.  
And this is perhaps the most truly remarkable thing about Eliot’s discussion of learning in 
this novel:  that she is able, as a woman writer of the later Victorian period, to elaborate 
this metaphor between intellectual and romantic passion in a way that ultimately leaves 
the reader wondering whether feminine narrative or masculine science is in fact superior.  
Indeed it’s striking enough that Eliot is able to interweave the history of science with 
scientific or medical analysis with individual and romantic narratives.  But that she is 
able both to interweave science and romance on the metaphorical plane and to 
recapitulate some portion of germ theory, is precisely what makes this part of the novel 
so engrossing.   
 In this early discussion of Lydgate’s professional ambitions—which form a 
central theme of the novel—the narrator explains that Lydgate had come to believe that 
his own interest in “special questions of disease, such as the nature of fever or fevers,” 
drew him to the work of Marie Bichat, a native of the country where Lydgate had studied 
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medicine.  Bichat’s insight was into “that fundamental knowledge of structure” (95).  His 
innovation was to suggest and, one assumes, demonstrate  
that living bodies, fundamentally considered, are not associations of organs which 
can be understood by studying them first apart, and then as it were federally; but 
must be regarded as consisting of certain primary webs or tissues, out of which 
the various organs—brain, heart, lungs, and so on—are compacted, as the various 
accommodations of a house are built up in various proportions of wood, iron, 
stone, brick, zinc, and the rest, each material having its peculiar composition and 
proportions.  95           
The further question, which would not have been possible without Bichat and which 
Lydgate now proposes as that which will organize his own research, asks, “have not these 
structures some common basis from which they have all started, as your sarsnet, gauze, 
net, satin and velvet form the raw cocoon?”  At this point, Eliot has staged a dramatic 
rendition of the progress of Lydgate’s own intellectual pursuits and interests.  But by 
narrating this development in scientific research so insightfully, she has also thrown into 
question the assumed superiority between masculine and feminine intellect.  In fact, she 
suggests that narrative, a somewhat feminine activity, might, in this case at least, be able 
to subsume masculine scientific knowledge within it. 
 Meanwhile, Eliot is also enacting the authorial persona in a way that separates 
itself from typical Victorian femininity.  One might at this juncture counter that Eliot is 
not enacting a feminine authorial perspective at all, and that her nom-de-plume had 
successfully deceived at least the greater part of her readership, who would then mistake 
her for a male writer.  Thus, her attempt at writerly “passing” would have been so 
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successful that it would have preempted any discussion of those consequences which 
follow from her utilization of a feminine narrator.  But whatever the case with her reading 
audience—though there is evidence to suggest that astute readers soon guessed her sex 
correctly—there is textual evidence that she is writing from the point of view of a 
woman, which, it must be admitted, would have been equally an option for a male writer 
(witness Dickens’s Esther in Bleak House).  At any rate, in the same section which 
develops the metaphor of intellectual vocation as a kind of romance, the narrative voice 
observes the process whereby “middle-aged men” who “once meant to shape their own 
deeds and alter the world a little” come to be “shapen after the average and fit to be 
packaged by the gross.”  Thus glory fades, the narrator suggests.  But at this point, the 
metaphor snaps, and love and work are no longer read as analogous.  Instead, the narrator 
pursues the possibility that romantic love may in fact interfere with the pursuit of 
intellectual vocation.  Granted, this possibility is only outlined in the most implicit terms:  
“Nothing more subtle than the process of their gradual change!”  But in the concluding 
sentence of the paragraph, this suggestion becomes nearly unavoidable.  This is also the 
moment when the narrator reveals herself as feminine:  “you and I may have sent some of 
our breath towards infecting them, when we uttered our conforming falsities or drew our 
silly conclusions:  or perhaps it came with the vibrations from a woman’s glance.”  One 
might argue that the choice of saying “a woman’s glance” rather than “our” glance 
suggests a level of ambiguity about the gender of the narrator—indeed it must. But I 
think that the use of the formulation “you and I,” with the consciousness of the novel 
reader coded as female, as well as the use of “them” to refer to (middle-age) men, 
suggests the narrator might be feminine.  This impression is heightened by the turn to the 
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language of “infecting,” whereby romantic entanglement with a woman becomes the 
pretext for the sapping of masculine vitality.   
 The larger point of the hypothesis about a feminine narrator is that it inflects the 
way the reader is invited to construct the possibilities of learning, and especially of 
feminine knowing.  It goes without saying perhaps that Eliot had not reached the point of 
suggesting that marriage is not a suitable fate for a woman.  Indeed, she held the 
institution of marriage in high esteem, as evidence by her insistence that she be called 
Mrs. Lewes to the man with whom she lived.  Even though they were not married, she 
assumed it to be important that they appear to be.  Likewise, in a novel like Middlemarch, 
the narrator (always different, of course, from the author) is concerned with the 
phenomenon of marriage from a perspective that is at least sympathetic to the situation of 
young ladies, at least young upper-class ladies.  But in this context, the novel itself 
becomes a kind of knowledge which, as we have seen above, can actually compete at 
points with more traditionally masculine domains, such as medicine was in the late 
nineteenth century.  Thus, by examining and explaining scientific phenomena and 
scientific research so adroitly, the narrator signifies her distance from a girl like 
Rosamond, who could “adore a man’s pre-eminence without too precise a knowledge of 
what it consisted in” (169).   
Finally, there is a material consciousness of competition on the part of the 
narrator.  Indeed, one could suggest that this consciousness is structurally determined, to 
the extent that it corresponds to changing realities within the socio-economic sphere.  On 
the one hand, the widening of the professional strata of society complemented a greater 
level of female participation within these strata. Yet masculine privileged remained 
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largely intact, and female access to professional participation was restricted to a smaller 
number of professions, and especially teaching.  Thus writing became, for Eliot and some 
others, a sphere in which women could match wits with men.  It also became, as the 
narrative of Middlemarch suggests, an added bargaining chip within what could only be 
called the upper-class marriage market.  If Rosamond’s ignorance of any learning but that 
which serves to “finish” a lady contributes to her frustration of Lydgate’s professional 
vocation, wouldn’t it be better, the narrator seems to suggest, for a woman to be 
thoroughly versed in the habits of mind which allow her to produce high literary art?  
Such a constitution in the part of a female interested in negotiating her own social 
standing would presumably, aside from contributing to the tradition of art, remove the 
dangers of infection incurred by those women given to “conforming falsities” or “silly 
conclusions.”   
At a stroke, the narrator, by virtue of narrative skill alone, raises her esteem both 
as artist and as romantic object.  I don’t want to suggest that the narrator alone somehow 
holds the “truth” of the text and its commentary upon learning.  I do, however, want to be 
careful to try to isolate the particular contingencies of the narrative, along with those of 
other figures in the novel, because I believe such an operation can help to illuminate the 
ways the author attempts to navigate the relative importance of learning, status, and 
gender.  Ultimately, such an operation—of disentangling the separate figures and their 
corresponding plotlines, tends to result in what David Wayne Thomas would call “many-
sidedness,” an aesthetic particular to or typical of mid-Victorian liberalism.  As the name 
implies, this aesthetic is concerned more with heightening the dynamics of a 
philosophical pluralism than with arriving at discrete, irrefutable truths.  Truth, in the 
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guise of multi-sidedness, is instead always a collection of affects, feelings, and 
observations which often collide or contradict one another, but the resulting tensions are 
not meant to be resolved in some higher unity or proof which would disqualify the others.  
Instead, the insights which multi-sidedness enacts and dramatizes can be thought of as in 
some ways parallel to the notion of the enkuklios paidea, a geometrical image of learning 
replete with irresolvable tensions, oppositions, and relationships.  The components of the 
circle continually fall back on each other and contribute to the proliferation of new 
juxtapositions and contrasts.  It is, in the end, a highly rhetorical model of learning which, 
because it is composed of propositions which are not usually quantifiable and thus not 
falsifiable either, serves more to exhibit skill in the learner than finality in the 
conclusions.  In Middlemarch, the cycle of learning serves as the instrument by  means of 
which the narration inserts itself into the novel’s gendered competition. 
If I am correct in identifying multi-sidedness as a prevailing aesthetic conceit of 
Middlemarch, its centrality suggests an uneasy conjunction with what Terry Eagleton, in 
the introduction to Daniel Cottom’s Social Figures: George Eliot, Social History, and 
Literary Representation, calls “the structurally essential marginality of the humanities” 
(ix).  Something of this marginality is evident in the position of the narrator, as well as 
the author, especially in relation to the Rosamond-Lydgate coupling.  On the one hand, 
the narrator’s ability for indirect discourse and her familiarity with persons of many 
walks of life mark her as distinctly learned and elitist.  To know others better than they 
can know themselves is the sign of an arch intelligence, and the narrator displays such 
intelligence when she remarks, for instance that Rosamond “had neither any reason for 
throwing her marriage into distant perspective, nor any pathological studies to divert her 
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mind from that ruminating habit, that inward repetition of looks, words, and phrases 
which makes a large part in the lives of most girls” (106).   
By representing a knowledge of “what makes a large part in the lives of most 
girls,” the narrator expresses a somewhat condescending familiarity—she knows that 
world and that milieu, but she is not of it, precisely because she can articulate an explicit 
understanding of it.  Or, if she is in some sense of that girlish world, she excels its other 
inhabitants with her heightened self-consciousness.  She further elaborates this distance 
between herself and Rosamond by remarking that “in Rosamond’s romance it was not 
necessary to imagine much about the inward life of the hero, or of his serious business in 
the world.”  In other words, unlike the narrator, Rosamond cannot formulate a notion 
adequate to what Lydgate represents at this point in the novel:  namely, self-confident 
and detached masculine knowledge.   
The narrator, on the other hand, has as her prerogative, precisely that power which 
is inherent in the art of storytelling, especially in the mode of high Victorian realism.  She 
knows Lydgate from the inside.  She knows, for instance, that Lydgate “was enamoured 
of that arduous invention which is the very eye of research, provisionally framing its 
object and correcting it to more and more exactness of relation.”  This is of a piece with 
the analysis which I presented above regarding the etiology of fevers; it suggests a 
familiarity, once again, with the object of description.  And, once again, the careful 
description, in this passage, as in others, conveys a certain intimacy on the part of the 
narrator with those regions of scientific capabilities.  The narrator can, to provide another 
instance, speak comfortably of “that agreeable afterglow of excitement when thought 
lapses from examination of a specific object into a suffusive sense of its connections with 
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all the rest of our existence.”  Here, the narrator extends her identification with masculine 
knowing beyond the particular into its relation with the general.   
One might expect a strong continuity between this description of Lydgate and his 
“triumphant delight in his studies” on the one hand and that coeval narration of 
Rosamond’s thoughts on the other.  And indeed, there is in the narration the explicit 
sense that we are in both cases dealing with types, that the narrator is displaying an 
almost zoological understanding of humanity.  Lydgate, too, is placed within his 
appropriate grouping:  he is “like other heroes of science who had nothing but an obscure 
country practice to begin with.”  Yet there is a crucial difference in the way these two 
passages are related:  in the case of Rosamond, the narrator is filling in the wider 
understanding of the world which the former lacks.  True, Lydgate is equally 
misinformed about Rosamond’s social context or, at least, the consequences of marrying 
into that context.  Indeed, the narrator informs us that “each lived in a world of which the 
other knew nothing.”  Yet, the narrator mitigates this depiction of ignorance by placing us 
inside “his mind” when Lydgate makes the comparison between himself and “other 
heroes of science.”  He possesses a degree of self-knowledge which Rosamond 
apparently does not, and he can access that knowledge to form a kind of solidarity 
between himself and others of his sect.  Perhaps most surprisingly, the narrator of the 
novel positions herself—by way of the descriptions which she makes of Lydgate’s 
studies and the ease with which she ventriloquizes his inmost thoughts—as a member of 
that sect as well.   
And yet, of course, we know that she couldn’t have been a member of the ever 
more highly professionalized group of natural scientists and medical doctors that was 
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emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century.  The narrator’s exclusion from 
such a social reality returns us back to Eagleton’s remark about “the structurally essential 
marginality of the humanities.”  Eagleton explains that “the role of the humanities is to 
refine and elaborate the spiritual stock-in-trade of society to a point specialist enough to 
justify their own autonomous existence as professional disciplines, but closely allied 
enough to that empirical wisdom to allow them to appear ideologically acceptable.”  Or 
one might take an earlier moment from the “Forward” as more directly addressing the 
issues I am raising here:  “It is part of the vital role of human discourses within capitalism 
to occupy a modestly marginal position, always conveniently at hand to offer support 
when required to the currently hegemonic models of ‘humanity.’”  One could argue, in 
the case of Middlemarch, that the narrator stands as an allegory for literature, itself in 
turn understood as performing the ideological function of the humanities.  The fact that 
the narrator is gendered feminine simply complicates the operations of seduction and 
desire which, I would contend, are always already implicit in the production of ideology.   
Ideology has the function, not just, as explicators of Althusser are inclined to 
point out, of confirming our intuitions about the way the world works, such that “we have 
the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in the ‘still, small voice of 
conscience’):  ‘That’s obvious!  That’s right!  That’s True’” (Althusser, in Belsey 53).  
Rather, ideology has the function of confirming our desires, which is something slightly 
different.  Ideology has the effect of making us invest in the social totality and of 
believing that it makes sense to do so.  It tells us that the crises (of capitalism or whatever 
existing social system) are only temporary, not fatal, and that we will come out alright on 
the other side.  Of course, the ironic thing about ideology—and precisely its difference 
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from rhetoric, which similarly makes appeals to audiences—is that in a sense, it’s always 
right.  It’s neither a lie nor a proposition—it offers no content which can be reduced to an 
assertion, at least not an assertion which it would make any sense to controvert.  Even 
where ideology is merely a continuous whisper that “it will be all right,” the alternative to 
embracing this assurance is to sanction the death and destruction which form the margins 
of capitalism.  It is this quicksand terrain within the capitalist hegemon which ideology 
serves precisely to hide.  Thus the feminized narrator of a canonical English novel speaks 
in support of a new scientism at the same time that European scientism robs and 
massacres in Asia and Africa.  But of course, I have gone wide of the proper topic of this 
chapter and must return to the (ideological) rules of the game which obstruct such 
connections being made. 
In the more narrowly English context, the operation of ideological support on the 
part of the narrator is necessarily more localized.  Yet it is for all that quite salient.  Thus 
far I have outlined the ways in which the narrator identifies both as a female, even as a 
woman, but also with the scientific knowledge which Lydgate possesses.  One might 
suggest that Eliot was not writing as a woman, but from an ambiguously gendered 
perspective; she does after all adopt a masculine nom de plume.  But I have anticipated 
that argument already with my reading of the passage in which vocation and romance 
become intertwined in a set of metaphors and the narrator speaks of itself as a woman.  In 
any case, if the reading is wrong, it may change some of my bald assertions, but then 
again it may not.  I suspect that the general register of meaning would not greatly alter.  
After all, the narrator, while aligning herself with the power of Lydgate’s knowledge, has 
simultaneously distanced herself from the provinciality of Rosamond’s romanticism.  
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Some of the stakes around the novel’s articulation of a literary ideal become evident as 
we examine the gendered markers of the narrative.  Of course, one of the main markers 
involves gender and the dynamics of gender relationships in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  But this marker is in turn inflected by a whole host of 
complementary markers, such as education:  Lydgate has access to a professional 
education, Rosamond in some senses is ‘above’ such a fate (as compared to, for instance, 
the less affluent Mary Garth).  At the same time, the peculiar system of class demarcation 
becomes a highly important element in the relationship between Rosamond Vincy and 
Tertius Lydgate, among other characters.  Rosamond’s consciousness of rank is one of 
the principal reasons she is attracted to Lydgate.  The narrator reveals that  
the piquant fact about Lydgate [for Rosamond] was his good birth, which 
distinguished him from all Middlemarch admirers, and presented marriage as a 
prospect of rising in rank and getting a little nearer that celestial condition on 
earth in which she would have nothing to do with vulgar people, and perhaps at 
last associate with relatives quite equal to the county people who looked down on 
the Middlemarchers.          
With the last part of the predicate (beginning with “and perhaps at last associate . .  .”) the 
narrator supplies us with one more demarcation which is geographical but which carries 
social connotations:  namely, that of region.  Lydgate’s guardians are aristocrats (“of 
good birth”), and thus are likely associated with a county seat.  Nonetheless, their wealth 
has allowed them to send their ward to metropolitan centers like Paris in order to pursue a 
professional education.  In Rosamond’s mind, this itinerary equates to social prestige, and 
marrying a personage who had traveled, who comes from an aristocratic background, 
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who has the capacity for medical practice, would all be a snub to the small-town milieu in 
which she grew up.  In a moment when the aristocracy still has a great deal of normative 
social power, marriage into it must seem a way of escaping the stigma of a background in 
banking and manufacture, a background becoming stigmatic for an ever smaller social 
stratum.   
 In the event, however, the courtship between these two characters undervalues 
learning entirely, especially in the way that vocation and romance both come to be 
substitute objects of passion.  One can have a passion for vocation or a passion for 
romance, the narrative implies, but keeping the two separate is a sticky business.  At the 
intersection of vocation and passion, a whole series of questions erupt, some silly and 
some revealing, but all of a piece with the (relative) democratization of learning across 
the genders and the anxieties which attended that process.  Chief among these is the new 
order of time to which professional people are obliged to submit:  what will an 
engagement in a romantic relationship mean from the point of view of professional and 
social advancement?  “Certainly,” the narrator explains, “being in love . . . did interfere 
with the diligent use of spare hours which might serve some ‘plodding fellow of a 
German’ to make the great imminent discovery” (217).  Not only the passion and joy of 
discovery but also the evolution of romance itself is placed on the schedule of the work 
week.  The pursuit of learning or vocation according to a fixed, regular habit, must 
necessarily inflect the rest of one’s time as well, and the time which one calls free 
nonetheless is inevitably shaped by the time devoted to earnest labor.  Yet Lydgate 
refuses to accept that if marriage is something other than a nonentity, it too will interfere 
in that ideal of persistent activity to which he has devoted his mental life.  Because he 
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doesn’t prepare for this eventuality, marriage becomes for him just another obstacle to 
work, a small affair to be handled with the familiar strategies of convention and time 
saving.  By becoming another chore, romance shows the insurmountable distance 
between what it should have been and what it is.  Ultimately, the narrator suggests, 
romantic love is incompatible with the passion for learning which Lydgate, like 
Casaubon, possesses in such abundance. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Learning, Realism, And Simulacra 
 
It’s difficult to write about learning and literature in the Victorian period without 
referring to the state.  This difficulty arises because of the long history of the relationship 
between aesthetics and politics which has been a trope of western thought since at least 
the period of classical Greece and Plato’s writings.  In particular, the role of mimesis, 
which reached a kind of crisis in the Victorian period, seems to have thrown into question 
the status of the statesman and the part of the artist, including the literary artist, in the 
republic of letters.  The Victorian era, with notable exceptions, saw an intensified 
commitment to the real and the authentic as aesthetic genres or predispositions precisely 
because they had the capacity to teach.  Writers and readers were partners in a cultural 
enterprise that emphasized and responded to the desire to learn and know.  An adequate 
representation of life could teach because life itself was thought to convey lessons. 
This equation, between life and art, as well as between their respective 
pedagogical purposes, nonetheless raises certain questions about the value of art (or 
literature) with which writers of the period inevitably had to struggle.  What, after all, 
could be the value of literary art when that art depended upon strict adherence to reality 
to achieve its purpose?  Why was the art necessary, or, to put it differently, why wasn’t 
the reality self-sufficient?  Such concerns may have been behind the occasional attempt 
on the part of the Victorian writer to introduce a discourse about the value of parody or
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imitation, in which the original and the authentic are temporarily forgotten in favor of the 
pedagogical values of the simulation.    
In my chapter on Our Mutual Friend, for instance, for example, I read the 
discourse of learning through a lens that takes into account the relationship between 
learning and the reality of credit default in the era of its publication.  The problems of 
value related to the credit crisis form part of what Reginia Gagnier calls the “discourse on 
the relationship of the One to the Many, or the self to society” (265).  When Mr. Boffin 
denominates Bella the “true golden gold,” he is making a claim, perhaps failed or 
utopian, for a value which stands outside of and is immune to the circulation of bad credit 
and bad bills of the sort traded in by Fascination Fledgeby.  This de/nomination, this 
value which is placed upon Bella’s selfhood, and the rejection of the absolute value of 
money which it represents, are elicited through a process of learning whereby Mr. Boffin 
reads and imitates notorious literary misers.  Thus learning serves as the vehicle which 
can reveal models of value and subjectivity which are “true” rather than counterfeit.  But, 
in the process, Dickens found it nonetheless necessary to rely upon parody and imitation 
precisely to undercut them in the end in favor of the authentic.  And the parodic 
continually threatens to resist being put back in its place as a pedagogical foil.    
At the least, it seems inevitable that the text would, at some level, invoke the 
opposites of authenticity.  Duplication, simulacrum, replication, resemblance, all form 
part of the text’s equipage: we can observe this simply in the sheer proliferation of its 
narratives about learning:  Silas Wegg tutors the Boffins, the Boffins tutor Bella, Bradley 
Headstone teaches Charley, Charley himself trains to become a teacher.  Ultimately, the 
success of Bella’s experience with tutoring perhaps says as much about a narrative 
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investment in the perpetuation of inherited property as it does about learning per se.  Thus 
the romance of the novel allows for the continuation of community by reconciling the 
lower middle-class world of clerks with the true bourgeoisie, now intent on pursuing the 
traditionally aristocratic practice of bequeathing wealth to offspring.             
It is likely evident that, in my work for the dissertation, I have drawn attempted to 
make connections between the historical and the aesthetic. I have relied upon, for 
instance, the writings of Hayden White, who urged that literature and history are so 
interconnected that it has become untenable and undesirable to investigate either without 
some sense of the other.  In the book Tropics of Discourse, White offers a depiction of 
annals and the chronicles, which must be differentiated from the history of a given 
period.  In the annals, sometimes a year passes in which nothing is recorded:  it would 
seem nothing had happened.  Furthermore, events are simply that; they are self-contained 
units the causes and effects of which are not explained and are therefore not suffered to 
impact one another.  Finally, there is no meaning ascribed to events in the annals:  the 
king vanquishes the Moors, there is a drought, a nobleman is married.  But what do these 
events mean?  Are they good or bad?  The chronicle and the annals are largely mute on 
these questions.  But White’s insights about the narrative status of history have 
consequences beyond the stipulation that history is a form of literature.  In White’s 
theory, the literary and the historical are mutually inscribed discourses.  And, in the 
telling of cultural history, the value of the poetic cannot be overemphasized. 
Thus my dissertation’s argument, that learning was central to representations of 
selfhood in the Victorian period, attempts to maintain an awareness not only of the 
historical conditions upon which those representations were contingent but also of the 
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ramifications of the literary status of those same representations.  On the historical side of 
the balance sheet, one might say that learning took on a new charge in the nineteenth 
century. Alan Rauch has pointed out that knowledge had become, by the Victorian 
period, something which was coveted by those who feared they might otherwise “fall 
behind.”  Thus there is a sense in which learning played a role as social capital.  Learning 
ironically also had the potential, in the form of scientific knowledge, to produce a unified 
theory of life and experience, one which would no longer be subject to the vagaries of 
mere opinion.  In general, learning represented a new frontier, though one fraught with 
countless anxieties.  One of the anxieties which runs through my chapters has to do with 
politics and the class dynamics which inform politics.  
Don Quixote, that grandfather of modern fiction, has its narrator explain that there 
are four types of narrative (those of the great who remain great, of the great who become 
humble, of the humble who remain humble, and the humble who become great), and it is 
perhaps not surprising that the two main characters of the novel represent narratives of 
change:  Quixote himself descending into humbleness and Panza hoping to rise to 
greatness.  Perhaps this sense of dynamism and change which Cervantes imparts is also 
that which informs the Victorians some two and a half centuries later. Accordingly, one 
trope which is recurrent with regards to learning is antithesis, or opposition.  It is 
antithesis which describes the way literature represents learning in the period, whether it 
be the opposition between near and far, between big and small, between the authentic and 
the imitative, between universal and particular, or between masculine and feminine.   The 
narratives which we prefer are those that represent some change in fortune, and the fact 
that this informs the destinies of literary characters shows how important antithesis is to 
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our expectations of modern literature.  The divergences of signs must, of course, be 
specified in each instance, but their operation according to a logic of antithesis, rather 
than catachresis or mere juxtaposition, is essential because it provides the loci for the 
movement which is so important to subjectivity.   
For instance, the humble see themselves on the pathway to greatness, only to have 
some catastrophe interfere with their plans.  Bradley Headstone seems to be a well-
functioning, if uninteresting, cog in the machine of industrial capitalism, fulfilling his 
duties to the pauper youth: “With his disciplined show, [he is] subdued to the 
performance of his routine educational tricks” (532).  But despite his normative 
appearance, he undergoes an almost complete split in his persona, his wild, nocturnal 
perambulations providing a stark contrast to his scholarly face.  Ultimately, Headstone 
suffers from a passion that, were he not such a lowly character, could be described as 
either romantic or tragic.  But he is nonetheless interesting from the point of view of 
community and authenticity.  I have attempted to argue, or at least be sensitive to, the 
way in which subjectivity is an imagined position within a social community.  But 
Headstone’s narrative underscores the fragile and tenuous nature of community under 
capitalist social relations.  The narrative presents Headstone as someone whose 
background is obscure, but we know that he comes from the pauper class.  It would seem 
that his future is settled—he lives next door to the headmistress of his school, and she 
clearly takes a keen interest in him.  But on this score, the narrative gives in to a mean-
spirited supposition: namely, that paupers, once they have been given an education, won’t 
be happy with their position in life, but will always want more.  They will, in short, 
become wild creatures who will brook no restraint.  Thus, the text seems to voice a worry 
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that learning might represent the end of stability and of community.  Indeed, the historical 
record suggests that transience, disruption, and social dislocation were widely 
experienced phenomena in the period of early industrialization.  The boom and bust 
cycles, the vicissitudes of trade and the international market, and credit crises had 
become well-established facts of life by the nineteenth century.  The romantic imagine of 
a unified nation had been displaced by the antitheses of modern social life.  
Thus have I tried to specify the syntactic link which connects learning and 
subjectivity in the nineteenth century.  But what have I meant by learning? Perhaps like 
all substantive signifiers, learning is a seme the definition of which is “scattered 
throughout discourse.”  I have tried to glean the meaning of learning by examining its 
literary representation in the Victorian period and by examining how those 
representations subside in a context inseparable from such institutions and technologies 
as the charity school, criticism, financial speculation and credit, patrician social mores, 
the novel, and science. I wanted to suggest that learning has some connection to the order 
of discourse, the disciplining of knowledge which Foucault traced from the beginnings of 
modernity.  To Foucault, the archive revealed transpositions of signs in the strata 
constituted by language, value, and life.  Under all of the relationships between 
disciplines, there resides the power of making statements and the form of subjectivity.  In 
my reading of Victorian-era literature, I have attempted to produce a document that owes 
something to Foucault.  There is something of the “anonymity of discourse,” as well as 
something of the “institutional contexts of utterances,” which informed the way I 
conceived the project at hand.  But there was, furthermore, a discourse about how value 
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works and the possibility of simulacrum which worried the writers or motivated them to 
some degree.  
Learning, we will find as we read Victorian texts, is particularly positioned to 
reveal insights both about the individual and the collective in which—even against 
which—the individual seeks to determine his/her selfhood.  Jane rebels against the Reed 
household; Dorothea Brooke finds Tipton to be constraining; and Silas Wegg can’t really 
stand the Boffins, even though he is ever so obsequious.  Central to subjectivity in each 
case is dissatisfaction.  The community is no longer viewed as an eternal resting place: 
society is no longer Aristotelian or Platonic, but Hobbesian:  it is constantly in motion, 
and one of the ways that the characters navigate the changing alliances of modern society 
is by way of learning.  This way of thinking about learning highlights the reality that in 
Victorian literature, learning is often depicted as a means rather than an end, but this is 
consistent with an industrial society that turns people into means as well.  The literature 
of the period often portrays individual experience against a backdrop that is more or less 
historical.  Teufelsdrockh composes his social philosophy in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic wars and the deepening economic crisis of that aftermath.  Jane Eyre pursues 
her position as governess in a mansion whose lord has traded with the colonies.  Bella 
Wilfer imagines the wealth of the empire returning to England for her to purchase.    The 
narratives which tell each character’s story show that the respective character’s individual 
story is bound up with that of a larger collective.    
 But perhaps it is wrong to equate the literary with the individual and the historical 
with the collective.  If I have done so, it is primarily for the purposes of polemic.  The 
more important point for the terms of my argument is that learning—as an experience, 
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possession, or pursuit—shapes the way that selfhood is imagined.  Learning transforms 
Charlie Hexam from a scavenger to a model student.  Even in narratives where learning is 
not itself an indication of transformation, it is highly important:  witness the way in which 
Eugene Wrayburn’s education is central both to his position as a gentleman and to his 
relationship with others of his background, especially Mortimer Lightwood.  
Looking back at the work I have done for this manuscript and the arguments I 
have marshaled in order to make sense of my hypothesis and the texts I have read, it 
seems I have made claims that go beyond the mere assertion that learning shapes 
subjectivity.  We would naturally expect that experiences of learning would inform the 
way characters are described, even when that description is performed by a narrator 
which strives to efface itself.  In the realism which is generally attributed to the early and 
middle Victorian periods, one would expect that narrative recursivity be understated.  
Nonetheless, one of the more compelling questions which I sought to simultaneously 
explore was the role of the literary itself.  Furthermore, it is once again a question of the 
time period and the specific cultural moment represented by nineteenth-century England.  
What difference does literature make in representations of learning and selfhood in the 
Victorian period?  This is a question which can be answered only with a consciousness of 
the way in which knowledge itself was a pressing issue for the Victorians—the desire “to 
know” which Alan Rauch discusses is essential to the role that learning plays in the 
period.  I have followed Rauch and Fredric Jameson to a certain extent by assuming that 
knowledge represents an “ideologeme” and that it is “a concept structured by social and 
cultural forces that recognize the value of the term as a political device” (13).  Of course, 
this recognition of the term’s value may be more or less manifest, but the fact of its status 
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as an ideologeme with some political connotation accounts for the way my project seems 
to digress at a number of points in order to retrace the political and social implications of 
the discourse of learning.   
Thus learning and knowledge are, in my consideration, sites for the elaboration, 
expression, and articulation of power relations.  And this is largely the point of my trying 
to connect learning with subjectivity, for the same power relations which inflect the field 
of learning also constitute the social dimension in which subjectivity and community are 
lived, experienced, and contested.  This concern with power and the way in which I 
imagine subjectivity, finally, reveal something else about my theoretical approach.  I 
would suggest that there are essentially three main approaches to the study of 
subjectivity, each of which can be associated with a primary author.  The first is that of 
Louis Althusser, who saw subjectivity as related to ideology and the state.  In this model, 
the state, through ideology as a material practice, calls forth, interpellates, the subject.  In 
the second approach, that of Jaques Lacan, the subject misrecognizes itself in a symbolic 
order to which it must nonetheless submit.  The subject is here constituted by the gap 
between itself and what it says or the representations it produces.  Both of these models 
are useful and have influenced the way I have approached the question of subjectivity.  
However, they have not provided the main impetus. 
That impetus has been provided by the work of Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, who 
have proposed the possibility of an exterior to the state without, at the same time, 
reverting to a model that is theocentric.  It was Deleuze who named this practice or 
method nomadology.  I deployed this model, which relies heavily on arrangements, 
assemblages, rhizomes, vectors, and lines of flight, in order to think about the 
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connections between learning on the one hand and both subjectivity and micropolitics on 
the other.   
The abandonment of the circle is symbolic of Deleuze’s attempt to overcome 
Platonic ideal forms in thought.  And it is in attempting to come to terms with Plato that 
Deleuze has something to say about subjectivity.  Specifically, regarding the operation of 
simulacra (in which the true claimants are distinguished from the false), 
the one problem which recurs throughout Plato’s philosophy is the problem of 
measuring rivals and selecting claimants.  This problem of distinguishing between 
things and their simulacra within the pseudo-genus or a large species presides 
over his classification of the arts and sciences.  Difference and Repetition 60 
It is in the operation vis-à-vis the claimants that Deleuze parts ways with Plato.  The 
formulation of simulacra calls for a strong reading of difference because it implies 
something different in the cases of Plato and Deleuze.  Deleuze is simply concerned with 
multiplying the quotients of the division, with preserving the claims to participation.  
Plato’s difference distinguishes the true from the false claimants.  Deluze’s difference 
determines the nature of all the claims—that is why, as he says, the division is all on one 
side.  Whereas Plato wants to distinguish between the grounded and the groundless 
claims to participation (in, for instance, the claims to govern men forwarded by the 
statesman on one hand and by the charlatan on the other), Deleuze wants to determine the 
ground for all claimants.  Hopefully, my reliance on such a determination has helped to 
illuminate the way that learning produced or augmented notions of self that were after all, 
highly contradictory. 
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